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17, 18 MARCH, 7 APRIL 1998

[1998] 3 All E.R 74

3PLR/1998/35  (CA)








Murray Rosen QC and Stephen Rubin (instructed by S J Berwin & Co) – for the appellant

Charles Flint QC, Anthony Peto and Andrew Hunter (instructed by Mishcon de Reya) – for the respondent



[Sam Eleanya, Agboola Omolola Oluwafolakemi, Eleanya Kalu Vincent, Eleanya Ugochi Vine]




Practice – Pre-trial or post-judgment relief – Mareva injunction – Plaintiff suspecting breach of order and applying to cross-examine defendant – Whether cross-examination should be allowed – Whether defendant entitled to rely on privilege against self-incrimination.

The plaintiff bank had employed the first defendant, DA, as the manager of its Greek shipping finance business. Allegations were made that bribes had been taken by DA and that the plaintiff had been induced by lies told by him to make loans to third parties to buy two ships at inflated prices. The plaintiff applied ex parte for, and was granted, a Mareva injunction under which DA was required to inform the plaintiff’s solicitors in writing of all his assets. It stated that DA might be entitled to refuse to provide some or all of that information on the grounds that it might incriminate him, but that, in those circumstances, he had to provide the allegedly privileged information to the supervising solicitor who would hold such information to the order of the court. DA swore an affidavit in which he purported to confirm that he had informed the plaintiff’s solicitors of all his assets, save for the `specific assets’ in respect of which he had claimed privilege against self-incrimination. The plaintiff believed that DA had failed to comply with his disclosure and discovery obligations and applied to cross-examine him. The judge allowed DA to be cross-examined and decided to deal with any questions of privilege as they occurred. When the cross-examination commenced, DA stated that he wished to assert his right of privilege against self-incrimination because of the risk of being prosecuted in a criminal court for corruption. The judge directed that he should answer the questions on the grounds that, where the court was concerned with whether a bribe had been taken, the offence was complete when the bribe was taken, so that what had happened to the money was immaterial and nothing that was being asked would increase DA’s existing risk of prosecution. DA appealed.



Held – The test to determine whether a person was entitled to claim privilege was not limited to whether there was an increased risk of prosecution. Rather, a witness was entitled to claim privilege in relation to any piece of information or evidence on which the prosecution might wish to rely in establishing guilt and also on which they might wish to rely in making their decision whether to prosecute or not. In the instant case, the judge had misunderstood the risk which had to be guarded against, ie the provision of evidence which would assist a prosecution and had therefore been incorrect to find that there was no increase in the risk of prosecution and of a successful prosecution. It followed that the claim to privilege should have been upheld. However, although it was only in exceptional circumstances that cross-examination would be ordered on an affidavit sworn pursuant to a Mareva injunction, as the plaintiff had justified concerns as to whether there had been breaches of the injunction, the judge had been right to rule that some cross-examination should be allowed. Accordingly, the appeal would be allowed against the judge’s ruling on the claim to privilege, but dismissed against the ruling to allow cross-examination

Dictum of Staughton LJ in Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola UEE v Lundqvist [1990] 3 All ER 283 at 292 applied.

Cases referred to in judgments

Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden (1993) 31 NSWLR 412, NSW CA.

Bayer AG v Winter (No 2) [1986] 2 All ER 43, [1986] 1 WLR 540.

Brebner v Perry [1961] SASR 177, S Aust SC.

BTR Engineering (Australia) Ltd (formerly Borg-Warner Australia Ltd) v Patterson (1990) 20 NSWLR 724, NSW Commercial Division.

Cobra Golf Ltd v Rata [1997] 2 All ER 150, [1998] Ch 109, [1997] 2 WLR 629.

House of Spring Gardens Ltd v Waite [1985] FSR 173, CA.

IBM United Kingdom Ltd v Prima Data International Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 748, [1994] 1 WLR 719.

Istel (A T & T) Ltd v Tully [1992] 3 All ER 523, [1993] AC 45, [1992] 3 WLR 344, HL.

Jackson v Gamble [1983] 1 VR 552, Vic SC.

Khan v Khan [1982] 2 All ER 60, [1982] 1 WLR 513, CA.

Paxton v Douglas (1809) 16 Ves 239, 33 ER 975.

Paxton v Douglas (1812) 19 Ves 225, 34 ER 502.

R v Armagh Justices (1883) 18 Ir LTR 2, Ir QBD.

R v Boyes (1861) 1 B & S 311, 121 ER 730.

Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre [1981] 2 All ER 76, [1982] AC 380, [1981] 2 WLR 668, HL; affg [1980] 2 All ER 273, [1982] AC 380, [1980] 3 WLR 487, CA.

Reynolds, Ex p, re Reynolds (1882) 20 Ch D 294.

Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp, RTZ Services Ltd v Westinghouse Electric Corp [1978] 1 All ER 434, [1978] AC 547, [1978] 2 WLR 81, HL;

Saunders v UK (1997) 2 BHRC 358, ECt HR.

Short v Mercier (1851) 3 Mac & G 205, 20 LJ Ch 289, 42 ER 239, LC.

Smith v R (1991) 25 NSWLR 1, NSW CA.

Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola UEE v Lundqvist [1990] 3 All ER 283, [1991] 2 QB 310, [1991] 2 WLR 280, CA.

Sorby v Commonwealth of Australia (1983) 152 CLR 281, Aust HC.

Tate Access Floors Inc v Boswell [1990] 3 All ER 303, [1991] Ch 512, [1991] 2 WLR 304.

Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd [1939] 2 All ER 613, [1939] 2 KB 395, CA.

Yukong Line Ltd of Korea v Rendsburg Investments Corp of Liberia [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 604.

Cases also cited or referred to in skeleton arguments

Allhusen v Labouchere (1878) 3 QBD 654.

Bekhor (A J) & Co Ltd v Bilton [1981] 2 All ER 565, [1981] QB 923, CA.

Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd [1942] 2 All ER 187, [1942] 2 KB 253, CA.

Fisher v Owen (1878) 8 Ch D 645.

Hadmor Productions Ltd v Hamilton [1982] 1 All ER 1042, [1983] 1 AC 191, HL.

Lloyds Bank plc v Smith (6 February 1992, unreported), QBD.

Ministry of Defence v Foxley [1995] CA Transcript 266.

Interlocutory appeal

7 April 1998. The following judgments were delivered.

WALLER LJ (giving the first judgment at the invitation of Millett LJ). This is an appeal brought with our leave by the first defendant, Dimitri Antonatos (DA), from the following interlocutory decisions made by Steel J: (1) a decision on 10 March 1998 that DA should attend on 12 March 1998 for cross-examination on his disclosure of assets; (2) a decision on 12 March 1998 that DA’s cross-examination should continue; and (3) decisions made on 12 and 13 March 1998 that DA should answer various specific questions put on cross-examination which he objected to answer on the grounds of self-incrimination.

Outline facts

The respondent plaintiff, Den Norske Bank ASA (DnB), is a bank. From 1986 until recently, DA was the manager of DnB’s Greek shipping finance business. In an affidavit sworn on 17 February 1998 by John Nicol Simpson, the chief executive of the London branch of DnB, DnB’s case against DA was in broad terms as follows. It is said that as early as 1995 some allegations were made in relation to bribes being taken by DA. But until January 1998 such investigations as were carried out by DnB did not produce any concrete evidence to support the allegations being made. On 27 January 1998 a declaration which had been given in evidence in proceedings in Singapore stated that DA had asked a customer to pay DA a bribe of $100,000 for approving a loan and that the customer had paid that sum at DA’s request to the bank account of a Liberian entity called `Skoukla Inc’. Investigations carried out thereafter indicated to the bank that between 1994 and 1997 DA had received at least ten secret commissions from four clients of DnB totalling $705,000 which were paid into two accounts in the name of Skoukla and probably at least one further secret commission of $150,000 into a different account. It was further alleged that the bribes enabled impecunious borrowers to borrow from DnB causing DnB losses on the loans of over $24m.

DnB assert that DA was probably taking bribes from 1990 or earlier. The evidence to support that was a telex found on DA’s desk at DnB’s office referring to a `commission of 1% due to DA’s efforts’, if a loan of $1m was granted to a client, Milord Shipping Ltd.

It is further asserted that between 1993 and 1994 DA orchestrated a fraud centred around the purchase and a resale of two ships, the Sea Diamond and Sea Jade. The assertion is that DnB were induced by lies told by DA to make loans to third parties to buy the ships at inflated prices. In the result it is alleged that a profit was realised on the transactions relating to the ships enabling a substantial sum to be paid into a Swiss bank account in the name of `Sea Dream Shipping Corp’ (Sea Dream) a company which it is asserted was controlled by DA. The bank further asserts that Sea Dream was a Liberian company now struck off the register. The bank say that the Sea Dream account seems to have been operated well beyond the date of being struck off and they thus assert that Sea Dream was not a genuine trading company.

Without going into further detail, the affidavit of Mr Simpson produced a powerful case of dishonesty against DA. It produced a powerful case that he had received bribes totalling $855,000; that he had made a secret profit of $1,078,000 and that DA was liable in damages for deceit or breach of contract in relation to losses suffered in the sum of approximately $24.6m.

Based on that affidavit applications were made ex parte for Mareva and Anton Piller orders. Both types of order were made on 18 February 1998. For the purpose of this appeal it is only the order for a Mareva injunction on which it is necessary to concentrate. That injunction ordered DA not to remove or dispose of assets up to the value of $20m or in any way to dispose of or deal with certain properties identified in the order. It further ordered DA not to dispose of money in certain identified bank accounts including a bank account in the name of Sea Dream at the office of Bankers Trust AG in Zurich. It further prevented DA from disposing of certain other assets including a Ferrari alleged to be owned by DA and a yacht alleged to be owned by DA. The order further provided by para 2 that DA must not remove or in any way deal with-

`any monies whether commissions, gifts or other assets … which he has received directly or indirectly (whether in his own name or not) during the course of his employment with the Plaintiff from any of the companies or individuals named in Annexes C and D to this Order or which he has received from any companies or individuals who are known by or who trade under the names or in association with the ships set out in Annexes C and D to this Order and any other assets or monies which have been acquired by or which represents such monies or other assets (all hereinafter referred to as “the Specific Assets”) INCLUDING but not limited to the monies set out in Annex E.’

By para 3 of the order, the first defendant, DA, was required to inform DnB’s solicitors in writing-

‘as soon as reasonably practicable, of all his assets and of the Specific Assets whether in or outside England and Wales … or whether held by him legally or beneficially or held by him through nominees or otherwise howsoever, and of the Specific Assets, giving the value, location and details of all such assets and Specific Assets, and (in the case of the Specific Assets) to the best of his knowledge and belief what has become of them, including without limitation details of all bank accounts including the name or names in which the account is held, the name of the bank, building society or other entity, the address of the relevant branch and the number of the account controlled by the First Defendant or to which the First Defendant is a signatory and details of all interests held by the First Defendant in any company, ship or partnership or joint venture relating to the companies, ships and individuals named out in Annexes C and D to this Order.’

The paragraph further states:

`The First Defendant (DA) may be entitled to refuse to provide some or all of this information on the grounds that it may incriminate him. In the event that the First Defendant claims to be entitled to the benefit of such privilege, he must provide such allegedly privileged information to the Supervising Solicitor who will hold such information to the order of the court.’

In Sch 4, the supervising solicitor undertook to explain to DA the effect of the order including his entitlement to avail himself of the privilege against self-incrimination.

The order also provided that `the information must be confirmed in an affidavit which must be served on the Plaintiff’s Solicitors within 7 days after this Order has been served on the First Defendant’.

Annex C to the order is referred to in the affidavit of Mr Simpson as a list which has been compiled by investigators of `those of DnB’s customers and former customers with whom DA dealt who might potentially be involved with bribing DA.’

Annex D refers to a further schedule of customers with greater detail in relation to the principals who may have acted for the same plus the ship-owning companies and names of ships with which the borrowers may have been concerned.

DA swore an affidavit on 27 February 1998 in which he purported to confirm that he had informed DnB’s solicitors in writing to the best of his knowledge information and belief of all his assets save for the `specific assets’. What he stated was that he had informed the supervising solicitor of the specific assets and of the documents that he had in his possession power and control which relate to or evidence those specific assets, and he confirmed that he had made those disclosures to the supervising solicitor on the grounds that he claimed privilege against self-incrimination with respect to the information required to be disclosed.

Thus, at this stage, as he had been advised he might be entitled to do, DA was refusing to provide any information as to any commissions, gifts or other assets he might have received from the customers listed in appendices C and D.

DnB were concerned as to whether they had effective Mareva relief in relation to what on their case were assets which they were entitled to trace, being either gifts or bribes from customers, or other assets purchased with such gifts or bribes. They continued thus their investigations and attempts to obtain further information. Before us the results are conveniently summarised from DnB’s point of view in an affidavit of Mr Miller sworn on 10 March 1998. In short Mr Miller swore by reference to detailed evidence (1) that since the ex parte applications DnB had discovered overwhelming evidence that DA controlled Sea Dream; (2) that investigations had now revealed a compelling case that Ginastera Shipping Corp (Ginastera) was another front company used by DA to receive the proceeds of bribes and self-lending funds; and (3) that there was a strong prima facie case that International Seafarer’s Corp (ISC) was another front company used by DA to receive the proceeds of bribes and self-funding loans.

That affidavit also dealt with the basis on which by this stage DA’s wife had been joined in the proceedings. It explained how DnB had discovered how breaches of the Mareva injunction had taken place; and it asserted that there were other accounts, first in the Channel Islands held in the name of MA (DA’s wife), which were really held for DA, and second an account in the name of Clark Shipping which was also alleged to be simply a nominee account for DA. It was also asserted that it appeared that one of the alleged breaches of the Mareva was apparently designed to secure an interest in a shipping company being sold by a Captain Kardesis who was a customer of the bank (and whose name will appear again later in the story). All these assets of DA, it was alleged, had not been disclosed by DA so far. (It was of course not known what documents and information had been provided to the supervising solicitor).

The affidavit, after dealing with other matters to which it is unnecessary to refer, then dealt with the privilege against self-incrimination. It referred to s 31 of the Theft Act 1968 and the abrogation of DA’s privilege by that section so far as obtaining property by deception was concerned. It asserted that the only offence outside the scope of the Theft Act in relation to which DA was at risk, was receiving bribes contrary to the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906. The affidavit asserted:

`The essential element of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 is the payment of a bribe. Further evidence as to what the bribee has done with the bribe is not relevant to proving the offence, and does not increase the risk of prosecution for the offence. It follows that where DnB already possesses conclusive evidence as to what payments DA has received, evidence which would enable DA to trace these payments or to establish the present whereabouts and value of DA’s assets is not incriminating. In practical terms, the only real increased risk of prosecution for bribery arises if the information or document shows further bribe payments about which DnB is presently unaware.’

The affidavit then sought by para 47 the following orders:

`47 For all the reasons stated above, I believe that DA has completely failed to comply with his various disclosure and discovery obligations. I respectfully ask the Court to make the following determinations and orders: 47.1 A determination as to which classes of information and documents carry a risk of incrimination. 47.2 An order that DA should be cross examined on his disclosure and that questions should be allowed on all the classes of information in respect of which the Court finds there to be no risk of incrimination. 47.3 An order that DA (and the Supervising Solicitor) should forthwith list and deliver up to DnB all the documents which they have within the classes in respect of which the Court finds there to be no risk of incrimination. 47.4 As regards information and documents in respect of which the Court finds that there might be a risk of incrimination, an order (a) that DA shall make full written disclosure and deliver all documents to the Supervising Solicitor; and (b) that there should be a hearing in camera attended by DA and the Supervising Solicitor to determine what information and documents should be disclosed to DnB (in an edited form if appropriate). 47.5 An order that DA should sign letters in proper form directing release of documents to DnB to all existing addresses and to those listed in paragraph 37 above.’

That affidavit was, as I have indicated, sworn on 10 March 1998. Prior to that date it is right to say that there had been a hearing in front of Richards J, who had ruled that the issue raised in relation to self-incrimination should be resolved at a hearing to take place on 10 March 1998. It can be deduced that it was for that purpose at least in part that Mr Miller’s affidavit had been sworn. But DA had also sworn a further affidavit on the 9 March 1998. That affidavit was sworn in order to obtain the release of his passport. In para 4 of that affidavit he swore as follows:

`I can confirm that the assets to which I have deposed and which are disclosed by my First Affidavit are all of the assets affected by the Mareva Injunction and that I am not using the privilege against self-incrimination which I have asserted to keep secret from the Court or the Plaintiffs any assets frozen by the injunction.’

It will be noted that there was no indication in Mr Miller’s affidavit that DA’s attitude to self-incrimination had been altered, but it may be DA’s further affidavit had not been served or fully digested when Mr Miller’s affidavit was drafted. On 10 March 1998 before Steel J, DnB, through its representatives, altered their attack. They did not proceed to allow the question of self-incrimination raised by DA to be resolved as a discrete question. They applied to cross-examine DA. According to the reasons of Steel J which she ultimately gave on 13 March 1998, they did so because of their concern about DA’s `frankness and truthfulness in so far as his disclosure is concerned’ and DnB’s concern in relation to the companies `which had not been disclosed by DA and sums which had been shown to be paid to and from accounts over which DA had some degree of interest or control’. The judge records in her reasons the fact that DA was seeking to claim privilege against self-incrimination but there is no indication in her reasons that DnB’s attitude had been altered because of the change they perceived in DA’s attitude to self-incrimination in para 4 of his third affidavit. We were told however that reliance was placed on a perceived change of attitude when the application to cross-examine was made.

As her reasons show Steel J directed herself by reference to House of Spring Gardens Ltd v Waite [1985] FSR 173 and was persuaded that `the only just and convenient way of ensuring that the defendant would not deal with his assets so as to deprive the plaintiff of the fruits of their judgment’ was to allow DA to be cross-examined and to deal with any privilege questions as they occurred. DA was thus ordered to attend for cross-examination `upon his affidavit concerning disclosure of assets sworn 27 February 1998′. There has been no order drawn up in the above terms, but that this was the form of order I deduce from DA’s draft notice of appeal to this court.

The cross-examination commenced on 11 March 1998 without, at this stage, any challenge to the judge’s ruling. We have full transcripts and the pattern can be summarised as follows.

(1)     Pages 8 to 19 record general questions about whether DA had disclosed all his assets (to which his response was that he had), and as to whether he had received gifts from members of his family, to which no objection was taken until p 19. Then objection was taken to a general question about `who else’ in the family might have assisted him on the grounds that `quite a lot of members of the family … were clients of the bank … and I have asserted privilege over any dealings with customers of the bank’. Mr Peto is recorded as submitting `that of course is far too wide’. The judge is recorded as saying Yes and the cross-examination continued.

(2)     The next period covers the possibility of receipts from family including receipts outside the context of the bank’s business. In answer to one question relating to non-bank business, DA states `he would like to claim privilege in relation to his clients’ ie customers of the bank. The judge ruled that since the question was directed to what happened outside the bank’s business, the privilege could not be claimed.

(3)     After further questioning about receipts from family and outside the family, Mr Peto came to `loans’ and asked generally whether anyone within the family had made `loans’. Mr Rubin, for DA, then made clear that `there is a loan which he had advised DA to claim privilege in relation to’; the judge suggested that it might be appropriate to deal with the privilege question at this stage, but Mr Peto objected and Mr Rubin made clear that the claim related to `loans made by a certain member of the family’. The judge suggested that it was appropriate to find out from whom DA said he received loans, and Mr Rubin, having made clear previously that his aim was to allow as much progress to be made as possible `without getting into this issue of privilege’, allowed the questioning to continue. Mr Rubin then suggested that it was better for Mr Peto to go through the names. Mr Peto did so, and in relation to one name, Kardesis, when asked whether any gift or loan was received from that family DA said `I would like to assert my right of privilege against self-incrimination’. At that stage no attempt was made to obtain a ruling that the privilege was not properly claimed.

(4)     Cross-examination continued, and while questions were being asked in relation to payments made to DA’s wife when they separated, DA stated that he had paid his wife $340,000 and this was a sum he had borrowed. When it was put to him that he had not previously revealed this borrowing, Mr Rubin stated that DA had previously claimed privilege and DA stated `that is relevant to this discussion’. When asked whether he would reveal the source of the loan, DA took the privilege point and it is in relation to this question and answer that there was then argument about whether DA was entitled to rely on the privilege against self-incrimination. Mr Peto’s submission in relation to this particular question and answer was that DA, having now revealed that he had borrowed money and from a source in relation to which privilege was being claimed, the cat was in effect out of the bag, thus questioning should be allowed to continue. Mr Rubin’s submission was first that what he was seeking to guard his client against was the risk of providing evidence to a prosecutor in criminal proceedings; he submitted that it might well be that exploration of where the loan came from and how it was made might for example lead to questions being asked about the companies whom DnB were suggesting were fronts and that such information would be of use to anyone seeking to prosecute DA for corruption. He further submitted that one could see that in fact by virtue of the way in which the questions and answers had developed from which Mr Peto could make the deduction he now claimed to make, showed that the procedure of allowing cross-examination to take place had been itself unfair. He submitted that it might have been possible to conduct an examination limited to dealing with assets, but that the way in which the examination had been conducted demonstrated that DnB were intent on getting into the merits of their case and thus infringing the claim to privilege against self-incrimination, and that the examination should be stopped at that stage.

Mr Peto submitted that the judge was only dealing with a ruling in relation to one question. He submitted that on the documents available it was plain that $340,000 came from a Sea Dream bank account in Zurich. Documents showed payment into DA’s solicitor’s account, and then to an account in the Channel Islands. He submitted that on Mr Miller’s affidavit it was plain that there was already evidence that would convince any jury beyond reasonable doubt that DA was `actively concerned with its (Sea Dream’s) management, and that any attempt to suggest that answering the questions relating to where the money came from would land him in any worse trouble is simply unreal’. Thus he submitted rulings on privilege should be directed to particular questions. DA should be directed to answer the particular question.

The judge at this stage ruled:

`My ruling in relation to this part of the question is that the defendant quite clearly here is already, by the information which is before the court, exposed to the risk of prosecution, and the risk here in the light of that information in my view would not be increased if he were required to answer questions as to the origin of the $340,000.’

She also confirmed that she was refusing to stop the examination as requested by Mr Rubin for DA.

(5)     At this stage Mr Rubin sought leave to appeal against the judge’s ruling on 10 March and her rulings made at this stage of the examination. Leave was refused and he then requested an opportunity to test the matter in the Court of Appeal before the examination continued. The judge would have been in favour of allowing that course, but Mr Peto then said he would not ask the question `where did you get the loan from’, and Mr Rubin said that without giving up any of the points he had taken he would not object to further questions `just dealing with assets in a general sense’.

(6)     Examination continued. Questions were asked about a flat in Athens. Mr Peto asked about the sources of money to buy that, and objection on grounds of privilege was taken. He did not press for an answer but asked about whether it was mortgaged. DA said there was a loan and Mr Rubin then asserted privilege, but before any ruling on that DA responded that he had no intention of mortgaging the flat and questions moved on; when a loan is once again mentioned, privilege was claimed and Mr Peto did not pursue the matter.

(7)     Questions on the Ferrari were asked as to where DA got the money from to buy it; privilege was claimed. Debate took place and the question was ultimately `placed in the basket’.

(8)     Questions were then asked in relation to a flat in Brazil, and other properties, to which no objection was taken.

(9)     Ginastera was raised and the question asked was whether DA had `any control over any of its assets’. Privilege was immediately claimed. Mr Peto’s submission to the judge was that DA had already said that he had disclosed all his assets, and thus that either the answer by DA should be No, or if Yes, the only incrimination came from having told a lie earlier. After some interchanges, once again a question was asked `do you have any degree of control over the assets of Ginastera?’ Privilege was claimed but the judge directed an answer to be given. The answer was `I have no ownership of this company’, and under questioning DA asserted that Ginastera’s assets are not his assets; the judge clearly thought that DA was being evasive, and permitted further questioning. Ultimately that turned to the authority to sign cheques. Again DA was evasive, but answered ultimately that he did have authority to sign. It was at this stage that an excerpt from the minutes of Ginastera was produced which showed as a matter of record that DA had such authority.

(10)   DA was then asked whether there were any other bank accounts over which he had signing powers. He said no and then was asked what about at the date of the Mareva, and he said `only in so far as a company over which we have claimed privilege’. (The next day DA in fact sought to clarify this answer as intending to say that at one time he had had the power to sign an account for which privilege was claimed, but not as at the date of the Mareva). The inference drawn by Mr Peto probably accurately was that the account being referred to was that of Sea Dream. DA was then asked whether he was the only signatory on behalf of `Sea Dream’ and a claim to privilege was made. Mr Peto sought a direction that DA be compelled to answer. Mr Rubin said that he did not mind a ruling but that execution of the ruling should be delayed so that the matter could be tested in the Court of Appeal. The judge ruled that the question should be answered, and Mr Peto pressed for immediate execution of that ruling, but then relented in order to save the examination hearing. The matter was adjourned at the end of that day, the understanding being that Mr Peto would investigate other areas leaving matters `in a basket’ for the Court of Appeal.

(11)   On the second day Mr Peto sought to ask questions (a) about Sea Dream and (b) about Ginastera. At first a modus vivendi appeared to have been reached whereby if a claim for privilege was raised the judge ruled the question should be answered, and the arrangement was that DA would provide the answers to the supervising solicitor pending an application for leave to have the judge’s rulings tested in the Court of Appeal. Mr Peto for DnB became dissatisfied with that process. The judge was also concerned that DA was simply using a claim to privilege to frustrate DnB’s legitimate concerns to be able to obtain effective Mareva relief. The judge’s view was that in so far as the risk of prosecution was concerned, because `prosecution in relation to the bribes finishes on the payment thereof’ information relating to what happened to any money received did not increase the risk of prosecution, and could not thus be the subject of a claim to privilege. The question arose whether the matter should be taken to the Court of Appeal there and then, but both counsel were anxious to continue so far as it was possible to do so, Mr Peto because he felt in his clients’ interests understandably that there was some risk of dissipation of assets; and Mr Rubin because on behalf of DA he did not want to be seen to frustrate the inquiry at least in the areas outside that for which privilege was being claimed.

(12)   The examination then continued and DA continued to assert a privilege against self-incrimination in relation to any matters involving Sea Dream, the loan of $340,000, Sea Dream’s account in Zurich, payments by DA’s wife to Sea Dream, payments to Kardesis, and matters involving ISC. The judge continued to rule that the questions should be answered and the questions were left `in the basket’.

Judge’s reasoned ruling

The judge, for the benefit of the Court of Appeal, gave a reasoned ruling to which I have already referred, explaining her reasons for allowing the examination to take place. She also supported her rulings on privilege, and as to why she ruled that the examination should be entitled to continue. Her reasons were essentially three-fold that (1) where the court is concerned with whether a bribe has been taken, the offence is complete when the bribe is taken, thus what has happened to the money is immaterial; (2) nothing that was being asked `would increase DA’s existing risk of prosecution’, and (3) she had formed the view that DA’s attitude was `no less than a deliberate and determined attempt to frustrate these proceedings (ie the obtaining of effective Mareva relief) on grounds that were totally ill-founded’.

Unsatisfactory nature of the rule allowing privilege to be claimed

One must start by expressing sympathy for all those involved in the procedure summarised above, not least the judge. So far as DnB were concerned, they had a strong prima facie case that DA had taken bribes and been a party to a fraud, and utilised front companies to disguise the whereabouts of the spoils. They thought and think they are being frustrated in their attempts to discover what bribes DA did receive, and if he did receive them, where the moneys went, and/or where the money is now. So far as DA was concerned there was (as the judge found) a risk of him being prosecuted in a criminal court for corruption. If only Parliament had done that for which there has been a need now for far too long, of extending the policy underlining s 31 of the 1968 Act to criminal offences more generally, the above sorry saga might never have needed to unfold in the way it did. Section 31(1) provides as follows:

`A person shall not be excused, by reason that to do so may incriminate that person or the wife or husband of that person of an offence under this Act-(a) from answering any question put to that person in proceedings for the recovery or administration of any property, for the execution of any trust or for an account of any property or dealings with property; or (b) from complying with any order made in any such proceedings; but no statement or admission made by a person in answering a question put or complying with an order made as aforesaid shall, in proceedings for an offence under this Act, be admissible in evidence against that person or (unless they married after the making of the statement or admission) against the wife or husband of that person.’

If its ambit were wider so that it not only applied to offences under the 1968 Act but to criminal offences more generally , DA could have been required to answer questions even though they incriminated him; DnB would have been able to protect such assets as they could have traced; and DA would have been protected from having the answers used in evidence against him in any criminal proceedings. The call for Parliament to act made in cogent terms by Browne-Wilkinson V-C in Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola UEE v Lundqvist [1990] 3 All ER 283 at 302, [1991] 2 QB 310 at 338, repeated by others since, including Lord Lowry in the House of Lords in A T & T Istel Ltd v Tully [1992] 3 All ER 523 at 544, [1993] AC 45 at 69, appears to have gone unheeded.

Unfortunately, the court itself has no power to fill the gap left by Parliament. It has been recognised, all too clearly, that nothing that a civil court can do can prevent the prosecuting authorities obtaining information supplied (see Lord Wilberforce in Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre [1981] 2 All ER 76 at 81, [1982] AC 380 at 442 and the Istel case). If there is to be protection it must be statutory.

The lack of power in the court needs emphasis in this case, because the order envisaged that somehow, by allowing matters which might otherwise incriminate an individual to be placed in the hands of a supervising solicitor, that that would provide the requisite protection. During the course of the hearing before us serious doubts were expressed by members of the court whether this did provide adequate protection. It is right to say in that regard that in the standard form Anton Piller order issued pursuant to the practice direction dated 28 October 1996 issued by Lord Bingham CJ with the concurrence of Sir Richard Scott V-C, the warning given to the defendant under para 6 is in the following terms :

`You may be entitled to refuse to permit disclosure of any documents which may incriminate you (“incriminating documents”) or to answer any questions if to do so may incriminate you.’

But in the body of the order under the heading `Obtaining Legal Advice and Applying to the Court’ it is stated that the defendant before permitting entry to the premises may-

`gather together any documents he believes may be incriminating or privileged and hand them to the supervising solicitor for the supervising solicitor to assess whether they are incriminating or privileged as claimed. If the supervising solicitor concludes that any of the said documents may be incriminating or privileged documents or if there is any doubt as to their status, the supervising solicitor shall exclude them from the search, and shall retain the documents of doubtful status in his possession pending further order of the court.’

That form of order thus seems to contemplate that documents of doubtful status may be put in the hands of the supervising solicitor to alleviate the risk of self-incrimination. Of course I accept that putting documents in the hands of a supervising solicitor lessens the risk of prosecuting authorities becoming aware of the information.

But, if a prosecuting authority heard of what was happening, and if it sought an order for the handing over of the information in the possession of the supervising solicitor, it is difficult to see how the High Court would have any power to prevent the same. Furthermore, para 3 of Sir Richard Scott V-C’s order in this case did not allow the supervising solicitor to return answers provided, even though they were clearly self-incriminating. The effect of the paragraph quoted in the standard form of the Anton Piller order, at least allows clearly incriminating documents to be returned, and in any event, since it is dealing with pre-existing documents, it may be regarded as acceptable. The effect of para 3 is thus not simply to leave in the hands of the supervising solicitor documents about which there is doubt, but, documents which may clearly be incriminating.

Self-incrimination: the relevant principles

We were referred at the end of the arguments to an Australian case Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden (1993) 31 NSWLR 412. In that case, Kirby P (at 420-424) summarised the principles relating to the privilege against self-incrimination, certain of which I gratefully adopt so far as is relevant to this appeal.

`2. The basis of the privilege against self-incrimination was explained long ago by Lord Eldon LC in Paxton v Douglas ((1812) 19 Ves 225 at 227-228, 34 ER 502 at 503): “In no stage of the proceedings in this Court can a party be compelled to answer any question, accusing himself, or any one in a series of questions, that has a tendency to that effect: the rule in these cases being, that he is at liberty to protect himself against answering, not only the direct question, whether he did what was illegal, but also every question, fairly appearing to be put with the view of drawing from him an answer containing nothing to affect him, except as it is one link in a chain of proof that is to affect him … I have looked into all the cases; and I find the distinctions between questions, supposed to have a tendency to criminate, and questions, to which it is supposed answers may be given, as having no connexion with the other questions, so very nice, that I can only say, the strong inclination of my mind is to protect the party against answering any question, not only that has a direct tendency to incriminate him, but that forms one step towards it.”… 4. A mere statement by a witness that the answer may tend to incriminate that witness is not sufficient to found the claim for privilege against self-incrimination. The Court must be satisfied that there is reasonable ground and that the objection is taken bona fide: Jackson v Gamble ([1983] 1 VR 552 at 556) … The test is sometimes expressed as to whether there is a “real and appreciable risk of criminal proceedings … being taken against” the witness: see Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre ([1981] 2 All ER 76 at 80, [1982] AC 380 at 441). A remote or slight possibility of legal peril to a witness may not, in a particular case, be sufficient to invoke the privilege and to sustain a refusal to answer a question: see R v Boyes ((1861) 1 B & S 311, 121 ER 730). In some circumstances, a person will lose the privilege if pardoned (as was the case in R v Boyes) or if earlier dealt with by law upon the subject said to give rise to the apprehension of jeopardy. If criminal proceedings have been concluded (either by acquittal or by conviction and sentence) a person can stand in no further jeopardy of punishment upon the precise matters already dealt with; 5. Where a question arises as to whether the claimed privilege is not claimed bona fide or whether the danger apprehended is without substance, it is clear law that “great latitude should be allowed to [the witness] in judging for himself the effect of any particular question”: see R v Boyes. Thus, in R v Boyes, although a Crown pardon exempted the accused from the further jeopardy of criminal punishment, he stood liable to the risk of impeachment by the House of Commons because the offence alleged concerned bribery at an election for Members of Parliament. The Court accepted the submission. But it held that since the witness did not run the slightest risk of impeachment and was in no real danger from the evidence he was called upon to give, the pardon took away the privilege: see also Sorby v Commonwealth of Australia ((1983) 152 CLR 281 at 293). A reason for extending “the great latitude” referred to is that it will sometimes be more apparent to the witness than to the court how a particular line of questioning may open up the risk of further, future or different incrimination. The witness may perceive the manner in which an answer might open up to investigation indirect or derivative evidentiary material thereby exposing the person to a collateral risk of criminal or like proceedings not perhaps apparent to the questioner; 6. The foregoing considerations will be reasons for caution in deriving a conclusion that the claim of the privilege against self-incrimination is not made bona fide. There is authority to suggest that a want of subjective bona fides in invoking the privilege will remove the privilege: see, eg, Ex parte Reynolds; Re Reynolds ((1882) 20 Ch D 294 at 300); R v Justices of Armagh ((1883) 18 IR LTR 2 at 3); BTR Engineering (Australia) Ltd (formerly Borg-Warner Australia Ltd) v Patterson ((1990) 20 NSWLR 724 at 730). However, in my respectful view this is a dubious principle. What is in issue, ultimately, is not the subjective fears of the witness claiming the privilege but the objective tendency of the question to expose that witness to the risk of criminal prosecution. One witness may not perceive such a risk. Unless the judicial officer presiding intervenes, the question will be answered and the privilege lost. One witness may have multiple motives and even mala fides. But if the question is such in fact as to expose him or her to the risk of future prosecution, it is the duty of the judicial officer to uphold the privilege. It will be easier and more reliable to assess the reasonableness of the apprehension than the genuineness of the sentiment. A court can quite readily speculate upon and judge the possible use of demanded oral testimony. The devil himself knoweth not the mind of man [or woman]; 7. It is for the presiding judicial officer to determine whether the objection taken is good and whether there are reasonable grounds for the belief on the part of the witness that he or she is, or may be, in peril of future criminal or like proceedings if the answer is given. Just as the court must protect the privilege, it must also make sure that the rule is not abused; but applied only where its invocation is justified: see Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd ([1939] 2 All ER 613 at 617, [1939] 2 KB 395 at 403). The proper procedure in a claim for privilege is to object to each question as it is asked: see Ex parte Reynolds (20 Ch D 294); Brebner v Perry ([1961] SASR 177 at 180). It is not proper to refuse to be sworn or to decline to answer any questions at all or to claim a global protection from the privilege. Such a refusal may amount to a contempt of court: see Smith v The Queen ((1991) 25 NSWLR 1 at 9). Nevertheless, a point will be reached in questioning where it will be unnecessary to persist with an entire cross-examination which is clearly futile by reason of the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. To demand a tedious repetition of questions, rebuffed every time by a claim of privilege which is upheld, would be pointless …’ (Kirby P’s emphasis.)

One of the main points taken by DnB in this case was that DA was not entitled to claim privilege because there was no greater risk of him incriminating himself by the answers that he might give, as compared with the risk that there already was. Reliance was placed on Brebner v Perry. To consider that submission it is necessary to define the test in relation to whether an answer will incriminate. In many cases one sees the court using the test of `increase the risk of prosecution’, the phrase used by the judge in this case. In my view, the authorities demonstrate that `risk of prosecution’ is to put the test too narrowly. In the Sociedade Nacional case [1990] 3 All ER 283 at 292, [1991] 2 QB 310 at 324-325 Staughton LJ deals with this aspect:

`The substance of the test is thus that there must be grounds to apprehend danger to the witness, and those grounds must be reasonable, rather than fanciful. Other points that emerge from the cases are these: (i) the affidavit claiming privilege is not conclusive (see R v Boyes, Ex p Reynolds and Khan v Khan [1982] 2 All ER 60, [1982] 1 WLR 513); (ii) the deponent is not bound to go into detail, if to do so would itself deprive him of protection (see Short v Mercier (1851) 3 Mac & G 205 at 217, 42 ER 239 at 244 and Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp ([1978] 1 All ER 434, [1978] AC 547); (iii) “… if the fact of the witness being in danger be once made to appear, great latitude should be allowed to him in judging for himself of the effect of any particular question …’ (see R v Boyes (1861) 1 B & S 311, [1861-73] All ER Rep 172 at 174, and the Rio Tinto Zinc case and Khan v Khan); (iv) the privilege is not available where the witness is already at risk, and the risk would not be increased if he were required to answer (see Brebner v Perry and the Rio Tinto Zinc case); and (v) “If it is one step, having a tendency to criminate him, he is not to be compelled to answer” (see Paxton v Douglas (1809) 16 Ves 239 at 242, 33 ER 975 at 976), “… as it is one link in the chain of proof” (see Paxton v Douglas (1812) 19 Ves 225 at 227, 34 ER 502 at 503). That last point recurs in other cases (eg the Rio Tinto Zinc case), and may be important. I am inclined to think that it refers to any fact which a prosecutor would wish to prove in order to establish the guilt of the witness on a criminal charge. In the Rank Film Distributors case [1981] 2 All ER 76 at 82, [1982] AC 380 at 443 Lord Wilberforce said that disclosure “may set in train a process which may lead to incrimination or may lead to the discovery of real evidence of an incriminating character.” That may be thought to go rather further, and to protect a man from having to disclose the names of those who could give evidence against him, assuming that there was otherwise power to require that information. (See also Short v Mercier (1851) 20 LJ Ch 289 at 292, “how evidence can be got”.) I am not presently convinced that the privilege, by virtue of the doctrine of links in a chain, extends as far as that. But the point need not be decided in this case.’

In Tate Access Floors Inc v Boswell [1990] 3 All ER 303 at 313, [1991] Ch 512 at 529 Browne-Wilkinson V-C talks about a prosecutor finding documents `equally useful’. In IBM United Kingdom Ltd v Prima Data International Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 748 at 762, [1994] 1 WLR 719 at 731 Sir Mervyn Davies applies a test of `some important facts that bear on establishing whether or not he has acted criminally’. In Saunders v UK (1996) 2 BHRC 358 at 374 the European Court of Human Rights uses the test of testimony-

`which appears on its face to be of a non-incriminating nature-such as exculpatory remarks or mere information on questions of fact-may later be deployed in criminal proceedings in support of the prosecution case, for example to contradict or cast doubt upon other statements of the accused or evidence given by him during the trial or to otherwise undermine his credibility.’

Cockburn CJ in R v Boyes (1861) 1 B & S 311 at 330, [1861-73] All ER Rep 172 at 174 as quoted by Staughton LJ in the Sociedade Nacional case [1990] 3 All ER 283 at 291, [1991] 2 QB 310 at 324 perhaps put the matter most neatly when he said:

`… the courts must see, from the circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer.’

Thus, it is not simply the risk of prosecution. A witness is entitled to claim the privilege in relation to any piece of information or evidence on which the prosecution might wish to rely in establishing guilt. And, as it seems to me, it also applies to any piece of information or evidence on which the prosecution would wish to rely in making its decision whether to prosecute or not.

In Brebner v Perry the witness had provided a statement making admissions to the police and then when called to give evidence claimed the privilege. The ruling was not only that there was no increased danger to the witness in answering the questions but was also a ruling that the witness was taking the privilege against self-incrimination in bad faith. Clarke JA in Accidental Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden (1993) 31 NSWLR 412 at 433 thought that the correctness of Brebner‘s case would need to be considered at some time:

`Finally it is submitted that, as Leathem had already provided a statement, he would not have exposed himself to further jeopardy by giving sworn testimony. As a matter of fact I do not think that is correct. Any witness who gives sworn evidence admitting to his guilt of a crime is exposing himself to jeopardy unless he has already been dealt with for that crime, he has been pardoned or there are other similar circumstances. The fact that he might have earlier admitted the crime in a signed statement, which he may or may not wish to disavow, cannot mean, in my view, that there is no additional prejudice in giving sworn testimony to like effect …’

I respectfully agree with Clarke JA.

It is one thing for someone to make a statement to the police or anyone else which he might afterwards try to retract. It is quite another for him sometime later to be made to repeat any admission on oath in court in the presence of a judge and his own lawyers. It makes the potentially retractable impossible to retract.

If there is a risk of self-incrimination and if there is no bad faith a `no increase in risk’ must be almost impossible to establish. It is of interest that it failed in the Tate Access case [1990] 3 All ER 303 at 313, [1991] Ch 512 at 529 and the IBM case [1994] 4 All ER 748 at 762, [1994] 1 WLR 719 at 732.

In relation to bad faith it has been suggested that if the witness is acting in bad faith the privilege can be overridden. In my view the position is not as simple as that. If there is no serious risk of prosecution and if the witness does not believe that he will be prosecuted and is simply not answering the question because he does not wish to provide the evidence or the information, then he will not be entitled to claim the privilege. But, as pointed out by Kirby P in the passage in the Accident Insurance Mutual case quoted above, a witness may have mixed motives. If the question in fact exposes him or her to the risk of future prosecution, it is the duty of the court to uphold the privilege even if the witness is acting from mixed motives or even mala fide because he or she does not fully appreciate the risk.

There is one further point to emphasise. An Anton Piller order should not be made where it will require the defendant to incriminate himself. The authorities on this aspect are summarised in Cobra Golf Ltd v Rata [1997] 2 All ER 150 at 164-166, [1998] Ch 109 at 126-128. It is possible to build a mechanism into an order which provides a clear warning to the defendant through, for example, advice from the supervising solicitor. But the authorities summarised by Rimer J in the Cobra case show how difficult it is to provide adequate protection and there is no distinction in this regard between an Anton Piller and a Mareva order. Once again I emphasise that the expedient of ordering a defendant to place incriminating information in the hands of a supervising solicitor does not seem to me to provide adequate protection.

It is finally important to recognise that it is only in exceptional circumstances that cross-examination will be ordered on an affidavit sworn pursuant to a Mareva order (see House of Spring Gardens Ltd v Waite [1985] FSR 173 at 181 in the judgment of Slade LJ). The anxieties expressed by Scott J in Bayer AG v Winter (No 2) [1986] 2 All ER 43, [1986] 1 WLR 540 relating to the court wanting no part of being part of a star chamber process must constantly be borne in mind.

In the above context let me turn to the present proceedings.

Original ex parte order

Sometimes Mareva orders are simply designed to protect assets generally in order to meet an ultimate judgment; sometimes they are designed to trace and protect specific assets to which the plaintiff claims a proprietary remedy; sometimes they get close to being an Anton Piller order designed to obtain evidence of fraud which might otherwise be destroyed. Sometimes the form of order does not distinguish clearly between its objectives. Paragraph 2 of Sir Richard Scott V-C’s order was clearly designed to protect assets defined as specific assets to which a proprietary remedy was being asserted. But the incorporation of the same definition into para 3 prima facie had the effect of requiring the defendant to say whether or not he had received bribes from any of the identified sources. It was unfortunate that para 3 was framed in the way that it was. An order should not be made which allows a plaintiff to interrogate a defendant so as to discover whether the plaintiff has a claim against the defendant. A fortiori, an order to discover whether the plaintiff has a claim against a defendant which would constitute a criminal offence risks falling foul of the principles relating to the granting of Anton Piller and Mareva orders set out above unless there is a clear machinery for protecting the defendant.

Where a plaintiff has brought his action and pleadings have been exchanged, he may legitimately be entitled to frame an interrogatory to which no objection could be taken other than that the answer would tend to incriminate. As will appear hereafter I take the view, particularly in the light of changes in the criminal law, that a plaintiff in such a situation would be entitled to ask the court to draw inferences from the refusal to answer.

But the situation is different where a defendant is being asked to swear an affidavit as to his assets in the Mareva context, or indeed being cross-examined on that affidavit. In such circumstances the procedure is for the purposes of policing a Mareva, and the court should be astute to guard against that procedure being used for the gaining of evidence by some form of admission from a defendant, which may be useful for the plaintiff in proving the substantive case (see Yukong Line Ltd of Liberia v Rendsburg Investment Corp of Liberia [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 604).

Paragraph 3 of Sir Richard Scott V-C’s order refers to the annex to the order, which is a list of clients with whom DA may have dealt during the period 1990-97. Its effect is to order DA to disclose any gifts or bribes that DA may have received from such people. It seeks to protect DA against having to incriminate himself by providing that the answers can be handed to the supervising solicitor.

Whether or not the answers being sought might incriminate DA, it seems to me that the above is not a proper use of the Mareva jurisdiction. The orders are obtained ex parte without any ability on the part of DA to argue that he was being asked to deal with `fishing’ interrogatories. The position however is more serious than that because it is quite clear that the answers might also incriminate DA and even if it is clear that they do so, the order required the information to be provided to the supervising solicitor. That does not provide full protection. Furthermore the claiming of privilege may provide DnB with an answer from which it would ask a court later to draw inferences.

The above points in relation to Sir Richard Scott V-C’s order were not taken until argument developed before this court. DA simply raised in his affidavit the privilege against self-incrimination to which I will now turn.

Should the question of self-incrimination raised in the affidavit have been dealt with prior to any cross-examination?

It was originally intended that the issue on self-incrimination taken in the affidavit would be dealt with as a discrete issue. However DnB became concerned as to whether the injunction had been breached, and as to whether there were not matters which had not been disclosed in DA’s affidavit. In these situations things move fast and swift decisions have to be taken. But it seems to me clear that it would have been helpful if further consideration had been given to self-incrimination before commencing any examination. It is true that in normal circumstances where a witness is giving evidence at a trial, the usual course is to take the questions one at a time and see whether any objection is taken, and whether the objection is well founded. But where the question is whether the examination should take place in relation to an affidavit sworn pursuant to a Mareva injunction, and where self-incrimination is raised as in this instance in the affidavit, a ruling on that aspect would assist in deciding whether the examination will be of any purpose, and will further assist in defining those areas to which examination should be limited. In this case also it would have helped to clarify para 4 of DA’s further affidavit on which much reliance was placed in this court. The paragraph is not easy to comprehend. We are told that in skeleton arguments produced for the judge some reference was made to the possibility that the paragraph constituted a waiver in some way. If argument had been addressed to that paragraph and reliance placed upon it, it would have become apparent as it did in this court, that DA did not in any way intend to forego his claim to privilege at any stage and was not bound by such waiver (if any) as could be spelt out of the paragraph. Once that was clear, it seems to me that para 4 has little further relevance.

If the question of self-incrimination had been dealt with at the outset, what would have or should have been the result?

The judge was persuaded when the issue arose during the examination that there was no increase in the risk of self-incrimination. Her reasons were as I have said, threefold, (1) that where the court is concerned with bribes, where the proceeds of the bribes have gone is of no materiality in establishing the bribe allegation; (2) there was no increase in the risk of prosecution; and (3) the claim to privilege was in any event taken mala fide.

That view was contrary to the principles that I have sought to outline. First, to suggest that the offence of bribery is complete once the bribe has been taken, and thus that what has happened to the money is not material (a) misunderstands the risk which has to be guarded against; and (b) misunderstood DnB’s case and thus the likely case of any prosecutor. The risk to be guarded against was the provision of evidence which would assist a prosecution. It was DnB’s case that they could corroborate their assertion that DA had taken bribes by demonstrating that he had himself, or through certain front companies, received certain sums. DA was in effect being asked to confirm that moneys he, or the front companies, held, were bribes, or at the very least that he or the front companies had received moneys from clients of DnB which corresponded to sums DnB asserted were bribes.

Answers to the question `have you received bribes from any of these clients?’, was obviously incriminating. `Have you received moneys from these clients and if so how much?’ was also incriminating in that there was (i) an increased risk of prosecution and (ii) an increased risk of a successful prosecution.

In relation to the judge’s third reason, she had of course seen DA cross-examined in areas which she might not have done if she had correctly ruled on the privilege taken in DA’s affidavit before allowing the examination to begin. But it is convenient to say at this stage, that, as will appear, although I think that the judge was right in saying that DA became evasive, the difficulty was that the closer a question got to being incriminating, the more evasive he was likely to be if he was forced to answer it. It seems to me that albeit DA would be unenthusiastic to assist DnB, that does not make his answers mala fide if there was a risk of the answers assisting a prosecution. Evasiveness does not thus support mala fides unless it is possible to say objectively that there was no real risk of incrimination.

In any event it seems to me that the claim to privilege against answering on affidavit the questions posed by para 3 of Sir Richard Scott V-C’s order, in so far as it related to specific assets, should have been upheld. In those circumstances it is obvious that the information supplied to the supervising solicitor should be returned to DA. At the conclusion of argument before us we directed that the information provided to the supervising solicitor under para 3 should be put into the hands of the solicitors acting for DA, and held by them to the order of the court. Equally obviously, those solicitors should now be released from the order requiring them to hold the said information.

Would there then have been a need for cross-examination?

DnB had justified concerns as to whether there had been breaches of the Mareva injunction. They were further concerned as to whether the entities, which they were now suggesting were fronts, were within DA’s control so as to render the assets of those entities assets of DA and they could not know precisely what claim to privilege would be made to individual questions as opposed to the blanket form of order previously obtained. In my view in that context the judge would have been entitled to rule, having regard to the urgency, as she did, that some examination should be allowed.

General approach to the examination

The approach of DnB to DA’s association with the entities now alleged to be fronts, as one can ultimately see from the examination that took place, was to try and ignore the concept of incorporation and conduct what might be called, a full-frontal assault.

There are serious objections to this way of dealing with matters. The concept for a layman and even a lawyer of `control’ in relation to Liberian, Panamanian, or comparable off-shore entities, so that assets of such entities must be treated as his, bristles with problems. It is most unlikely that an individual having no natural connection with the place of incorporation of such entities will accept that he has control or that assets of the entities are his for whatever purposes the entities were used. On a cross-examination of the type that took place here relating to such entities, it may be legitimate to try and establish what assets the entities have, what has happened to them, who holds the shares in the entities, who operates the bank accounts, but questions about control can genuinely not be easy to answer and may well be irrelevant. Thus accusations of not revealing the assets of the entities as assets of the defendant may not be justifiable. Once such entities are discovered to exist, it is likely that the only fruitful course is to join the entities in the action so as to be able to get them to produce affidavits sworn by their proper officer as to the whereabouts of assets, bank accounts etc.

The second objection is that once again, as it seems to me, since it was DnB’s case that the frauds and bribes were being taken or conducted through these entities, for DA to admit control and/or that they were fronts would be providing evidence which would increase the danger of incrimination, and thus there was a strong likelihood that the privilege against self-incrimination would be invoked.

Thirdly, if cross-examination was to take place, it would need to be clearly recognised that this was not to provide an occasion on which DnB could try and establish its case, as opposed to police the Mareva.

What then of the examination that took place?

I see no objection to the questioning as summarised in my summary (1) to (3) above. Furthermore, the initial claim to privilege by DA was, as it seems to me, too wide and rightly ruled to be so.

However, DA was entitled to claim privilege against self-incrimination in relation to any question that sought to establish the receipt of money coming from a client of DnB and/or the quantity thereof. Thus his privilege claimed should have been upheld. Mr Rubin’s submission both as to privilege and at the line of questioning that followed the claim to privilege was leading to a revelation of further material over which DA was entitled to claim privilege should have been accepted. The fact (as was submitted by Mr Peto) that DnB had documents from which they could draw the inference that $340,000 came through Sea Dream, either showed that any question was unnecessary or (on the basis that the question was necessary) did not affect the right of DA not to be forced to assist with providing any further evidence to a prosecuting authority. Thus the ruling was in my view wrong. Furthermore, if questioning had persisted in these areas also Mr Rubin’s submission that the examination should be stopped should have been upheld. The judge would in any event have stopped the examination at that stage to allow the matter to be tested in the Court of Appeal if some modus vivendi could not be reached. Entirely sensibly questioning continued without objection from Mr Rubin. During that questioning further claims to privilege were made about sources of funds in relation to the purchase of a flat in Athens, and the Ferrari which, having regard to the latitude which must be shown to someone claiming privilege, should also have been upheld.

There was then questioning to which no objection was taken before the question of `control over the assets of Ginastera’ was raised, and privilege was claimed. That claim also should have been upheld. In any event Mr Peto’s submission at this stage that the answer was either yes or no and if yes the only incrimination came from having told a lie earlier about his assets was entirely misplaced. There would always be a genuine dispute as to whether assets of Ginastera were assets of DA for all the reasons already explained. Furthermore the risk of incrimination came from providing any admissions relating to the use of front companies on which DnB themselves relied as a link in establishing the bribery case, and on which a prosecuting authority would similarly rely. Once questioning was allowed to continue in relation to control, DA was bound to be evasive, and it would not be fair to conclude from that evasiveness that the claim to privilege was not being made bona fide.

The fact that a document could be produced to show that DA had signing authority for Ginastera could not affect the question of privilege. The answers being sought, if answered one way, would have added significantly to the information that a prosecuting authority would like to have.

There was nothing wrong with the question then asked about whether there were any other bank accounts over which DA had signing powers. But, once DA had answered to the effect that he only had signing powers “in so far as a company over which we have claimed privilege”, any attempt to examine DA on the basis that that company was Sea Dream, and about whether there were other signatories of Sea Dream’s account, was something for which DA was entitled to claim privilege if he so wished.

As regards the further questioning which, despite some disagreement between Mr Peto and Mr Rubin at one stage, clearly took place on the basis that any claims for privilege could be taken, ruled on, and rulings tested in the Court of Appeal, DA’s claim to privilege against answering any questions relating to Sea Dream, Ginastera, ISC or any nominee account or the source of any funds eg the $340,000 loan, which by clear implication Mr Peto, for DnB, was seeking to say came from bribes or gifts from clients, should have been upheld. Further, much of the questioning seemed more to try and bolster DnB’s case than to protect assets covered by the Mareva; that emphasises the entitlement to claim privilege since, if the questions were thought necessary for DnB’s case, it is likely a prosecutor would have wanted to make use of the answers as well.


First, it must once again be recognised how very unsatisfactory the present position is in relation to the claim to privilege against self-incrimination. However, DnB and its advisers must work within the limits. In my view they obtained by para 3 an order from Sir Richard Scott V-C that went beyond those limits. Furthermore, DA’s claim to privilege in his affidavit should have been upheld. Also, the claim to privilege in relation to answering the questions set out in the schedule, with which we have been supplied, should have been upheld. As to whether there might be some more limited relief to which DnB might even now be entitled along the lines suggested in Lundqvist or after joinder of certain of the entities, it is not for this court in my view to work out. But it seems to me, on the present material and on the basis of the present order, extremely unlikely that any further examination of DA should be allowed to proceed.

Should anything be done to expunge parts of the cross-examination which has now taken place? At this stage it seems to me that very little damage, of which DA has any right to complain, has in fact been done. Some questions have been asked to which no objection was or could have been taken. Some questions were asked to which objection has been made. The question may arise as to whether DnB can rely on any of the examination at the trial. In Yukong v Rendsburg Phillips LJ expressed the view concurred in by Kennedy LJ that in order to use the transcript of an examination on affidavit as to assets ordered to be sworn under a Mareva order in the substantive proceedings, an application for leave was necessary under RSC Ord 29, r 1A(3). The matter has not been argued before us but it is right to record that I have some reservations about that being the proper construction of Ord 29, r 1A(3). It involves construing `proceedings in which the order for cross-examination was made …’ as the application for Mareva relief, as opposed to the more natural `main proceedings’ in which that relief was being sought. It also seems that there would be a distinction between using the affidavit sworn by the defendant in the main proceedings (for which no leave would be needed) and the examination on that affidavit for which leave would be needed. The matter may need further consideration since it is also unclear how fully the matter was argued before Phillips and Kennedy LJJ. In any event, if an application as envisaged by Phillips LJ was successful or if after fuller argument a different construction was placed on Ord 29, r 1A, the question may arise at the trial whether DnB can rely on a refusal to answer questions on the grounds of self-incrimination and seek to persuade the court to draw inferences from that refusal. On this latter aspect there are competing views. Staughton LJ agreed with Leggatt J in the Lundqvist case that it was not right to be able to rely on the refusal to answer. However, Templeman LJ in the Court of Appeal in the Rank Film Distributors case [1980] 2 All ER 273 at 291, [1982] AC 380 at 423 expressed very strong views to the contrary and Bridge LJ appears to have shared Templeman LJ’s views (see [1980] 2 All ER 273 at, [1982] AC 380 at 425). No disapproval appears to have been expressed in the House of Lords in relation to those views. Furthermore, even in the criminal context, ss 34 and 35 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 have altered the position, and the present standard form of the Anton Piller order for example contains a warning that refusal to permit disclosure may be taken into account at a future stage.

In my view, particularly having regard to ss 34 and 35 in the criminal context, the view of Templeman LJ should be followed.

In my view, it would not be right for this court to order destruction of the present transcript or to make any attempts to disentitle DnB using the answers received. That is a conclusion I have come to not without some anxiety having regard in particular to the criticisms that can be made of para 3 of Sir Richard Scott V-C’s order and to the difficult position in which counsel for DA was placed. But ultimately my reasons for so concluding are (1) that it was proper for some examination to take place; (2) it did take place with a modus vivendi being worked out from time to time; (3) it does not leave DnB in possession of incriminating material which might be available to a prosecuting authority; (4) there would in any event be serious practical difficulties in relation to preventing `use’ of information already in the minds of those representing DnB; and (5) the question whether the answers provide relevant evidence and/or whether it is right to allow inferences to be drawn from the answers given should be for the future (whether on an application under Ord 29, r 1A or at the trial) in the light of circumstances as they exist then bearing in mind this judgment

In the result in my view the appeal should be allowed against the judge’s rulings that DA should answer the questions set out in the schedule with which we have been supplied. It follows that in my view also DA should not be required to provide answers to his own solicitors or the supervising solicitor, and any answers and/or information given to his solicitors and remaining subject to the order of the court, should now be free to be used as DA and his solicitors agree. In my view however also the appeal should be dismissed against the judge’s ruling to allow cross-examination at all and her decision to allow it to continue on the basis that it did.


MILLETT LJ. I also agree.

Appeal allowed in part.

Dilys Tausz Barrister.


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