3PLR – BEST OILS LTD V. ORUOSA
POLICY, PRACTICE AND PUBLISHING, LAW REPORTS 3PLR
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BEST OILS LTD
V.
ORUOSA
COURT OF APPEAL
IN THE IBADAN JUDICIAL DIVISION
3PLR/2001/86 (CA)
OTHER CITATIONS
3 NWLR (Pt. 593) page 82
BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS
MORONKEJI OMOTAYO ONALAJA, JCA (Presided and delivered the leading judgment)
DALHATU ADAMU, JCA
FRANCIS FEDODE TABAI, JCA
BETWEEN
BEST OILS LTD
AND
- SIMON ORUOSA
- MUNIRU AKINRINSOLA
- ADENIYI OYEKUNLE
REPRESENTATION
Oluwole Aina Esq. for appellant.
Olumide Fusika for respondents.
MAIN ISSUES
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – JUDICIAL PRECEDENT – Decision in CCB Nig. Plc. v. Rose (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 544) 37 – whether distinguishable from the instant case where pleadings have closed with issues joined.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Joinder of parties and joinder of causes of action – principles governing same – whether the respondents were right to have brought a joint action against the appellant in the instant case.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Misjoinder – need for the statement of defence to be categorical as to the type of misjoinder sought to be challenged.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Pleadings – binding nature of pleadings on the courts and the parties.
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE – Order 11(1) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules of Oyo State 1987 – purport of.
MAIN JUDGMENT
MORONKEJI OMOTAYO ONALAJA, JCA ((Delivered the following judgment)):
In paragraph 16 of the statement of claim filed by the three plaintiffs in the High Court of Oyo State, Ibadan they claimed as set out under. This approach has been adopted following the rule in our adversarial system that the particulars of claim supersedes the particulars of claim set out in the writ of summons Lahan v. Lajoyetan (1972) 6 S.C 190; Ndigwe v. Nwude (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt. 626) page 314 S.C; Nnubia v. A.G., Rivers State (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt. 593) page 82 CA; U.B.A Ltd. v. Ademuyiwa (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt. 628) page 570 CA.
The said paragraph 16 of the statement of claim is the concluding/paragraph and reads as follows:
“16. Whereof the plaintiff claims against the defendant:
(a) A declaration that the purported termination of the plaintiffs’ employment are illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever and that the plaintiffs are and continues to be in the employment of the defendant notwithstanding the purported termination.
(b)(i) An order directing the defendant to pay over to the plaintiffs all accrued salaries and other emoluments to which they should have been entitled since the purported termination on 30th October, 1996 until judgment in this suit
or
(ii) Alternatively, five hundred thousand naira only each N500,000.00 being general damages for wrongful termination of plaintiffs’ employment on account and in disregard of his trade union rights.”
From the foregoing of reference to the statement of claim pointedly that pleadings were filed, delivered and exchanged. The defendant a company incorporated in Nigeria after it was served with the statement of claim, filed, delivered and served its statement of defence on the plaintiffs who filed a reply to the statement of defence.
Upon completion of pleadings the defendant filed a notice of preliminary objection wherein it urged and prayed the court to strike out the action on the grounds of misjoinder of parties and misjoinder of causes of action as improperly constituted.
The parties through their counsel on 20th day of January, 2000 made their respective submissions before the High Court of Ibadan who later gave his ruling instantly and concluded his ruling as follows:
“In my view it is therefore in order for the respondent’s counsel to refer to the statement of claim to show the nature of the claim and why the plaintiffs sued together. In the circumstances, I hold that the objection lacks merits and it is thereby dismissed.”
Dissatisfied with the said ruling the defendant hereinafter referred to in this judgment as the “appellant” lodged timeously an appeal to this court through its notice of appeal wherein it raised in paragraph 3 of the grounds of appeal as follows:
“3. Grounds of appeal:
(1) The learned trial Judge erred in law by entertaining the action when he had no jurisdiction to do so by reason of the case not being properly constituted.
(2) The learned trial Judge erred in law by failing to hold himself bound by the case of C.C.B (Nig.) Plc. v. Rose (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 544) page 37 a decision of a High Court in respect of proper constitution of action in contract of employment.
Particulars
Unless appropriate case where a decision can be distinguished a High Court is bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal on any issue of law”
The notice of appeal was served on the plaintiffs henceforth referred to as “respondents” in this judgment. They had a joint legal representation.
In accordance with the Court of Appeal Rules, the appellant filed appellant’s brief of argument wherein based on the grounds of appeal it raised one issue for determination in this appeal as follows:
“3. Issue for determination:
From the grounds of appeal, the only issue arising for determination is
“Whether the learned trial Judge was right in the circumstance of the case by holding that the action was properly constituted.”
In paragraph 2 of respondents’ brief of argument the issue for determination reads thus:
“2.0. Issues for determination:
Whether the plaintiffs can be properly joined in or maintain a common law suit having regard to the circumstances of this case, and if not what cause is available to the court?”
Upon the matter coming up for argument of the appeal, the learned counsel for appellant relied and adopted, appellants’ brief of argument in amplification of the arguments in appellant’s brief contended that the respondents could not jointly maintain the action against the appellant, because the right to relief by each respondent was on individual contract of employment with appellant and did not constitute the same transaction or series of transactions, with the contract of any other employee reliance was put in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Cross River State Newspaper Corporation v. Oni (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 371) page 270 being case listed as number 10 in the list of authorities of the appellant. Wherein the two main requirements are-
(a) that the right to relief is in respect of or arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions; and
(b) that if separate actions were brought by such persons a common question of law and fact would arise.”
Which was a libel against a team in a single publication and the defendant did not raise objection to the joinder adopted in Ayankoya v. Olukoya (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt. 440) page 1 at 15 and 16. The two cases were not based on wrongful dismissal cases where several workers join as plaintiffs to sue the same employer as was decided in CCB (Nig) PLC v. Rose (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 544) page 37 which learned counsel submitted was on all fours with the present appeal which action arose as a result of the compulsory retirements or retrenchments of the employees of the bank.
On being served with the statement of claim the appellant’s bank filed a motion to strike out the suit for misjoinder of parties and causes of action in the High Court which motion was refused on appeal after setting out the facts the Court of Appeal stated in part that:
“The value of their earned leave differs from another. Their six months’ salary in lieu of notice of retirement differs from each other. Their accrued salary within leave period is different. All these are borne out by annexture A which is attached to the statement of claim and forms part of it. I say without equivocation that there can be no better example of misjoinder of parties and causes of action as is presented in this case.”
Whilst in his concurring judgment Tobi JCA stated lucidly as follows:
“In the realm of master and servant, it is the law that although ten or one hundred persons are given employment the same day under the same conditions of service, the contract of employment is personal or domestic to each of the persons. In the event of breach, the persons do not have collective right to sue or be represented in a suit.”
The above authorities were binding on the learned Judge with liberty for him to distinguish them, rather the learned Judge ignored them which would have resulted that the respondents were not employed jointly with joint conditions of service and that their joint appointment was jointly terminated and that they were jointly entitled to joint damages they could not jointly sue for breach of contract, so the action was in-competent for misjoinder of action and misjoinder of persons so court should allow the appeal and strike out the action.
In addition appellant relied on Emono v. NPA (1966) LLR 268; Amachree v. Newington (1952) 14 WACA 97 at 99 – 100 and Ogwuche v. Mba (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt. 336) page 75 so the appeal be allowed.
The respondents urged the court to dismiss the appeal based upon respondents’ brief of argument filed on 30th April, 2000 wherein upon respondents’ singular issue the plaintiffs were properly joined and could maintain the action having regard to the fact that the respondents’ appointments were summarily terminated for engaging in trade union activities by different letters of termination of 30th October, 1996. Each respondent claimed N500,000.00 as general damages in alternative to declaration of reinstatement. By paragraphs 6 to 12 of the statement of claim gave a brief account of the completely similar facts of respective plaintiff. As each respondent entered into individual and separate contracts of employment with appellant entitled them after filing separate actions, appellant submitted was for respondents to apply for consolidation of the actions to be tried together which was not the prayer of appellant. The lower court rightly rejected the appellant’s contention that the action was incompetent for misjoinder.
Respondents relied on order 11 rule 1 of High Court of Oyo State (Civil Procedure) Rules 1987 which provides as follows:
“All persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs, in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction or transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, where if such persons brought separate actions, any common question of law or fact would arise; and judgment may be given for such one or more of the plaintiffs as may be found to be entitled to relief, for such relief as he or they may be entitled to, without any amendment.
Provided that if, upon the application of any defendant, it shall appear that such joinder may embarrass any of the parties or delay the trial of the action, the court or a Judge in chambers may order separate trials, or make such other order as may be expedient in the circumstance.”
Respondents contended that order 11 rule 1 (supra) allows for joinder of persons as plaintiffs who claim jointly, severally or in the alternative:
(a) If they are claiming to be entitled to relief arising from the same transaction or series of transactions;
(b) If where they bring separate actions a common question of law or fact would arise;
(c) If notwithstanding the fact that they have been joined together in one action, it is still possible to treat their claims separately and to give judgment in accordance with their respectively proven deserved measure of relief without the necessity of an amendment of the process by which they commenced the action.
Whilst the proviso is as follows:
(a) For a defendant to bring an action to challenge the joinder of the plaintiffs and or their causes as the appellant did at the lower court.
(b) For the court to determine whether the joinder is capable of embarrassing any of the parties or delay the trial of the action; and if so
(c) To order separate trials, or make such other order as the expediency of the case may dictate.
interpreted in Cross Rivers State Newspaper Corporation v. Oni (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 371) page 270 at page 288 per Iguh JSC as follows:
“The first point that must be made is that the joinder of persons in one action as plaintiffs as well as the joinder of causes of action are clearly permissible under the provisions of order 8 rule 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 1978 of Oyo State. Two limiting factors or conditions must however be established by such plaintiffs to qualify for his joinder. These are:
(1) That the right to reliefs is in respect of or arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions; and
(2) That if separate actions were brought by such persons a common question of law or fact would arise.
The establishment of the above two conditions for joinder notwithstanding, order 8 rule 1 has in the overall interest of the fair administration of justice further stipulated a proviso as follows:
“…..That if upon the application of any defendant it shall appear that such joinder (or several plaintiffs) may embarrass or delay the trial of the action, the court or a Judge may order separate trials or make such order as may be expedient.:”
(See also Ayankoya v. Olukoya (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt. 440) 1 S.C). Respondents submitted that the case of CCB (Nig) Plc. v. Rose (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 544) page 37 relied upon by appellant was on interpretation of order 3 rule 3 of the High Court of Anambra State (Civil Procedure) Rules 1988 as applicable to Enugu State unlike order 11 rule 1 of Oyo State Rules which only permits joinder of parties but not of causes of actions. It was therefore erroneous to claim by appellant that “the case is on all fours with the present one.” Respondents contended that CCB (Nig.) Plc. v. Rose (supra) do not support appellant’s contention therefore this honourable court should disregard it as inapplicable in this case, the appeal should be dismissed.
Respondents submitted that it was clear from the writ of summons, the statement of claim, the statement of defence and the reply to statement of defence that even though the respondents have instituted a common action, their claims are severe, the claim of success or failure of the claim of one plaintiff cannot prejudice the other plaintiffs or the defendant. Each plaintiff has the burden to prove his claim to determine the success or failure of his case.
The appellant is not arguing that it would be prejudiced by a joint trial of the claims of the plaintiffs but would want the plaintiffs/respondents to institute separate actions then in the course of trial for them to apply for consolidation and joint trial. This procedure would result in delay of the trial instead of the quick and expeditious trial. The respondent’s action as formulated complied with joinder of persons and actions as rightly held by the lower court which should be affirmed by this court and dismissal of the appeal.
The above is a précis of the contentions of the parties in this appeal succinctly put whether respondents’ action as framed was competent and not incompetent by misjoinder of parties and misjoinder of actions.
The appeal raised parties to civil action which was considered by me in chapter IX of Commentaries From the Bench Part II by Onalaja, JCA at pages 118 to 150 in particular pages 134 and 135 wherein similar provision to order 11 rule 1 of the High Court of Oyo State (Civil Procedure) Rules 1987 (supra) was considered that:
“Order 13 rule (1) is ipsissima verba order 11 rule 1 High Court of Oyo State (Civil Procedure) Rules 1987 (supra) stipulates that all persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative judicially interpreted as having a common interest and not conflict of interest. It deals with joinder of parties and not joinder of causes of action with the guide being having same interest in the action and not whether it was similar acts of a defendant that gave rise to different causes of action. See Amachree & Others v. Newington (1952) 14 WACA 97 whilst Oludotun Adekunle Kukoyi v. Adiatu Ladunni (1976) 11 S.C 245 decided that the object of the rule is to prevent the multiplicity of actions and it deals with joinder of parties and not joinder of causes of action.”
The rule was judiciously interpreted in Cross Rivers State Newspapers Corporation v. Oni (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 371) page 270 per Iguh JSC reflected above in this judgment that joinder of persons in one action as plaintiffs as well as the joinder of causes of action are clearly permissible subject to fulfillment of the two conditions of –
“(1) That the right to reliefs is in respect of or arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions and
(2) That if separate actions were brought by such persons a common question of law or fact would arise.
Appellant contended and relied on the dicta of Ubaezonu JCA and Niki Tobi JCA in CCB (Nigeria) Plc. v. Mrs. Amadi Rose U & 3 Ors. (for themselves and on behalf of 11 other employees of the defendant retired or retrenched by the defendant) 1998 4 NWLR (Pt. 544) page 37 CA it was held as follows:
“(3) In an action in a representative capacity all the parties represented must have a common interest. In the instant case, the parties do not have a common interest or a common right. The interest of each respondent is tied to his/her contract employment with the appellant. The terms of their contract are different from each other. Each signed a separate contract with the appellant. Action in a representative capacity does not apply.
(4) For parties to be joined in a suit, they must have the same or common interest, to the extent that they have a common mission or cause to pursue. Where the interests are separate, distinct or irreconcilable, a Judge will not grant an application for joinder. To grant such an application is tantamount to the court forcing persons with unidentical or unrelated causes of action in the litigation a situation which will run against the accepted tenor or principles of justice. In the initial desire on the part of the court to save litigation time, so much confusion arises in the course of the litigation, which ultimately results in protraction of the judicial process;
(5) In a representative action, the representants or representers must have a common interest with those represented to the extent that they stand or fall together. It does not matter whether the common interest is singular or plural. What matters is that it must be the same and not distinguishable.
(6) In the realm of master and servant relationship although ten or one hundred person are given employment the same day under the same conditions of service, the contract of employment is personal or domestic to each of the persons. In the event of breach, the persons do not have collective right to sue or be represented in a suit.”
It is trite law that both the courts and the parties are bound by their pleading Abimbola George & Ors. v. Dominion Flour Mills (1963) 1 All NLR 71 S.C; Ferdinand George & anor. v. U.B.A Ltd (1972) 8/9 S.C 264.
In the instant appeal the plaintiffs/respondents pleaded in the statement of claim as follows:
“(1) The plaintiffs were at all times material to this suit employees in the employment of the defendant.
(16) (supra) (A) (b) (1) (II) or alternatively five hundred thousand naira only (N500,000.00) being general damages for wrongful termination of plaintiffs’ employment on account and is in disregard of the trade union rights.”
Appellant averred in paragraph 8 of the statement of defence thus:
“(8) The defendant will at the trial contend that the plaintiffs’ action is frivolous, bad for misjoinder, vexatious and incompetent.
The CCB Nig Plc. v. Rose U (supra) relied on heavily by appellant was a case in which the appellant/defendant raised the issue of misjoinder of persons and misjoinder of causes of actions unlike the present appeal where the pleadings have closed with issues joined.
In paragraph 8 of the statement of defence (supra) appellant stated it would contend at the trial the claim was bad for misjoinder but silent whether it was for misjoinder of persons or misjoinder of causes of actions. Misjoinder means in a civil case the improper union of parties. In pleading misjoinder is the improper union of parties or causes of action in one suit at law or equity. With the state of the pleadings as stated in paragraph 8 of the statement of defence the misjoinder was not pleaded to be bad for misjoinder of persons or causes of action this would only be resolved as pleaded by evidence during trial.
In doing substantial justice with departure from technicality in deciding issues order 8(1) now order 11 (1) High Court of Oyo State (Civil Procedure) Rules Cap. 46. Laws of Oyo State order (8) rules 10 (1) (2) provide as follows:
“(10) (1) No cause or matter shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non joinder of parties and the court may in every case or matter deal with controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it.
(2) The court or a Judge may at any stage of the proceedings either upon or without the application of either party and on such terms as to the court or a Judge may seem just, order that the names of any parties improperly joined whether as plaintiff or as defendants, be struck out and that the names of any parties whether plaintiffs or defendants who ought to have been joined or whose presence before the court may be necessary be joined in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter.”
Order 8(1) now order 11 (1) reproduced above that all persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where if such persons brought separate actions any common question of law or fact would arise, where several plaintiffs have taken advantage of this rule any defendant may apply to the court to order separate trials. The court has a discretion to make such an order if the defendant applying is able to satisfy it (1) that the joint trial will embarrass him or (2) that it will delay the trial of the action.
Should the court, however refuse to order separate trials, it may give judgment for such one or more of the plaintiffs as may be found to be entitled to relief without the necessity of amending the writ or the pleadings. In the instant appeal respondents did not sue or plead representative action but pleaded severally the causes of action and claimed general damages individually so with respect the present appeal is distinguishable from CCB v. Rose where pleadings have not closed as it was only the statement of claim the appellants relied upon in contradiction where issues have been joined and whether the misjoinder was for misjoinder of persons which cannot cause the matter to be defeated by reason of misjoinder of parties, but not for misjoinder of causes of action, as the pleading was not categorical as to the type of misjoinder as pleaded in paragraph 8 of the statement of defence which could only be resolved by evidence at the trial the objection on misjoinder was rightly rejected as the stage was premature.
After a careful consideration of the arguments proffered on the issue raised by the parties it is resolved against the appellant leading to the dismissal of the appeal.
Having dismissed the appeal the respondents are entitled to the cost of the appeal which is fixed in the sum of N5,000.00 (five thousand naira) in favour of respondents against the appellant.
DALHATU ADAMU, JCA: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother Onalaja, JCA in this appeal. I agree with the reasons and conclusion of my brother in the said judgment which accords with mine. The passage quoted from chapter 9 of his book “Commentaries From The Bench” is very succinct and clear and provides a final solution to the issue of joinder or misjoinder of parties raised by the parties in this appeal. It is clear from the facts and circumstances of the case that the right of the respondent to the relief (i.e. their cause of action) arose from the same transaction or transactions and instead of allowing them to take separate actions thereby causing multiplicity of actions it is desirable if they sue, as they did in the present case, jointly and severally. It is also trite that the main and only reason which makes a person a party to an action or proceeding is that he would or should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled must be a question in the action which cannot be effectively and completely settled unless he is a party – See Babayeju v. Ashamu (1998) 9 NWLR (Pt. 567) 546, Udo v. Cross River State Newspapers Corporation (2001) 22 WRN 53; (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 732) 116 at 162.
It is clear from the circumstances of the case and claims at the trial court that if the respondent had brought different actions against the appellant, a common question of law could arise for determination by the said trial court. In such a situation it is desirable and conducive to have a joint action or claim as was brought by the respondent rather than bringing multiple claims or actions at the trial court which may in the end have to be consolidated for convenience.
In view of my above consideration of the lone issue in this appeal. I too find the appeal as lacking in merit and hereby dismiss it. I abide by the consequential orders in the lead judgment including the order on cost.
FRANCIS FEDODE TABAI, JCA: I had the privilege of reading before now the judgment prepared by my learned brother Onalaja, JCA and I agree with the reasoning and conclusion thereat.
Order 11 rule 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules of Oyo State 1988 states:
“All persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs in whom any right to relief (in respect of or arising out of the same transaction or in a series of transactions) is alleged to exist whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where, if such persons brought separate actions any common question of law or fact would arise; and judgment may be given for such one or more of the plaintiff as may be found to be entitled to relief, for such relief as he or they may be entitled to without amendment.”
There is no doubt that each of the plaintiffs/respondents had a separate and distinct contract of service with the defendant/appellant. But for the purpose of this appeal paragraphs 6 – 14 of the statement of claim are relevant. The said paragraphs are to the effect that a chapter of the National Union of Food Beverage and Tobacco Employees (a Trade Union) was inaugurated at the appellant’s factory with the respondents elected Chairman Financial Secretary and Treasurer respectively. On the 29/10/96 they were introduced to the management of the appellant as such officers. Immediately thereafter the appellant threatened to deal ruthlessly with them. And on the following day the 30/10/96 their appointments were terminated. And that the termination was wrongful and illegal as it offends the Labour Act Cap. 198 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, the I.L.O. Convention No. 98 of 1948 and section 37 of the 1979 Constitution.
Paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the statement of defence are also relevant. They allege to the effect that following the formation of the appellant’s branch of the union the respondents abandoned their duties for hours almost on daily basis under the pretext of attending union meetings. Such conduct of the respondents affect the capacity utilization of the appellant company following which it carried out a re-organisation. And the result is the termination of the respondents and others.
From this state of the pleadings it appears to me that the principle in Cross River State Newspaper Corporation v. Oni (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 371) 270 applies and the action permissible for two reasons namely-
(1) that the right to the reliefs claimed arose out of the same transaction, that is, the formation and participation by the respondents in trade union activities, and
(2) that even if separate action were brought by the respondents common questions of law and fact would arise.
This is also the principle in order 11 rule 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 1988 of Oyo State. Having regard to the facts pleaded showing that the right to the reliefs claimed by the three respondents arose out of the same transaction and that common question of law and fact would arise for determination even if a separate suit is filed by each of the respondents, it is my view that a single suit as presently constituted is the most convenient and appropriate notwithstanding the fact that each of the respondents had a separate contract of service with the appellant.
For these and fuller reasons very ably articulated in the leading judgment I also hold that the objection for misjoinder was rightly dismissed by the lower court. I affirm the ruling of the court below and the appeal accordingly dismissed for lack of merit. I also award N5,000.00 costs against the appellant in favour of the respondents.
Cases referred to in the judgment
Amachree v. Newington (1952) 14 WACA 97.
Ayankoya v. Olukoya (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt. 440) 1.
Babayeju v. Ashamu (1998) 9 NWLR (Pt. 567) 546.
C.C.B (Nig.) Plc. v. Rose (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 544) 37.
Cross Rivers State Newspapers Corporation v. Oni (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 371) 270.
Emono v. N.P.A (1966) LLR 268.
George v. U.B.A (1972) 8-9 S.C 264.
George v. Dominion Flour Mills (1963) 1 All NLR 71.
Kukoyi v. Ladunni (1976) 11 S.C 245.
Lahan v. Lajoyetan (1972) 6 S.C 190.
Ndigwe v. Nwude (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt. 626) 314.
Nnubia v. A-G., Rivers State (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt. 593) 82.
Ogwuche v. Mba (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt. 336) 75.
U.B.A Ltd. v. Ademuyiwa (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt. 628) 570.
Udo v. Cross Rivers State Newspapers Corporation (2001) 22 WRN 53; (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 732) 116.
Statute referred to in the judgment
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 s. 37.
Rules of court referred to in the judgment
Anambra State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 1988 Or. II r.1 & Or. 3 r.3.
High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 1978 or. 8 r. 1, & 10(1)(2).
Oyo State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 1987 or. 11 r.1.
Book referred to in the judgment
Onalaja, Commentaries From the Bench pt. II Ch. IX Pp.118 – 150.
