3PLR – LIGGETT AND MYERS TOBACCO CO V. REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS
POLICY, PRACTICE AND PUBLISHING, LAW REPORTS 3PLR
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LIGGETT AND MYERS TOBACCO CO
V.
HIGH COURT OF LAGOS
10TH MARCH, 1969
SUIT NO. M/163/68
3PLR/1969/65 (HC-L)
BEFORE:
KASSIM, J.
REPRESENTATION
Ogunlami – for the Applicants
Awotesu – for the Respondent
MAIN JUDGEMENT
KASSIM, J.:-
This is an application brought under Section 18(4) of the Trade Marks Act, No. 29 of 1965, for an order that the Registrar of Trade Marks do proceed with the Registration of the applicants’ trade mark “CHESTERFIELD” simpliciter or without any design.
The solicitors for the applicants, Messrs David Garrick & Co., who are trade mark agents, filed with the respondent an application for the registration of the aforementioned trade mark. The applicants are the owners and proprietors of the trade mark “CHESTERFIELD” and Device registered as No. 4046 on the register of trade marks in class 45. The respondent refused to register the trade mark “CHESTERFIELD” without any design on the ground that the word is a geographical name. He heard the applicants’ solicitor but confirmed his refusal to accept the mark for registration under section 9(1) (d) of the Act as being a geographical name in its ordinary signification; and the applicants have, therefore, appealed to this court.
In paragraph 10 of the affidavit sworn to by Mr. Jacob Olu Tomisin, one of the solicitors of the applicants, it is stated that they have regularly used the trade mark on their goods since 1965, that their goods bearing the trade mark are widely used in Nigeria, and that in the minds of the public the said trade mark is associated with their goods. One Mohamed Kamal Maki, a Lebanese, also swore to an affidavit in support of the applicants’ motion and he avers inter alia that he is the proprietor of a firm called Prince Stores which distributes large quantities of cigarettes and tobacco, that the applicants are among their main suppliers of these goods, that their cigarettes and tobacco are labelled “CHESTERFIELD”, and that as soon as he sees the label he knows at once that it is the product and In Magnolia Metal Co’s T.M.S. (1897) 2 Ch. 371 14 R.P.C. 265 at 621, Rigby L.J. says, inter alia, “But in our judgment, the phrase `geographical name’ in section 64(e) ought not, in general, to receive so wide an interpretation. It must, we think, in the absence of special circumstances, be interpreted so as to be in accordance, in some degree, with the general and popular meaning of the words, and a word does not become a geographical name simply because some place upon the earth’s surface has been called by it. For example, we agree with Mr. Justice Kekewich that the word `Monkey’ is not proved to be a geographical name by showing merely that a small but by no means generally known island has been called by that name.” The fact that the letter “M” in the word “Monkey” is capital in this quotation disposes of the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that since the “C” of the “Chesterfield” in the application is not a small one the applicants cannot rely on its dictionary meaning.
I order, therefore, that the application be accepted. See s.18(5) of the Act. In view of Section 51 of the Act, I make no order as to costs.
Application granted
