3PLR – DANIYAN V. IYAGIN

POLICY, PRACTICE AND PUBLISHING, LAW REPORTS  3PLR

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DANIYAN

V.

IYAGIN

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

[ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION]

3PLR/2001/106  (CA)

 

OTHER CITATIONS

7 NWLR (Pt 760) 345

FWLR [pt. 120] 1805

 

 

BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:

MOHAMMAD SAIFULLAH1 MUNTAKA COOMASSIE, JCA (Presided)

ZAINAB ADAMU BULKACHUWA, J.C.A

ALBERT GBADEBO ODUYEMI, J.C.A (Delivered the leading judgment)

 

BETWEEN                    

1. DR. MICHAEL AYO DANIYAN

In substitution for J.B. DANIYAN (for himself and on behalf of Eseyin-Moga and Atte-Mote families of Okenaun-Mopa)

2. S.O. OLORUNNISHOLA

(on behalf of Omba family of Okenaun-Mopa)

 

AND

1. MR. ELKENA OBA IYAGIN
2. OYI TRADITIONAL COUNCIL
3. YAGBA LOCAL GOVERNMENT
4. GOVERNMENT OF KOGI STATE

 

MAIN ISSUES

APPEAL – Findings of facts by a trial court – when an appellate court would interfere with same – applicable principles.

CHIEFTAINCY MATTERS – Plaintiff in a chieftaincy matter – what plaintiff must state in pleadings.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER – Declaratory order – essence of .

LOCUS STANDI – Meaning of – proper order for the court to make when a plaintiff lacks locus standi to sue – relevant documents for the court to consider when determining issues of locus standi.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Representative action – need for plaintiff suing in a representative action to seek leave – whether failure to obtain leave vitiates the validity of the action.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Pleadings – nature of denial in a statement of defence that qualifies as insufficient denial or insufficient traverse.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Representative action – persons who qualify as parties in such action.

 

MAIN JUDGMENT

ALBERT GBADEBO ODUYEMI, J.C.A. (Delivered the following judgment):

 

By a writ of summons issued out of the Lokoja Judicial Division of the former High Court of Kwara State on 6th September, 1990, the then 1st plaintiff (now deceased) for himself and on behalf of Eseyin-Moga and Atte Mote families of Okenaun-Mopa while the 2nd plaintiff on behalf of Omba family of Okenaun-Mopa claimed from the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th respondents as follows:

 

“1.     A declaration that the purported appointment of the 1st defendant as Otunba of Mopa in Yagba Local Government Area based on the recommendation of Oyi Traditional Council and contained in a letter Ref. YAG/LGE/l/30 written by the Sole Administrator, Yagba Local Government, Isanlu is ultra vires, illegal and contrary to the custom of Mopa community relating to such an appointment and therefore null and void.

 

2. A declaration that the 1st defendant having not been installed by the Elulu of Mopa can not wear the Traditional Red Cap (Atu-Odi) and therefore he can not perform or attend the traditional council meeting of Mopa Chiefs.

 

3. A declaration that the 1st plaintiff who has been properly nominated, selected by the Okenaun compound of Iloke, duly presented to Patia, Legemu Quarters and subsequently to the Elulu of Mopa, as the Otunba of Mopa is therefore the person whose, nomination and selection ought to have been ratified by the government.

 

4. A perpetual injunction restraining the 1st defendant from parading himself as the Otunba of Mopa, or/and wear the Traditional Red Cap (Atu-Odi), beads and other insignia of Otunba of Mopa and/or attend the Mopa Traditional Council meeting in that capacity.”

 

By the close of pleadings in the suit, Kogi State of Nigeria had been excised out of the former Kwara State of Nigeria. The suit was then transferred to the Kabba Judicial Division of Kogi State. 1st defendant thereafter filed a notice of preliminary objection to the suit on the grounds inter alia that – the court had no jurisdiction to try the case as constituted and that the suit was an attack on the power of the Military Governor to make the Chiefs Edict, No. 3 of 1988.

 

Arguments were taken on the application. The High Court of Kogi State (hereinafter called “the lower court”) in a considered ruling ruled against the 1st defendant and dismissed the application in its entirety. An appeal to the Kaduna division of this court by the 1st defendant also failed.

 

The judgment in that appeal was delivered by the Kaduna division of this court on 5th March, 1996. Both the creation of Kogi State and the interlocutory appeal in part, account for the somewhat chequered history of this action.

Before hearing of the substantive action commenced, the 1st plaintiff had died. He was substituted in the same representative capacity by the present 1st plaintiff by order of the lower court. The application for substitution was not opposed by any of the defendants. In consequence, further amendments were made to the statement of claim to reflect in paragraphs 1,23,26,27,28 and relief No. 3 of paragraph 49 of the amended statement of claim, the order of court for substitution.

 

At the end of the trial, the lower court refused the reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs and dismissed their claim. It is against that judgment that the plaintiffs have now appealed to this court. The notice of appeal filed in the lower court contained 8 grounds of appeal misnumbered as follows:

 

“1.     The decision of the trial court is against the weight of evidence.

 

2        The trial court erred in law in dismissing the case of the plaintiffs after he has held that the plaintiffs have no locus standi.

 

3. The trial court erred when it held that the plaintiffs have no interest to prosecute in the case.

 

4. The trial court erred in holding that the plaintiffs have not discharged their duty to prove that the Daniyans are natives of Mopa qualified to be appointed as the Otunba.

 

5. The trial court misdirected itself when it used the evidence of PW3 Ronke that his father did not become Shaaba until he was 3 generations in Mopa to determine nationality of the Daniyans. This has occasioned miscarriage of justice.

 

6. The trial court erred when it held that because the late Pa Luke Daniyan had an Amuro ancestry the Daniyans are therefore matrilineal when evidence abound that every family particularly the 54 families listed in exhibit 1 came from other villages.

 

7. The trial court erred in law by failing to nullify the purported appointment of 1st defendant in view of the abundant evidence that the nomination of the 1st defendant was not proper.

 

8. The trial court erred in giving consideration to documents which were tendered, but not demonstrated in court while giving no reliance to document tendered and interpreted. This has caused miscarriage of justice.

 

The appellants in the appellant’s brief of argument desire the duplication in ground 2 to be referred to as 2 and 2(i) respectively.

 

From the 8 grounds of appeal the appellants have formulated 6 issues for determination in this appeal as follows:

 

“1.     Issue No. 1 – relates to ground, 2.

 

Whether it is proper for the trial court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ case when the court found that the plaintiffs lack locus standi in the case.

 

2. Issue No. 2 – in respect of grounds 1 and 2 (1).

 

Whether the plaintiffs have sufficient interest and authority to prosecute the case.

 

3. Issue No. 3 – relates to ground 4. Whether the court did not misdirect itself when it used unpleaded fact to arrive at its judgment in respect of what a recent settlement is and the number of generations a person must have been before qualifying as a citizen and entitled to Otunba chieftaincy of Mopa.

 

4. Issue No. 4 – relates to grounds 3 and 5.

 

Whether the mere fact of ancestry linkage is so exceptional in the case of Daniyans as to disentitle them to nativity of Mopa when all the 54 families in Mopa have ancestral lineage with other towns/village too?

 

5. Issue No. 5 – relates to ground 6.

 

Whether the appointment of 1st defendant satisfied the traditional requirement of selection, nomination and recommendation through the Elulu to the appropriate authority?

 

6. Issue No 6 – relates to ground 7.

 

Whether the trial court was right in ignoring evidence contained in exh. 9 which support the plaintiffs’ case while using evidence from the same document in support of the defendants and whether the court did right in discountenancing exhibit 3 properly before it and interpreted.”

 

For the 1st respondent three issues have been formulated for determination.

 

They are:-

 

“I.      Whether from the claims of the plaintiffs and the evidence before the court, the plaintiffs showed sufficient interest and authority to prosecute the case either in representative or personal capacities, and if they did not whether the order of dismissal was correctly made by the learned trial judge.

 

1. Whether the learned trial Judge made correct findings and determination of the issue of who is entitled to occupy the position of the Otunba of Mopa

 

III.     Whether the learned trial judge from the evidence before him correctly determined the issue of the validity of the appointment of the 1st defendant as the Otunba of Mopa.

 

In the brief of 2nd, 3rd and 4th respondents, the following two issues were formulated for determination in this appeal. They are:

 

“1.     Whether having regard to the exhibits tendered by the plaintiffs in the course of trial and the testimony of witnesses called by the plaintiffs, the nomination of 1st defendant to Oyi traditional council and the subsequent approval by the government was proper (This issue relates to ground 6 of the appellant’s ground of appeal).

 

2. Whether having regard to the contents of exhibit “9” tendered by the plaintiffs in the trial court, the testimony of the plaintiffs’ witnesses and law, there is sufficient basis to disturb the judgment of the trial court. (This issue relates to ground 7 of the grounds of appeal).”

 

With respect, I am of the view that the issues for determination can be set out as follows:-

 

1. Whether the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs have locus standi to prosecute the claim in representative capacities as claimed – grounds 2 and 2(i); and

 

2. Whether the lower court made a proper evaluation of the evidence – This issue encompasses grounds 1,3,4,5,6 and 7 in the notice of appeal.

 

The first issue relates to the locus standi of the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs respectively and covers issues 1 and 2 in the appellants’ brief of argument. The following portions of the judgment of the lower court in volume 2 of the proceedings indicate the aspects of the court’s decision on the locus standi of the plaintiffs against which the appellants complain in this issue.

 

“Paragraph 16.03.

 

In the evidence in chief of the 1st plaintiff, Dr. Michael Daniyan his connections with this matter are as stated in his own words

 

1. “My hometown is at Mopa Okenaun compound…………;

 

ii        ………….I am aggrieved I want the court to hold that the person duly selected was upturned contrary to Mopa tradition and custom …………………

 

iii.      My great grand father by name Ajemgbelelokun was the progenitor of the Daniyan’s at Mopa .……………….

 

1. My brother Chief Daniyan testified before the Oyi Traditional Council at Kabba”.

 

16.05.         In my view, it is an established principle of law that pleadings do not constitute evidence. The pleading not alluded to in evidence as in this case, will be deemed to have been abandoned. Eseigbe v. Agholor (1993) 9 NWLR (Pt. 316) 128. It is the duty of the plaintiffs to call evidence in support of their pleadings in so far as there is no admission of the matter alleged by them. Chief R.B. Buraimoh v. Chief Maliki Adeniyi Esa and others (1990) 4 SCNJ 1 at page 8. The plaintiffs have therefore failed to discharge the first onus on them who purport to sue in a representative capacity. See Chief Effiong Enebiet Efiom Duke and others for themselves and members of Yellow Duke House v. Etubom George Duky Henshaw (1940) 6 WACA 2000.

 

16-07. Above, in my view, does not dispense with the need for the plaintiffs to still adduce necessary evidence in court in proof of their authority of the hearing.

 

The affidavit in support of the motion on notice for an order replacing the name of’ the 1st plaintiff (now deceased) with the name of Dr. Michael Ayo Daniyan has this to say –

 

“That following his death the families of Eseyin-Moga and Atte Mote net (sic) at Chief S.B. Daniyan’s house and resolved that Dr. Michael Ayodele Daniyan should represent the interest of the two families in the present suit.”

 

16.08.         “Evidence led as to the above, would have been the best proof of the authority of the said plaintiffs to sue in a representative capacity as this is not facts (sic) which the court can take judicial notice of as required under section 74(l) of the Evidence Act as urged on the court by the learned counsel to the plaintiffs.”

 

I have made copious excerpts from the judgment of the learned trial judge so as to show on a consideration of authorities whether or not the complaints of the appellants against the judgment are justified. There is no doubt that the issue of locus standi is a question of law. The submissions on behalf of the appellants are as follows: The appellants concede that the trial court has rightly described what locus standi is, basing its definition on legal authorities cited but submit that the trial court did not properly apply the principles of law to the case of the plaintiffs.

 

That from the following findings of fact by the court – viz:-

 

(a)     Otunba chieftaincy title is not a family title or designated for certain families;

 

(b)     Otunba chieftaincy is not heritable by children and grandchildren as it is personal honour;

 

(c)     Otunba title is a communal one;

 

(d)     The general traditional title is different from the family traditional chieftaincy as no family in Mopa can lay claim to the general traditional chieftaincy;

 

(e)     Under Mopa tradition the appointment of an Otunba and Elulu are rotational between Odo Ile and Iloke Mopa so that whenever it is the turn of any of the two parts all the families there will appoint their Otunba and it is almost automatic;

 

(f)      Every person in the area whose turn it is, is eligible if the family there nominated him;

 

(g)     Both the Daniyan family and that of Elkena Oba Iyagin (1st defendant) are from the same Iloke section and that both of them were from Okenaun compound of Iloke, it is the submission of appellants that the issue of a chieftaincy family will not arise.

 

Appellants therefore contend that in that event, any of the Daniyans from Iloke and Okenaum are eligible and hence, have interest in the chieftaincy – They rely on paragraphs 1,2,3,15,16,18,19 and 24 of the further amended statement of claim.

 

It is further contended that the issue is not that of rotation between chieftaincy families but that of arrangement by custom to a section of the community at any particular point in time. It is contended that the decision of the lower court that plaintiffs/appellants have failed to prove that J.B. Daniyan (the original 1st plaintiff) was a bona fide son of Mopa is a decision on the locus standi of the Daniyans (including the 1st plaintiff).

 

Accordingly, appellants submit that that decision is to the effect that the Daniyans do not have sufficient interest which would entitle them to prosecute this suit. It is also contended that without tendering in evidence the authority given to 1st and 2nd plaintiffs by those whom they claim to represent, it is open to the court to deduce from the facts in court authority for plaintiffs to sue in representative capacity, if they are able to show a common interest or a common grievance – Atane v. Amu (1974) 10 S.C. 237; (1974) 9 NSCC 446.

 

It is also the submission of appellants that affidavit evidence in support of the application for the substitution of Dr. Michael Ayodele Daniyan in place of the original plaintiff – Chief S.B. Daniyan upon the latter’s death which application was granted without any objection from the defendants/ respondents is adequate evidence.

 

Appellants also contend that apart from the affidavit evidence before the court there was also evidence of PW2, PW3 and PW4 which inter alia, show in effect that the title in dispute rotates from one half of the community to the other half depending upon which half of the community has chosen the Elulu – (the Oba) as both titles cannot come within the same half; that in effect, the people of Okenaum have common interest to select and did select the original 1st plaintiff.

 

It is also the contention of appellants that the decision of the lower court to dismiss the action of plaintiffs/appellants because they (plaintiffs) have not shown that their personal rights have been infringed is not the appropriate one but that the decision should have been one of striking out the action; that therefore, there was no basis for the court to have made the extended and expanded decision on the other points which the court made.

 

For the 1st respondent it is contended as follows:

 

It is conceded that where at the preliminary stage of an action, findings are made that the plaintiff has no locus standi to prosecute the action, the only option open to the court is to strike out the action, it is however contended that in this case, the matter has gone through the complete process of trial on its merits and as such, the proper order to make is justifiably a dismissal since plaintiffs have been shown not to be entitled to the reliefs claimed.

 

It is also contended that locus standi is not limited to the limitation of a court to adjudicate but also encompasses the issue of cause of action.

 

That as such the plaintiff must show that he has some justiciable interest which may be affected by the action or that he will suffer injury or damage.

 

It is also the contention that the plaintiffs indicate in the title to the action that each of them has taken action in a representative capacity; neither has shown any order of court to sue in a representative capacity nor an approval of court to any authority which they claim to have received from those whom they claim to represent. In fact it is contended that plaintiffs pleaded that they would rely on the authority in the statement of claim but failed throughout the proceedings to exhibit that authority.

 

Reliance is also placed on the finding of the lower court that upon the available evidence, Otunba chieftaincy is not a family chieftaincy to be inherited by children and grandchildren but a personal honour to which neither the substitute 1st plaintiff nor the 2nd plaintiff has indicated a personal interest since the death of the original 1st plaintiff.

 

It is therefore contended that neither plaintiff can claim to have been aggrieved.

 

Regrettably, I find nothing in the brief of 2nd – 4th defendants which can be said to relate to the issue under discussion.

 

In the event, I take it as contended in the reply brief of appellants, that the 2nd – 4th respondents have nothing to say on this issue. The 1st and 2nd plaintiffs in this claim have shown respectively in the title to the writ of summons that –

 

The 1st plaintiff (both the original plaintiff and the substituted 1st plaintiff) makes the claims in the action for himself and on behalf of Eseyin-Moga and Atte-Mote families of Okenaun-Mopa;

 

The 2nd plaintiff makes the claim on behalf of the Omba family of Oke-naun Mopa. The relevant rules of the Kogi State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules to consider in this respect of this suit are as follows:

 

“Order 11

 

rule 8.Where more persons than one have the same interest in one suit, one or more of them may, with the approval of the court, be authorised by the other persons interested to sue or to defend the suit for the benefit of or on behalf of all parties so interested.

 

rule 35.The death of a plaintiff or defendant shall not cause a suit to abate if the cause of action survives.

 

rule 37.(1)   If there are two or more plaintiffs and one of them dies, and if the cause of action does not survive the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, but survives to them and the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff jointly, the court may, on the application of the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff, enter the name of that legal representative in the suit in the place of the deceased plaintiff and the suit shall proceed at the instance of the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs and the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff.”

 

Similarly, the provisions of the further amended statement of claim that need be considered on this issue are: 1,2,3,4,8,9,10,11,13-20;22-27,32,47-49.

 

“1.     Dr. Michael Daniyan, the 1st plaintiff, is a retired civil servant and a member of the Atte-Mote family of Okenaun compound of Patia in Iloke, Mopa.

 

2. The 1st plaintiff who represents himself, his own family and Eseyin-Moga of Okenaun shall rely on his letter of authority to do so at trial.

 

3. The 2nd plaintiff who represents the Omba family of Okenaun who shall rely on his letter of authority at trial is a farmer and resides at Mopa.

 

4. The 1st defendant who is purportedly recommended for the appointment as the Otunba of Mopa vide a letter by the sole administrator of Yagba LGA YAG/LGA/l/30 of 8th September, 1989 is of the Iyagbadi family also of Okenaun in Patia, Iloke Mopa . ……………………

 

8. The plaintiffs aver that Mopa is divided into two major settlements known and called Odole and Iloke.

 

9. That Iloke is further divided into two wards i.e. Patia and Legemo wards.

 

10. That Patia is further sub-divided into four (4) quarters/ compound namely, (1) Odonaun (2) Okenaun (3) Idose (4) Oke-Ofe.

 

11. That the Okenaun quarters consists of four major families which are: (1) Omba (2) Eseyin-Moga (3) Atte-Mote (4) Iyagbadi ….

 

13. The Oba of Mopa is called the Elulu which office has come to be rotated between Odole and Iloke (the two major groups).

 

14. The second office to the Elulu was known and called Shaaba until it was recently changed to Otunba.

 

15. The office of Otunba of Mopa is also rotated between Odole and Iloke, so that when the Elulu comes from Odole the Otunba must come from Iloke and vice-versa.

 

16. The present Elulu Oba Jolade is from Odole and therefore the turn of Iloke to appoint an Otunba.

 

17. That at the passing away of the last Elulu-Oba Orimolade who hailed from Iloke in 1981 the Iloke people know that since the Elulu would have to come from Odole it was their turn in Iloke to choose and appoint the Otunba.

 

18. The entire Iloke met in 1983 and resolved that it was the Patia ward that would produce an Otunba from Iloke.

 

19. The Patia ward consisting of four quarters also met in the same 1983 and unanimously resolved that it was the Okenaun quarters that should produce an Otunba of Mopa.

 

20. It was against this background that the Okenaun quarters deliberated in advance on the issue of Otunba and a seven man committee set up to look for a suitable candidate……………………………………………………………………………

 

22. The committee first met on 15th July, 1983 and on 23rd July, 1983 at which meeting the committee was enlarged to include Mr. Afolayan and Rev. David Isaiah.

 

23. The committee unanimously nominated Mr. J.B. Daniyan who did not accept the offer until the 2nd meeting of 23rd July, 1983 after due consultation with members of his family.

 

24. The issue of who Okenaun was going to present as Otunba to the Patia ward and subsequently to the whole of Iloke and Mopa at large was resolved on 23rd July, 1983 to be Mr. J.B. Daniyan.

 

25. The Okenaun quarters by its letter dated 30th April, 1986 to Iloke community made known its choice of J.B. Daniyan as the candidate nominated and selected to fill the position of Otunba of Mopa. The plaintiffs, hereby plead the said letter as well as the Elulu’s letter dated 11/4/84 requesting the Iloke community to present a candidate for the post of Otunba.

 

26. The plaintiffs at trial shall also show that the nomination and selection of 1st plaintiff was also endorsed by the Legemo ward of Iloke of 30/4/86, which is already pleaded.

 

27. That on 15th May, 1986 seven out of eight (7/8) title holders (Chiefs) of Iloke approved the candidature of Mr. J.B. Daniyan and communicated the same to the Elulu in their letter of same date. The said 15/5/86 is hereby pleaded.

 

32. That the 1st defendant who has been purportedly offered the appointment of Otunba of Mopa by a letter YAG/LGA/l/30 of 8/9/89 did not pass through any nomination, selection or screening either at compound/ quarters, ward or town level at any time.

 

47. That up till now, the 1st defendant is yet to be installed the Olukosi or Otunba by the Elulu as required by tradition.

 

48. That only chiefs properly installed by an Elulu can wear the traditional red cap in Mopa and not just anybody as presently done by the 1st defendant.

 

49. The plaintiffs shall show at trial that at no time in the history of Mopa has an Otunba been appointed by a government either at the local or state level.

 

(b)     That an Otunba has to be properly nominated selected and screened by the compound whose turn, it is to select one.

 

(c)     That the 1st defendant was never nominated, selected or approved by Okenaun compound whose turn it is to produce an Otunba.

 

(d)     That the 1st defendant’s purported offer of appointment is a rape and a slap on the face of the entire people of Okenaun, Patia, Iloke and indeed the entire Mopa community.”

 

The principles relating to locus standi with regard to representative action are fairly now well settled.

 

A plaintiff suing in a representative action should make an application simpliciter seeking leave to sue in that capacity;

 

Order 11 rule 8 is permissive not mandatory.

 

Even if an order for leave to sue in that capacity is not sought it will be presumed that leave to sue in that capacity was given if –

 

(a)     the title and the statement of claim reflect that capacity;

 

(b)     the suit was prosecuted in that capacity to judgment;

 

(c)     judgment was given for or against the plaintiff in that capacity.

 

It is settled law that failure to obtain leave to sue in a representative capacity does not vitiate the validity of the action.

 

It is the duty of courts to aim at doing substantial justice between parties and not let their aims be defeated by technicalities.

 

A denial in a statement of defence that “The defendants deny paragraph….. of the statement of claim and put the plaintiff to the strictest proof thereof” amounts to insufficient denial or insufficient traverse to put the matter thus denied in issue.

 

In a representative action, it is not only the plaintiff who is a party to the action. The others who are not named but whom the named plaintiff purports to represent are also parties to the action and they are parties because they are so bound by the action – (1) Alhaji Chief Yekini Otapo v. Chief R.O. Sunmonu & Ors. (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 58) 587. In Re Prince Muraino Adebari (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 58) pp. 587, 590-2; (2) Dokubo v. Bob Manuel (1967) 1 All NLR 113 at 121.

 

The effect of substituting one of the persons whom the plaintiff represented for the original plaintiff by the court for any reason is to bring him in as at the date of the original writ – Moon v. Atherton (1972) 2 Q.B. 435, where a court holds that the plaintiff has no locus standi to sue, the proper order to be made is that striking out the suit and not dismissing it since, in the strict sense, the action had not been tried.

 

Oloriode v. Oyebi (1984) 5 S. C. 1 at pp. 16,17.

 

Whenever a court is called upon to determine whether a plaintiff has locus standi or not the judge is bound to confine himself within the four walls of the writ of summons and the statement of claim before him and no more; as the issue of locus standi is a matter of law. Even if the statement of defence has been filed at the time the objection was made, the judge will still be bound to confine himself to the statement of claim to decide if plaintiff has locus standi.

 

The law is the same where a court is called upon to determine whether the writ of summons and the statement of claim disclose a cause of action or not – Adesokan v. Adegorolu (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt. 179) p, 293 at pp. 295, 305-6. The plaintiff has the onus to establish his locus standi for he has to show that he has sufficient interest in the matter – Thomas v. Olufosoye (1985) 3 NWLR:(Pt. 13) p. 523.

 

In chieftaincy matters it is not enough for the plaintiff to state that he is a member of the family; he has to state that he has an interest in the chieftaincy title and must state in his statement of claim how his interest in the chieftaincy title arises. Membership of a chieftaincy family is not enough. Not all members of a chieftaincy family are eligible for chieftaincy.

 

The term interest should not be given a narrow construction. It should be regarded as including any connection, association or interrelation between the applicant and the matter to which the application relates – Maradesa v. Military Gov. Oyo State (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 27) p. 125.

In a representative action once the plaintiff has satisfactorily established in himself the existence of a common interest and grievance in the subject matter of the action as such he is not bound to obtain the consent of the others whom he claims to represent Atane v. Amu and Anor. (1974)9 NSCC p. 446; 10 SC. 237. Locus standi denotes legal capacity or status to institute proceedings – it is not dependent on chance of success in suit but a condition of suit. It is determined by contents of statement of claim alone – Owodunni v. Registered Trustees of The C. C. C. & Anor. (2000) 6 S.C.N.J.399.

 

I have considered endorsement of the claim in the writ of summons as well as the above quoted paragraphs of the further amended statement of claim related back to the date of the institution of the action.

 

Applying the principles of law to the averments and the reliefs claimed, I have no doubt that the 1st plaintiff has established not only that he has a personal interest in the subject matter of the suit but also that he, as a member of the Daniyan family who are members of the Eseyin Moga and Atte-Mote families of Oke-naun Mopa as well as other members of the two families have an interest in the subject matter of the suit and are aggrieved by the alleged acts of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants against whom they have claimed.

 

Similarly, I find that the 2nd plaintiff has from the writ of summons and the averments in the aforementioned paragraphs of the further amended statement of claim established that he and those whom he represents have an interest in the subject matter of the claim and are aggrieved by the alleged acts of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th respondents.

 

In short I find that 1st and 2nd plaintiffs have locus standi to institute this action. With respect, it was an error on the part of the learned trial Judge and of respective counsel to have looked outside the writ of summons and the statement of claim.

 

In spite of the fact that there had been a full trial, they ought to have looked only within the four walls of the statement of claim.

 

In the event the subsidiary issue as to what order to make if it had been that either of them or both had no locus standi now becomes an academic exercise in which this court would not engage. I resolve the first issue set out for determination in this judgment in favour of the appellants.

 

The second issue set out in this judgment for determination is whether the lower court made a proper evaluation of the evidence. The issue relates to issues 3,4,5 and 6 in the brief of argument of the appellants. Each relates to a distinct complaint on the evaluation by the trial court of the evidence on certain points which came up for determination. In the circumstance I shall in the course of discussing this issue highlight the specific findings or inferences by the lower court upon which the complaints are based and indicate my view on each. The appellants contend that-

 

Contrary to the finding by the learned trial judge no issue was joined by the parties in their pleadings as to the age of Mopa and as such any evidence thereon should be expunged from the record so as to avert the miscarriage of justice which it would cause to the appellants.

 

Similarly, it is contended that although it is agreed by all concerned that every person or family in Mopa migrated into Mopa from other towns or villages outside Mopa, the parties have not joined issues as to the custom relating to the number of generations which a person or family must have lived in Mopa to become an indigene of Mopa. It is therefore submitted that to avoid miscarriage of justice to the appellants evidence relating to the number of generations which a person must have lived in Mopa to become an indigene of Mopa and related matters should be expunged from the records.

 

It is also contended that the finding of the lower court that the claim of the Daniyan family to the title of Otunba of Mopa is from the matrimonial line as the Father of S.B. Daniyan married his (S.B. Daniyan’s) mother who was a native of Mopa is illogical because it fails to take account of the received evidence as per exhibit I which has not been faulted that every family in Mopa migrated from other towns and villages. Appellants submit therefore that it is discriminatory to single out the Daniyans on account of their ancestry from Amuro.

 

Appellants also contend that the learned trial Judge was perverse in refusing to use exhibit 3 on the ground that the language in which it was written is not the language of the court even though DW1 testified on exhibit 3.

 

Also that the learned trial Judge was perverse in the use he made of exhibit 9 accepting aspects of the exhibit as are unfavourable to the appellants and rejecting those aspects of exhibit 9 which are favourable to the appellants thus causing a miscarriage of justice. It is the complaint of appellants that the pleadings aver, and are supported by evidence that J.B. Daniyan the original plaintiff was duly recommended by his family, by his compound and by the relevant chiefs to Elulu, the Oba of Mopa whose duty it is to present the candidate to the appropriate governmental authority for approval-

 

Appellants contend also that it is the evidence of Elulu – PW4 that the Elulu did not forward the name of 1st defendant to 2nd defendant.

 

It is therefore submitted that under section 78(j),(k) of The 1976 Local Government Law, No. 8 of 1976 it cannot be said that 2nd defendant has received a second nomination; that in the event, 2nd defendant could only accept or reject the nomination of 1st plaintiff but it could not, in law recommend 1st defendant to 2nd defendant or anyone else for appointment as Otunba.

 

The 1st respondent has raised by way of preliminary objection that paragraphs 3. 11 and 3.12 in the appellant’s brief of argument do not relate to any of the grounds of appeal and should be struck out.

 

For their part the appellants contend in the appellants reply brief to 1st respondents in respect of this objection that those paragraphs relate to ground No. 4 of the grounds of appeal and issue No. 3 of issues formulated by appellants. Paragraph 3.11 deals with the use made by the learned trial Judge of certain parts of exhibit 9. Paragraph 3.12 deals with the use made by the learned trial Judge of certain evidence given in respect of the names of the 1st original plaintiff.

It is the contention in respect of both paragraphs not only that there was no joinder of issues upon which the court received evidence on which the findings were based, but also that the use made of such evidence was improper.

 

I have hitherto carefully refrained from specifically including the contents of both paragraphs in this judgment before now but since I must deal with 1st respondent’s objection and rule thereon, I agree with the contention of appellants that both paragraphs properly come within ground No. 4 and issue No. 3 in the appellants brief and, of course, under issue 2 of this judgment i.e. evaluation by the lower court of the evidence before the court.

 

In the circumstance, I overrule the objection and strike it out. Now to deal with the substance of the arguments of 1st respondent on this issue. The 1st respondent contends that – the historical background of Mopa – pre and post 1911 was put in issue and cites in support paragraphs 13,14,15,16 and 17 of the amended statement of defence of 1st defendant as well as plaintiffs’ reply to 1st respondent.

 

In the circumstance, it is the contention of 1st respondent that all parties were entitled to adduce evidence either by way of examination in chief or by way of cross examination as to whether or not Mopa was in existence prior to 1911 and also to lead evidence on issues which make the existence or non-existence of the fact in issue probable or improbable more so, where evidence of custom or tradition which is mainly hearsay evidence is in issue. 1st respondent relies on sections 7 and 12 of Evidence Act.

 

It is contended that since the qualification that to be an Otunba in Mopa a candidate must be an indigene of Mopa of the male lineage only and that there is common ground that the father of 1st plaintiff migrated to Mopa, it is the only logical inference that 1st plaintiff is an indigene of Mopa of the female line only.

 

It is therefore contended by 1st respondent that the learned trial Judge properly evaluated the evidence before him when the court found that a candidate seeking to ascend any of the two most important posts in Mopa must be an indigene of Mopa and of the male line.

1st respondent concedes that 1st plaintiff was nominated to fill the vacant stool of Otunba but that nomination was withdrawn by the people who nominated him because he was of the female line and therefore not qualified.

 

It is also contended that the intervention of 2nd respondent in the dispute was within the power in law, of 2nd respondent and that the proceedings of 2nd respondent as evidenced by exhibit 9 deserves credibility and accords a position of pre-eminence to 2nd respondent to resolve the matter.

 

As regards the evaluation by the lower court of the evidence available in respect of the offer of appointment as Otunba to 1st respondent, it is contended that-

 

Appellants no longer became entitled to the declaration claimed because the cause of action of the original 1st plaintiff had, in law, died with him; that there was evidence in support of the averments in the pleadings of 1st defendant/ respondent before the lower court of the custom or tradition of Mopa community in relation to approving and appointing to the Otunba title – reliance is placed on paragraphs 32,40 and 41 of the further amended statement of claim of appellants.

 

It is contended by 1st respondent that there were definite holdings by the trial court that no well laid out tradition, custom or procedure existed or were set out in a Chieftaincy Declaration for the Otunba title, nor has any such notorious traditions been proved to exist In the Courts to justify an invitation to the courts to take judicial notice of such custom.

 

It is also contended that the Elulu (PW4) in evidence conceded to the superior investigative power and recommending powers of the 2nd respondent.

 

It is therefore submitted that in the event, the PW4 acknowledged the superiority and finality of the 2nd respondent as appointing authority in respect of Otunba chieftaincy.

 

Finally it is the contention of 1st respondent that the onus is on the appellants who alleged that the tradition and custom of Mopa community has been violated to prove such violation. 1st respondent submits that no such evidence other than mere assertion has been proved.

 

I have no doubt that the two issues formulated by 2nd, 3rd and 4th respondents in their respondents’ brief (which I have recited earlier in this judgment) come squarely within this compass of evaluation of evidence by the lower court.

 

I should point out however that the 2nd – 4th respondents raised certain unsavoury preliminary objections against paragraphs 5.05 – 5.08 and paragraphs 6.01 to 6.06 of appellants brief.

 

Counsel for 2nd – 4th respondents has, in my view, been adequately tutored on the subject of the objections by the learned senior counsel to appellant in his reply brief on the need to study the relevant rules of court. I do not consider it necessary to deal with the objections any further in this judgment other than to agree with senior counsel that the objections are misplaced. I will add that they are objectionable and in bad taste in so far as the objections insinuate incorrectly that exhibits tendered in court and which ought to have been included in the records from the lower court were deliberately kept away. I therefore overrule the objections and strike out both objections.

 

I also must point out that the contents of the brief in question are far short of the requirements of a satisfactory brief. Try as much as one may, there is no substance whatsoever to be found in the brief that can be regarded as an answer to the issues raised in the appellant’s brief.

 

In the event, I must in this judgment, confine myself to the appellants brief, the reply brief of the appellant to the 1st respondent and the brief of the 1st respondent. This is apart from what I have said earlier herein on the preliminary objections of 2nd – 4th respondents to appellants’ brief.

 

It is now left for me to consider and rule on the various complaints by the appellant against the evaluation of the evidence by the lower court in view of the relevant aspects of the judgment, the arguments of parties thereon and the position of the law.

 

The learned trial Judge made a number of findings which are largely accepted as uncontroversial by the parties but the following paragraphs of the respective pleadings reflect the findings of the lower court which are controversial and which need to be examined in respect of the claims and counter-claims as to whether there was evidence in support of the pleadings and whether the learned trial Judge made a correct evaluation of the evidence.

 

Now for a look at the following paragraphs of the pleadings which have not been quoted previously in this judgment – Amended statement of defence – paragraphs 9,10,12,15,16-18,27,49,50,54, 59,68-71.

 

“9.     The 1st defendant avers that Ikeji was the first to settle at the present site of Ileteju while Iloke (being the name of the settlement, while on the hill top) moved to their present location which is flat in 1911 as a result of British invasion.

 

10. The name Ileteju was adopted by Ikeji and Iloke because of their contiguity and the flat terrain of the location.

 

15. The 1st defendant avers that both Eseyin-Mopa and Atte-Mote families are foreign to Mopa, traditionally.

 

16. The 1st defendant avers that Eseyin-Mopa family claimed to be from Agbajogun-Amuro while Atte-Mote family claimed to be from Orokere-Amuro.

 

17. The 1st defendant avers that the father of the 1st plaintiff came to Mopa as a steward to a man called Atuki who was a trader and thereafter settled in Mopa around 1911, and when his said father died in 1971, the people of Amuro came and wanted to carry the corpse away and also performed the traditional rites which included the slaughtering of a cow.

 

18. The 1st defendant avers that neither Eseyin-Mopa nor Atte-Mote families existed or was known in Mopa pre-1911 as they were neither part of the settlements on the hill top or at the foot of the hill in Mopa.

 

27. The 1st defendant avers, that Ikeji ward also of Ileteju-Mopa also presented a candidate for the office of Otunba of Mopa which was then vacant.

 

49. The 1st defendant avers that Mopa is a patrilineal society by custom and nobody claims traditional title or right through his/her mother.

 

50. The 1st defendant avers that the 1st plaintiff has only maternal ancestry to Okenaun and as such is traditionally disqualified from taking any traditional title (such as Otunba stool) on the platform of Okenaun.

 

54. The 1st defendant, who is a true son of Mopa patrilineally, is a son of Joshua Oba Iyagbin, son of Mepaigesa, son of Onasi (Chief Olukosi) son of Ogedemgbe who were all born and also lived in Mopa.

 

59. 1st defendant admits paragraph 42 of the statement of claim and hereby pleads all the minutes of the hearing and recommendation of the 2nd defendant after the two meetings with Mopa community.

 

68. The 1st defendant avers that it is the custom and tradition of Mopa that whenever an Elulu refuses to perform his traditional and customary function, an elder Chief would be designated by the other Chiefs to perform such a function, once it is not contrary to the law.

 

69. The 1st defendant avers that it was therefore in accordance with the age-long custom and tradition of Mopa that the Chiefs of Mopa mandated Chief Agbana the Objemu of Mopa (being the eldest Chief in Patia) to formally put the chieftaincy leaves as well as the traditional red cap (Atu-Odi) on him to mark his installation, having been duly appointed with effect from 1/7/89 by the government which appointment was communicated to him vide a letter dated 8/9/89 and received on 15/9/89. The letter of appointment is hereby pleaded.

 

70. 1st defendant avers that an elder Chief had to perform his customary installation ceremony because the Elulu refused to install him but persisted in his open support for the 1st plaintiff contrary to the customs and tradition of Mopa as well as the general wish of the people of Mopa and the decision of the government on the issue.

 

71. The 1st defendant denies paragraph 54 of the statement of claim and avers that in accordance with the Chiefs (Appointment and Deposition) law, he was properly appointment (sic) after due nomination by his family and by the 2nd defendant which was in accordance with the custom and tradition of Mopa.”

 

Plaintiffs’ reply to statement of defence – paragraphs 6,7 and 9.

 

In the consideration of the issue of locus standi, I have already quoted paragraphs 32,42,46,47,48 and 49 of the further amended statement of claim. I need not repeat them here. In my view, it is clear that issues were joined on the following controversial topics:

 

(i)      Probable age of settlement in Mopa;

 

(ii)     Comparative dates and age of settlement in Mopa of the ancestors of the 1st plaintiff family and of the 1st defendant family as well as their places of origin;

 

(iii)    Whether entitlement to Elulu and Otunba chieftaincies is through patrilineal lineage only or it is also through matrimonial lineage;

 

(iv)    Exhibit 9 – minutes of the meetings of 2nd defendant on the resolution by the traditional council of the conflict in respect of the dispute to the Otunba chieftaincy title.

 

The following guidelines established by case law may assist an appellate court on the findings of a lower court on fact in which it may or may not interfere-

 

In the area of findings based on credibility and demeanour of witness; the trial court is the master – Frank Ebba v. Ogodo (2000) 17 WRN 95; (1984) 4 S.C. 84; Fatoyinbo v. Williams (1956) 1 F.S.C. 87.

 

In a situation where the trial court has not evaluated a particular piece of evidence, the appeal court is in as good a position as the trial court to do so Fashanu v. Adekoya (1974) 1 NLR (Pt. 1) 35; Anyaoke v. Adi (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 31) p. 731 at 742. A custom, if it has been well established in a decision of the superior courts need not be pleaded and proved; but it would be necessary to plead facts and lead evidence to bring the suit in question within the ambit of the judicially noticed custom – (i) Nzeanya v. Okagbue (1963) 1 All NLR 352; (ii) Nzekwu v. Nzekwu (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt.104) p. 373.

 

A custom which is repugnant to equity and good conscience is not given recognition. Where it has been shown that evidence called by one of the parties is untrue or without weight or has been discredited, the court ought to accept evidence given by the other party unless it has been shown that it is of such quality that no reasonable tribunal should accept it – Nzekwu v. Nzekwu (supra) at p. 423.

Applying the above rules, it can be said that by and large, the findings of fact in the judgment of the lower court in most respect are unassailable. Subject to what I intend to say hereunder in respect of the finding of the lower court that there was multiple candidature in respect of the Otunba title, I find his findings on such matters on which issues were joined very much in accord with the pleadings of the parties and the evidence produced in support. Accordingly, I do not intend to disturb them.

 

However, the findings of the lower court with regard to what he termed a multiple candidature requires some examination.

 

It is agreed by all parties and this is confirmed by the documents exhibits 2, 4 and 9 that the candidature of 1st original plaintiff was sent to the Elulu (4 PW) in response to a call by him from the appropriate quarters in Mopa in 1986 and he forwarded the same to the 2nd respondent – after confirmation by the Chiefs of Mopa also in 1986. It is also agreed that the nomination of 1st defendant by his own supporters did not take place until 1989 while a decision by 2nd respondent on the candidature of 1st plaintiff was still being awaited by 4th P.W. the Oba Elulu.

 

It is also not in dispute that Oba Elulu declined to accept the nomination of 1st defendant or to recommend it to 2nd respondent because, according to the Elulu, the nomination of 1st defendant came from the wrong quarters of Mopa contrary to Mopa custom and tradition regarding the appointment of Otunba of Mopa.

 

It is also not in dispute that the candidature of 1st defendant was received by 2nd respondent from sources other than from Oba Elulu as a petition against the qualification of 1st plaintiff for the Otunba title. In this circumstance, I am of the opinion that the learned trial court was wrong to have found that the candidature of 1st defendant was properly considered by the 2nd respondent as a multiple candidature for the vacant title of Otunba of Mopa.

 

I am firmly of the view that in the circumstance of this case the only nomination properly before 2nd respondent for consideration was that of 1st plaintiff (original). A decision of 2nd respondent if it was to reject that candidature, ought to have been communicated to Oba Elulu to enable him consider whether to accept the decision or whether to appeal to higher authorities (as he was entitled to do) before calling for fresh nominations from the appropriate area of Mopa.

 

In my view the evaluation of this aspect of the dispute by the lower court cannot be correct when one considers the power of 2nd respondent under section 21 of the Kogi State Chiefs (Appointment, Deposition and Establishment of Traditional Councils) Law, No. 7 of 1992. The section empowers the traditional council to advise the State Government and Local Government in their respective areas on any matter relating to customary law. It does not empower a traditional council to substitute the 1st respondent for the 1st appellant whose candidature was the only one before it for consideration. That would be ultra vires the powers of 2nd respondent.

 

It is submitted by respondents that the Elulu recognised the superior authority of 2nd respondent. Yes, but the Elulu cannot by acquiescence confer on 2nd respondent a power which 2nd respondent does not possess in law.

 

– See

(i)      Amuda v. Adelodun (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 506) p. 480;

 

(ii)     Owodunni v. Registered Trustees of Celestial Church of Christ & Anor (supra).

 

In any case, the lower court rightly in my view found that Oba Elulu (4 P.W.) refused to accept the decision. Consequently Oba Elulu refused to perform the traditional ceremony on 1st respondent.

 

There has been no appeal against that finding. The finding by the lower court of multiple candidature does not depend upon the credibility of witnesses but on the cold facts on the printed record and the application of the law. This court is in as good a position as the lower court to evaluate the evidence and to correct the mistake in the evaluation by the lower court.

I now turn to the reliefs for declaration made before the lower court by the appellants which were refused.

 

The main plank upon which the respondents seek to support the decision of the lower court is on the ground that the original plaintiff having died, the cause of action was personal to the 1st plaintiff and therefore, died with him.

 

In this judgment I have shown that the cause of action either personal or in a representative capacity survived the original 1st plaintiff.

 

That under the rules of court, the present 1st plaintiff was duly substituted for J.B. Daniyan, the original 1st plaintiff. The essence of substitution was to give the substitute the cause of action which the substituted party had at the date when the writ in the action was issued.

 

Now the essence of an action for declaration and one way in which a declaratory relief is useful is that in an appropriate case a declaratory order would be made by the court where the justice of the case demands that it be made. It is a remedy for the determination of a justiciable controversy where the plaintiff is in doubt as to his legal rights. It is a binding adjudication of the rights and status of litigants even though no consequential relief is granted – See Black’s Law Dictionary 5th ed. at p. 368.

 

It is to be noted that after the substitution of the 1st plaintiff by Dr. Michael Daniyan the 3rd relief in the statement of claim has been amended in the further amended statement of claim to read as follows:

 

“A declaration that J.B. Daniyan who has been properly nominated to Patia Legemo quarters, and subsequently to the Elulu of Mopa is therefore the person whose nomination and selection ought to have been ratified by the government.”

 

I consider that in an appropriate case it is an appropriate relief.

 

In the event, it is hereby declared that plaintiffs/appellants are entitled to the reliefs sought in (1),(2) and (4) of the action the subject matter of the appeal herein. The 3rd declaration sought which seeks for a declaration that 1st plaintiff is the person whose nomination and selection ought to have been ratified by the government is hereby refused. This is not because he is deceased but because his nomination has been effectively rejected by the 2nd respondent.

 

In the event the appeal succeeds except for the 3rd declaratory relief sought in the action.

 

Accordingly I hereby set aside the judgment of the lower court delivered on 22nd October, 1999 together with the orders therein.

 

In its stead, I hereby grant the following declaratory orders and relief –

 

“(i)     the purported offer of appointment to Elkena Oba lyagin as Otunba of Mopa in Yagba Local Government Area based on the recommendation of Oyi Traditional Council and contained in a letter reference YAG/LGA/1/30 dated 8/9/89 written by the Sole Administrator of the said Local Government is ultra vires, illegal and contrary to the custom of the Mopa Community relating to such appointment and therefore null and void ab initio;

 

(ii)     the 1st defendant having not been installed by the Elulu of Mopa cannot wear the traditional red cap nor perform or attend the traditional council meeting of Mopa Chiefs;

 

(iii)    a perpetual injunction restraining the 1st defendant from parading himself as the Otunba of Mopa and or wear the traditional red cap (Atu Odi) beads and other insignia of Otunba of Mopa and or attend the Mopa Traditional Council meeting in that capacity.”

 

I make no order as to costs.

 

SAIFULLAHI MUNTAKA-COOMASSIE, JCA: I have had the advantage of reading in draft the lead judgment of my noble Lord, Albert

 

Gbadebo Oduyemi JCA in this appeal. In that judgment the facts and the issues raised thereon were carefully and competently considered to my satisfaction, and I do not consider it absolutely necessary to reproduce them here. Consequently I with respect, adopt the reasoning and conclusions therein adumbrated as mine. The appeal, I entirely agree, lacks merit same is hereby dismissed by me. I abide by the consequential orders carefully made by my learned brother Oduyemi JCA. 1, too, make no order as to costs.

 

ADAMU BULKACHUWA JCA: I entirely agree with the reasons set out by my learned brother Oduyemi JCA, in his judgment just delivered. He has ably stated the fact and dealt adequately with all the issues raised in the appeal. The appeal is allowed and I endorse all consequential orders therein. I make no orders as to cost.

 

Cases referred to in the judgment

Adesokan v. Adegorolu (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt. 179) 293 .

Amuda v. Adelodun (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 506) 480.

Anyaoke v. Adi (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 31) 731.

Atane v. Amu (1974) 10 S.C. 237; (1974) 9 NSCC 446.

Buraimoh v. Esa (1990) 4 SCNJ 1.

Dokubo v. Manuel (1967) 1 All NLR 113.

Duke v. Henshaw (1940) 6 WACA 200.

Ebba v. Ogodo (2000) 17 WRN 95; (1984) 4 S.C. 84.

Eseigbe v. Agholor (1993) 9 NWLR (Pt. 316) 128.

Fashanu v. Adekoya (1974) 1 NLR (Pt. 1) 35.

Fatoyinbo v. Williams (1956) 1 FSC 87.

Maradesa v. Military Gov. Oyo State (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 27) 125.

Moon v. Atherton (1972) 2 Q.B. 435.

Nzeanya v. Okagbue (1963) 1 All NLR 352.

Nzekwu v. Nzekwu (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt.104) 373.

Oloriode v. Oyebi (1984) 5 S. C. 1.

Otapo v. Sunmonu (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 58) 587.

Owodunni v. Registered Trustees C. C. C. (2000) 2 WRN 29; (2000) 6 S.C.N.J.399.

Thomas v. Olufosoye (1985) 3 NWLR:(Pt. 13) 523.

Statutes referred to in the judgment

Evidence Act, s. 74(1), 7, 12.

Local Govt. Law, No. 8 of 1976, s. 78 (j) (k).