3PLR – DINGSE V. REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE SUDAN
POLICY, PRACTICE AND PUBLISHING, LAW REPORTS 3PLR
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DINGSE
V.
REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE SUDAN
COURT OF APPEAL
[KADUNA DIVISION]
30TH APRIL, 2001
CA/K/238/98
3PLR/2001/108 (CA)
OTHER CITATIONS
BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:
ISA AYO SALAMI, JCA (Presided and delivered the leading judgment)
RABIU DANLAMI MUHAMMAD JCA
MAHMUD MOHAMMED, JCA
BETWEEN
- REV. ALI DINGSE
- MR. JOHN OKON
AND
THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE SUDAN (STATE OF NIGERIA) EKLISIYAR KRISTA A SUDAN (A NIGERIA) EKAS CHURCH KADUNA
EDITORS
[Sam Eleanya, Agboola Omolola Oluwafolakemi, Eleanya Kalu Vincent, Eleanya Ugochi Vine]
MAIN ISSUES
ACTION – Registration of a company or body under the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990 – whether qualifies every action brought by or against the company or body as arising from the Act.
COMPANY LAW – Trustees – appointment of – change of – section 682 and 683 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990 – need to register same with the Corporate Affairs Commission as condition precedent to validity.
COMPANY LAW – Registration of a company or body under the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990 – whether qualifies every action brought by or against the company or body as arising from the Act.
JUDGMENT AND ORDER – Order of court – need to obey same strictly – when not complied with – effect of.
JUDGMENT AND ORDER – Order of court to appoint new trustees by a church – court not expressly dissolving the existing board of trustees – implication of.
JURISDICTION – Primacy of jurisdictional issues – court lacking the jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter before it – effect of.
JURISDICTION – Proposed amendment of the constitution of a church – whether within the jurisdictional competence of the Federal High Court or State High Court.
JURISDICTION – Question of ordination of church priest – whether within the jurisdictional competence of the Federal High Court or State High Court.
MAIN JUDGMENT
ISA AYO SALAMI, JCA: (Delivering the leading judgment)
This is an interlocutory appeal brought against the decision of the Federal High Court delivered on the 18th December, 1997.The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant claiming as follows:-
“1. A declaration of accounts on its properties (sic) in Zaria town lying and situate at Samaru and Sabon Gari respectively from 1993 to date.
- A declaration of accounts on the properties (sic) of the plaintiff in Kaduna at Malali, Ungwan Maisamari and Lemu Road T/Wada from 1993 to date.
- A declaratory order that the supervisory role being played by the 1st and 2nd respondents in the management and control of the properties of the plaintiff is null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
- An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1st and 2nd defendants from the management of the plaintiff property both in Zaria and in Kaduna towns.
- A declaratory order that the ordination of 3rd defendant as a pastor is null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
- A declaratory order that the impending amended constitution of the plaintiff should not be registered or used otherwise except it is finally ratified by the General Church Council.”
The defendants objected to the competence of the trial court to entertain the matter on two grounds. The grounds are that the court does not have jurisdiction to hear the action and the proprietory of the instruction given by Yakubu Bali, the only trustee of the body within the jurisdiction to authorise the institution of the action. The learned trial Judge on each ground of objection overruled the defendants and held respectively that the Federal High Court is the only forum where the plaintiff’s action could be entertained at first instance. And, on the locus standi of the trustee to give instruction for the suit to be brought, before the lower court, he found that Mr. Yakubu Bali competently gave instruction for the action to be commenced.
The defendants were unhappy with the decision of the learned trial Judge and being dissatisfied with the ruling appealed to this court on 2 grounds of appeal. Briefs of argument filed by the respective parties, were exchanged. At the hearing of the appeal the respective counsel for both parties adopted and relied on their briefs of argument which were filed in pursuance of order 6 of the Court of Appeal Rules Cap 62 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.
The appellant framed the following 2 issues from his two grounds of appeal in the appellant’s brief of argument:-
“(1) Whether Mr. Yakubu Bali has the locus standi to institute and or instruct the institution of the suit at the Federal High Court as a trustee (whether registered or not) of the plaintiff, regard being had to the judgment of Justice (sic) Cudjoe (as she then was) in suit No. KDH/76M/84.
(2) Whether the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to determine and grant the reliefs claimed by the respondent in the court regard being had to the judgment of Justice (sic) Cudjoe (as she then was) in suit No. KDH/76M/84.”
On the other hand, the respondent too formulated 2 issues from the grounds of appeal:-
“(1) Whether the Federal High Court was right in holding that Mr. Yakubu Bali has the locus standi to instruct the institution or institute the suit, being the only registered trustee within the jurisdiction, irrespective of the judgment of (sic) Justice Cudjoe (as she then was) in suit No. KDH/76M/84………..
(2) Whether the Federal High Court was right in holding that it has jurisdiction to entertain the suit, irrespective of the judgment of (sic) Justice Cudjoe (as she then was) in suit No. KDH/76M/84……………….”
The formulations are the same except for the wordings. They are equally guilty of rudely referring to the learned trial Judge as “Justice” as if it were her first name. I think that members of the Bar should learn to show decorum and respect in their dealings with the Bench. When a member of the Bar finds it difficult to refer to and respect a Judge by referring to him or her as Honourable Justice one wonders what will be the attitude of lay members of the society at large.
In each of the briefs, issue 1 seems bifurcated as each sought to know whether “Mr. Yakubu Bali has the locus standi to institute or instruct the institution of the suit”. The first arm of the question respectfully does not arise as the record does not show that Mr. Yakubu Bali brought the suit. The party or person who brought the suit as plaintiff is one “The Registered Trustees of Ekas Church, Kakuri Kaduna”. In the circumstance the standing of Mr. Yakubu Bali to bring or institute the action is not an issue in this appeal and I do not intend to dilate further on this point in the course of this judgment.
In arguing the appeal, the learned counsel for appellant, in the appellant’s brief, submitted that having regard to the judgment of Cudjoe, J. (as she then was) in suit No. KDH/76M/84, Mr. Yakubu Bali lost his membership of the Board of Ekas Church as well as his capacity to instruct the institution of the suit at the Federal High Court culminating in the instant appeal. Learned counsel then argued that the court below, having found that the Kaduna State High Court ordered the replacement of the Board of Trustees of the plaintiff, wrongly ruled that Mr. Yakubu Bali, who was one of those ordered to be replaced, still retained his position as a trustee. Learned counsel then contended that the moment the state high court made that pronouncement all the three members of the Board ceased to hold the position since it is settled that judgment of a court takes immediate effect.
Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that, even if the order to hold a general meeting was not complied with, the position will still remain that the persons of Daniel Wambuda, Lt. Ibrahim Kachalla and Yakubu Bali ceased to so hold the position whether registered or not. Learned counsel argued further that there is nowhere the Kaduna State High Court hinged its decision on compliance with the provisions of section 682(1) Company and Allied Matters Act.
The learned Judge of the Kaduna State High Court of Justice ordered inter alia as follows:-
“1. The 1st defendants shall surrender the certificate of registration of Ekas Church to the plaintiffs pending the appointment of a fresh Board of Trustees who shall be appointed at a general meeting as provided in section 10 of the constitution of the Church of Christ in the Sudan (States in Nigeria), to be held not later than three months from today.”
Clearly the learned trial Judge did not unequivocally dissolve the existing Board of Trustee of the plaintiff. The court did so impliedly when it merely ordered that, within three months of the judgment, delivered on 31st January 1991, a general meeting of the church should be held with a view of electing three new trustees of the church. But this order was complied with more in breach than in compliance. The order to call a general meeting of the church, as was obliquely conceded by learned counsel for appellant, had not been complied with at the time of writing the appellant’s brief dated and filed respectively on 11th and 15th December 1998 almost seven years after the judgment. The court granted them three months to hold the general meeting. I am not unaware of the counter affidavit opposing the application for stay of execution purportedly deposed to, at an unknown date, by one James Ambi particularly paragraph 5 thereof. It is recited immediately hereunder:-
“5. That the entire Ekas Church acting on the basis of the honourable court’s judgment orders had on the 9th day of February 1991 appointed a new board of trustees. Copy of the minutes of the general meeting in which the trustees were appointed is herewith attached and marked exhibit A.” (Italics supplied)
This averment is however repudiated by exhibit A which says that the minutes was not that of a general meeting but of a care-taker committee. The heading of the document referred to as exhibit A, although not so marked, read as follows:-
“MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE CARE-TAKER COMMITTEE HELD ON THE 2ND FEBRUARY 1991 AT THE EKAS CHURCH UNGUWAN TELEVISION.”
The deponent averred that the meeting was held on 9th February 1991 contrary to the 2nd February 1991 stated in the minutes. Notwithstanding all these discrepancies there is no doubt that the purpose of the meeting was to elect three new members of the board of trustees of Ekas Church. This view is supported by paragraph 2 of the said minutes which is read in part as follows:-
“He explained the purpose of the meeting which is to elect a new Board of Trustees for the Ekas Church following the dissolution of the former Board by the High Court.”
If the power of the church to appoint new or replace trustees emanates from the judgment which prescribed a period of three months within which the three members would be elected or selected at a general meeting it is not open to them to contend that they are the new trustees without strictly implementing the order of the court. Since the church sought the forum of a care-taker committee, contrary to the order of the court, to the effect that the trustees should be elected at a general meeting, the decision arrived at a meeting held in contravention of the order of the court is null and void. It did not comply with the order of the court which ordered that a general meeting be held and there is nothing, on the record, showing that the meeting of a care-taker committee is synonymous with a general meeting. In the circumstance, the condition precedent for giving effect to the judgment of the Kaduna State High Court in suit No. KDH/76M/84 was not satisfied. In the result the resolution of that meeting is a nullity and not binding on any of the parties. It is not enforceable. There is, therefore no board of trustees selected or elected within three months to run the affairs of the Ekas Church. The alleged selection of Rev. Ali Dingse, Mr. Ahmadu Jatau and Pastor Mani Tanko was improperly carried out.
I agree with the submission of the learned counsel for respondent that the status of the Board of Trustees of Rev. Ali Dingse, Mr. Ahmadu Jatau and Pastor Mani Tanko remains incohate assuming they were properly elected, which is not the case, until registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission. A body or corporation desirous of changing some or all its trustees or appointing more must apply under section 682 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, Cap 59 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. It is required, by a resolution at a general meeting, to do so and then apply for the approval of the commission on the prescribed form. The commission shall consider the application and if satisfied cause the application to be published in two local newspapers and also direct a display of the notice of the proposed change or alteration to be mounted at a conspicuous place at the body’s headquarters or at any branches where majority of members are likely to see it. It is the assent of the commission to the application, signified in writing to the corporation or body, that renders the appointment valid from the date of the resolution appointing the trustees. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that it was not part of the judgment that the appointment of the trustees should be registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission lacks substance. It is condition upon which appointments can be validly made and since their own appointments were not registered with the commission it was neither validated nor brought into effect. It is, therefore, null and void. I am encouraged, in this view, by the provisions of section 683 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, Cap 59 which renders such change or alteration void. It provides thus:-
“683. Any change or alterations purported to be made in contravention of section 680, 681 and 682 of this part of this Act shall be void.”
If there is any doubt about the incompetence of the election of –
(d) Pastor Ali Dingse
(e) Ahmadu Jatau
(f) Pastor Mani Tanko
on the 2nd day of February, 1991 I believe section 683 had nailed or erased such doubt. The election or selection having been done not in strict compliance with the terms of the judgment cannot be sustained. The position is further aggravated by the failure of the appellant to seek approval of the commission for any change or alteration of incorporated trustees notwithstanding the omission of the learned trial Judge of Kaduna State High Court to include such a requirement in the judgment. It is a statutory condition which cannot be wished away or waived. It is a requirement of the law that approval of the Corporate Affairs Commission must be sought and granted before there can be a change or alteration of trustees. It is a mandatory provision which cannot be ignored because there is a sanction attached to default in obtaining the approval of the commission which is no less than voidance of the election of such trustees. The analogy of the removal of the chairman of a local government is not apposite. The situation at hand, in this proceedings, is where the court ordered the members to replace the existing board “within three months from 31.1.91”, without expressly dissolving the existing board of trustees, the necessary inference is that when the new board is properly constituted the existing one evaporates. But there was no new board set up within three months of the judgment of the court delivered on 31st January 1991 by the general meeting as stipulated by the court. The one allegedly set up on 2nd February, 1991 was not by a general meeting but a care-taker committee which does not answer to the order of the court. What next? I think the reasonable implication is that the flock could not be left without someone to shepherd them. So the existing board of trustees, in the absence of replacement ordered by the court, remains in office until it is changed in accordance with the provision of sections 680, 681 and 682 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act.
The answer to the appellants’ issue 1 is answered in the affirmative and ground 1 of the ground of appeal from which it is framed fails and it is dismissed.
In arguing the remaining issue, learned counsel for appellant contended that the learned trial Judge assumed jurisdiction to entertain the suit on the combined provisions of section 673(1) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, Cap 59 and section 230(1)(e) of the Constitution Suspension and Modification Decree No. 107 of 1993. Learned counsel, in the appellant’s brief, read the provisions of both enactments and then argued that the rationalization of the court’s reason, for assuming jurisdiction, on the ground that, since the respondent was registered in accordance with the provisions of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, Cap 59, its action, therefore, relates to the operation of the said Act in accordance with the provisions of section 230(1)(e) of the Constitution is untenable. He referred to the case of Nigeria Industrial Development Bank v. Fembo Nigeria Ltd. (1997) 2 NWLR (Pt. 489) 534. Learned counsel submitted in the appellant’s brief that for the Federal High Court to assume jurisdiction under the provisions of section 230(1)(e) of the Constitution, the subject of the claim must relate to dispute touching upon the provisions of Companies and Allied Matters Act or with respect to common law regulating the operation of companies.
Learned counsel for respondent took a simplistic view of the whole issue when he submitted in the respondent’s brief and I quote:-
“The respondent humbly submits that the Federal High Court was right in holding that it is the only court with jurisdiction to entertain the suit by virtue of section 230(1)(e) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree 107 of 1993, now section 251(1)(e) of the 1999 Constitution as the matter, which relates to part C of the Companies and Allied Matters Act is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.”
It is not every matter that falls within the ambit of the Act that is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. It is hoped that learned counsel for respondent will avoid falling into this type of generalisation.
I agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for appellant, with respect to the learned trial Judge, that the fact that a company or body is registered under the Companies and Allied Matters Act, Cap 59 does not qualify every action brought by or against it as an act arising from the operation of an Act relating to Companies and Allied Matters Act or any other common law regulation as contemplated by the provisions of section 230(1)(e) of the Constitution. The assumption of jurisdiction by the court below on the strength of section 673(1) of Companies and Allied Matters Act, Cap 59 cannot be correct. Section 673(1) of the Act provides as follows:-
“(1) Where one or more trustees are appointed by any community of persons bound together by custom, religion, kinship or nationality or by any body or association of person established for religious, educational, literary, scientific, social, development……….. purpose he, or they may, if so authorised by the community, body or association (hereinafter referred to as association) apply for registration under this Decree as a corporate body.”
Clearly section 673(1) of the Act does not confer jurisdiction on the Federal High Court nor any other court. The assumption of jurisdiction under it by the court is wrongful. The provisions of the subsection merely allow one or more trustees to apply for registration under the Act as a corporate body. Neither does section 230(1)(e) of the Constitution vests jurisdiction in the Federal High Court to entertain any action involving the respondent because it is incorporated in accordance with section 673 of Cap 59 simpliciter. Section 230(1)(e) of the 1979 Constitution which gives Federal High Court jurisdiction provides as follows:-
“230 (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly or a Decree, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters arising from –
(a) ………………………………………………
(e) the operation of any Act or Decree relating to companies and allied matters and any other common law regulating the operation of companies.”
It is clear from the reading of paragraph (e) of subsection (1) of section 230 of the Constitution that the Federal High Court will only assume jurisdiction if the claim or cause of action relates to law, whether statutory or common law regulating the operation of companies. The effect is that companies and allied matters and common law regulating the operation of companies would cover such legislations, subsidiary liegislations and common law regulating companies. In an action involving legislations, subsidiary legislation and common law regulating companies the Federal High Court would have jurisdiction. It will have jurisdiction in matters affecting the removal, change or alteration of the trustees, shares and share-holdings, memorandum and article of association etc. These are matters regulating companies and are provided for either in Companies and Allied Matters Act or common law regulating companies. In short, section 230(1)(e) confers and confines the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to matters pertaining to control of companies and allied matters, whether provided by Companies and Allied Matters Act or common law regulating operation of companies. But where the matter in dispute does not involve the control of a company or body and deals with ordinary course of business of a company State High Court and not Federal High Court has jurisdiction to hear the matter, that is, the dispute can be determined without recourse to either companies and allied matters or any common law regulating companies: NIDB v. Fembol Nigeria Ltd. (supra) cited in the appellant’s brief of argument, Bisco Hotels Limited v. Allied Bank of Nigeria Limited (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt. 465) 176 and Jammal Steel Structures Limited (1973) NSCC 619, 7up Bottling Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. Abiola & Sons Bottling Co. Ltd. (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt. 468) 714. 744.
The determination of this issue, that is, whether the Federal or a State High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit, turns upon the claim endorsed upon the writ of summons or particulars of claims, where there is one or a statement of claim. It is from one or more of these processes filed by the plaintiff that a cause of action which is a “bundle or aggregate of facts in the relationship between the parties which the court will recognise as enabling the plaintiff to enforce the claim against the defendant” per Adio, JCA (as he then was): U.B.N. Ltd. v. Penny Mart Limited (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt. 240) 228, 239. See also Egbe v. Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1; A.G. Oyo State v. Bello & Ors. (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 828, 876, 888; Savage & Ors. v. M. O. Uwaechia (1972) 3 SC 213, 221; Thomas v. Olufosoye (1986)
1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669, 682. See also Tukur v. Gov. Gongola State (1989) 9 SCNJ 1, 24, (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517, 549 and FBN Plc. v. Jimiko Farms Ltd. (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 503) 81, 92.
It is, therefore, necessary to examine the reliefs being sought by the plaintiff. They read as follows:-
“1. A declaration of accounts on its property in Zaria town lying and situate at Samaru and Sabon Gari respectively from 1993 to date.
- A declaration of accounts on the property of the plaintiff in Kaduna at Malali, Ungwan Maisamari and Lemu Road T/Wada from 1993 to date.
- A declaratory order that the supervisory role being played by the 1st and 2nd respondents in the management and control of the property of the plaintiff is null and of no effect whatsoever.
- An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1st and 2nd defendants from the management of the plaintiff’s property both in Zaria and in Kaduna towns.
- A declaratory order that the ordination of the 1st defendant as a pastor is null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
- A declaratory order that the impending amended constitution of the plaintiff should not be registered or used otherwise except it is finally ratified by the General Church Council.”
The particulars of claim which was also endorsed on the writ of summons are as follows:-
“1. The 1st and 2nd defendants rented out the church at Samaru Zaria to other churches for a consideration of seven thousand naira only (N7,000.00) per annum from 1993 to date which sum is N35,000.00.
- The 1st and 2nd defendants rented out the church at Sabon-Gari, Zaria to other churches for a consideration of six thousand naira only (N6000.00) from 1993 to date which sum is N30,000.00.
- The 1st and 2nd defendants rented out the church at Malali Ungwan Maisamari, Kaduna to other churches for a consideration of twenty-five thousand naira only (N25,000.00) per annum from 1993 to date which sum is N125,000.00.
- The 1st and 2nd defendants rented out the church at Lemu Road, T/Wada, Kaduna to other churches for a consideration not disclosed from 1994 to date
Total amount = N190,000 (unknown exclusive).
- The church was in the process of amending the plaintiff’s constitution but the process has not been consumated.”
Except claim 6 and particular 5 which talk about amending the constitution, all the other particulars deal with accounting for various sums of money totaling N190,000.00, being rents collected from various property of the church, situate at Zaria and Kaduna with exception of the one situate at Lemu Road, T/Wada, Kaduna, the rent of which was not immediately known to them. Surely accounting for rent collected does not and will not call for law regulating the operation of companies and allied matters to warrant or justify the court below assuming jurisdiction to hear the respondent’s suit as it is presently constituted. The other question namely ordination of priest, is a matter that does not touch upon the law whether statutory or common regulating the operation of company and allied matters. It, therefore, like claims for accounts, does not fall within the competence of the court – Federal High Court because recourse would not be had to Companies and Allied Matters Act Cap. 59 nor common law regulating the operation of companies.
The only outstanding relief sought is a tricky one. It deals with the proposed amendment of the constitution of the respondent which respondent wants approved by the General Church Council before it is registered. The ratification of the Constitution may require reference to the Companies and Allied Matters Act or common law regulations as to operation of companies. The procedure to be followed to get the constitution amended or otherwise are enunciated in the Act. It therefore falls within the contemplation of section 230(1)(e) of the Constitution, as in so deciding the issue arising therefore, the court will have recourse to the provisions of the Companies and Allied Matters Act Cap. 59.
I am now at a cross-road. I have found that 5 of the six reliefs sought before the Federal High Court are not within the contemplation of section 230(1)(e) of the Constitution and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is ousted in respect of the first five reliefs. The provision of paragraph (e) of subsection(1) of section 230 does not oust jurisdiction of State High Courts from cases involving routine transaction or their daily chores such as contract, tort or fiduciary relations simply because one or more of the parties are registered under the Companies and Allied Matters Act Cap. 59. The outstanding relief is as observed earlier within the competence of the court. Since jurisdiction cannot be conferred by either this court or the parties nor the court below or any other court it seems to me that reliefs 1,2,3,4 and 5 are not within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court and this court has no power to confer it with necessary jurisdiction to hear the suit, the only option open to this court is to strike them out. The reliefs are accordingly struck out. The remaining issue is within the competence of that court and is remitted to it to be tried.
The appeal partially succeeds and it is allowed with no order as to costs.
RABIU DANLAMI MUHAMMAD, JCA.: I have read before now the judgment just delivered by my learned brother Salami, JCA. He has thoroughly dealt with all the issues canvassed in the appeal. I am in complete agreement with his reasoning and conclusion. The appeal partially succeeds. I abide by all the consequential orders in the leading judgment.
MAHMUD MOHAMMED, JCA.: The judgment of my learned brother Salami JCA which has just been delivered was read by me before today. I entirely agree with the reasoning and the conclusion reached in that judgment in resolving the two issues arising for the determination of the appeal.
It is of the utmost importance, in the administration of justice in our courts that where the jurisdiction of the court is raised and is in issue, to dispose of that issue first as was rightly done by the lower court in the instant case because jurisdiction is a radical and fundamental prerequisite for adjudication. See Adeigbe v. Kushimo (1965) 1 All NLR 248. Furthermore, it is also trite that if the court is shown to have no jurisdiction, the proceedings leading to the judgment however well conducted are entirely a nullity as declared in the leading authority on the subject of jurisdiction in the case of Madukolu & Ors. v. Nkemdilim & Ors. (1962) 1 All NLR 584; (2001) 46 WRN 1. Therefore in the present case, although the lower court is clearly without jurisdiction to hear and determine 5 of the 6 reliefs being claimed by the respondents as the plaintiffs before it, the jurisdiction of that court to hear and determine one of the reliefs of the respondents in respect of which is has jurisdiction cannot be interfered with by this court. I therefore entirely agree that the lower court may proceed to hear and determine the respondent’s relief which that court is competent to hear and determine having regard to the existing law prescribing its jurisdiction.
The appeal thus succeeds in part and therefore I allow it. I also abide by the order on costs in the lead judgment.
Cases referred to in the judgment
Nigeria Industrial Development Bank v. Fembo Nig. Ltd (1997) 2 NWLR (Pt. 489) 534.
Bisco Hotels Ltd v. Allied Bank of Nig. Ltd (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt. 465) 176.
7up Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Abiola & Sons Bottling Co. Ltd. I(1996) 7 NWLR (Pt. 468) 714.
A.G. Oyo State v. Bello (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 828.
Adeigbe v. Kusimo (1965) 1 All NLR 248.
Egbe v. Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1
FBN Plc v. Jimiko Farms Ltd (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 503) 81
Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 All NLR 584; (2001) 46 WRN 1.
Savage v. Uwaechia (1972) 3 SC 213.
Thomas v. Olufosoye (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669.
Tukur v. Gov. Gongola State (1989) 9 SCNJ 1; (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517
UBN Ltd v. Penny Mart Ltd (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt. 240) 228.
Jammal Steel Structures Ltd (1973) NSCC 619.
Statutes referred to in the judgment
Companies & Allied Matters Act Cap 59, sections 673 (1), 680, 681, 682 and 683
Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993, section 230 (1)(e).
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, section 251 (1)(e).
Rule of court referred to in the judgment
Court of Appeal Rules, 1981; order 6.
