3PLR – ABORODE ALADE 2 ORS VS BUARI AKANDE AND ANOR

POLICY, PRACTICE AND PUBLISHING, LAW REPORTS 3PLR

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ABORODE ALADE 2 ORS

VS

BUARI AKANDE AND ANOR

COURT OF APPEAL

(IBADAN DIVISION)

CA/I/41/89

TUESDAY 8^TH MARCH 1994

3PLR/1994/4 (CA)

OTHER CITATIONS

5 NWLR PART 345 PG 468

BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS

ALOMA MARIAM MUKHTAR;

ISA AYO SALAMI;

SYLVANUS ADIEWERE NSOFOR.

REPRESENTATION

Ajayi ESQ,. – for the Appellants
Akinyele ESQ. – for the respondents

MAIN ISSUES

LAND LAW – Meaning of Holder or Occupier

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – purpose of pleadings – whether tantamont to evidence

Facts:

The respondents, as plaintiffs, sued the appellants, as defendants, in the Oyo State High Court claiming as follows:

Declaration that the defendants are up till the 25th day of March, 1991, the plaintiffs’ customary tenants on the plaintiffs’ farmland situate being and lying at Ibapon village in Ogbomos District in Oyo State of Nigeria which parcel of farmland shall be more clearly shown, described and demarcated in a survey plan to be filed later in this suit.
Declaration that by the judgment of the Oshun North West Grade ‘B’ Customary Court, Ogbomoso delivered in suit No. C. 41/70:Salami Akanni (For himself and members of Garuba Ajao Family v. Aborode Alade and Family delivered on or about the 25th March. 1971 the defendants said Customary tenancy on the said parcel of farmland had been forfeited.
An order of the court granting the plaintiffs, possession of the said parcel of farmland.
An injunction restraining the defendants, their servants, agents privies and /or any other person or persons claiming through them from entering unto or doing anything whatsoever on the said parcel of farmland.

The respondents relied on traditional history to prove their ownership of the land. They went back in time to their ancestor, one Saibu a great and noble Muslim priest who migrated from Sokoto to Largate. Saibu was of service to the Onpetu Asamu, as a result of which he was invited to Oje by the said Onpetu to settle permanently there near him, in consequence of which the Onpetu Asamu made an absolute grant of a vast tract of farmland, a virgin land now known as Ibapon, to the said Saibu. Saibu founded a village later called Ibapon on a portion of the land. The Onpetu gave his only daughter lanike away in marriage to Saibu, and they begat Ismaila. The Onpetu ordered that only Ismaila and his descendants should inherit the farmland, an order with which Saibu agreed.

Upon Saibu’s death the farmland devolved by inheritance under native law and custom on Ismaila who exercised various acts of ownership over it without any disturbance, and after his death his descendants who included the 1st and 2nd respondents inherited it.

The appellants’ family Aborode vide the request of Faghohin the 1st appellant’s father was granted the land in dispute for faming purposes by lawani, the then head of the respondents ‘family on payment of annual customary tributes ‘Ishakole’ On the death of Fagbhun the land in dispute devolved on his brothers, who continued to pay the agreed ‘Ishakole’ until Garuba, a member of the appellant family refused to do so during the reign of Garuba Ajao, even though they continued to use the land after their father’s death. Consequently the said Garuba Ajao instituted an action against the 1st appellant and his family in 1951 at the Grade ‘B’ Division of the Ogbomosho Native Court (vide Suit No. 2/51 Garuba Bale Ibapon v. Aborode and family) and he succeeded. After the judgment the appellants revived the payment of Ishakole until 1966 when they refused again, and yet another action was instituted by Garuba Ajao on which he succeeded even on appeal to the High Court. There were further refusals of payment of the said Ishakole after the death of Garuba Ajao and some more litigation. The respondents have exercised right of ownership by making absolute grants to various parties, and laid out buildings plots, but the appellants have stubbornly and illegally refused to vacate or quit the land in dispute, hence the present action.

The 2nd and 3rd appellants even though they agreed vide their joint statement of defence that there were litigation’s in respect of the land instituted against them by the respondents ancestors, they maintained the parties in the suits sued each other in their personal capacities, and the lands in dispute in those actions were not the same as the one in dispute in the present case. They also contended that if, on the other hand, the land in dispute is the same as the one being litigated upon in the present case, then they relied on the plea of estoppel per rent judicatam. The appellants traced the traditional history of the land in dispute to a grant to their ancestor lakoso many centuries ago by Onpetu Asamu under native law and custom on payment of Ishakole to the Onpetu Chieftancy family, and since the death of lakioso the land has continued to devolve on his descendants amongst whom are the appellants, under native law and custom. The appellants have exercised various rights over the land, and have lived and farmed thereon. According to the appellants their family were immediately before the commencement of the land Use Act 1978 in occupation of the said land and therefore had exclusive rights to the land, and to grant the respondents claims will have the consequence of infringing against the provisions of the said Law.

The appellants also counter-claimed. The learned trial Judge, Ademakinwa J., after evaluating the evidence before him gave judgment in favour of the respondents.

The appellants were dissatisfied with the judgment and appealed to the Court of Appeal

{Issues}

Whether the defence of estoppel per rem judicatam avails the appellants in this case.
Whether the appellants’ occupation and use of the land in dispute was unlawful and therefore not protected by the Land Use Act, 1978.

MAIN JUDGEMENT

{Held – Summary}

Unanimously dismissing the Appeal

Estoppel by record inter parties or per rem judicatam as it is generally known, or cause of action estoppel occurs where the cause of action is merged in the judgment, that is transient in rem judicatam. Therefore, on this principle of law or rule of evidence once it appears that the same cause of action was held to lie. (or not to lie) in a final judgment between the same parties, or their privies who are litigating in, and on the same subject matter, there is an end to the matter. They are precluded from litigation the same cause of action.
It is an established principle of law that for a case to operate as estoppel res judicatam and for a defence of res judicata to succeed it must be shown by the defendant that the cause of action in the earlier case is the same as the cause of action in the later case.
Under the provisions of section 36(2) of the Land Use Act, a person shall be entitled to continue to be in possession parcel of land for use for agricultural purposes as if customary right of occupancy had been granted to him if, on the commencement of the Act on 29th March, 1978, he was an occupier or holder of such land under customary rights or other wise, and the land was as at the date of commencement of the Act being used for agricultural purposes.
The words “holder” or “occupier” in section 36 of the land use Act mean the person entitled to a customary right of occupancy, that is the customary land owner other that a customary tenant. The definition of “customary right of occupancy” an “occupier and holder” in section 50 of the Act lend support to this view. Mere possession of a land as a customary tenant however so land cannot mature to confer the rights envisaged in the Act.
In an action for trespass, possession is in issue. Trespass being a wrong against possession it is maintainable by the party who is in exclusive possession of the land against all except the owner or one claiming through him. On the other hand, in an action for possession, possession is not in issue. The claimant for possession admits he has not the possession but rather it is the defendant who has it. The inclusion of a claim for possession with claims involving trespass and perpetual injunction is not to be commended. The rational for this is that, where the defendant is a trespasser the remedy of injunction is a complete answer to his act of outer for by his mere entry on the land the trespasser does not obtain the necessary possession on which to found a claim for recovery. It follows, therefore, that if the plaintiff succeeds and an injunction is ordered the claim for possession is a negation of the very facts on which that for trespass must be founded. Such a claim ought not therefore to be joined with the other claims.

Lead judgement Delivered by Mukhtar JCA

The following is the content of a writ of summons taken by the plaintiffs in the lower court who are respondents in this court against the defendants who are now the appellants:-

Declaration that the defendants are up till the 25th day of March, 1991, the plaintiffs’ Customary tenants on the plaintiffs farmland situate being and lying at Ibapon village in Ogbomose District in Oyo Sat of Nigeria which parcel of farmland shall be more clearly shown, described and demarcated in a survey plan to be filed later in this suit.
Declaration that by the judgment of the Oshun North West Grade ‘B’ Customary Court. Ogbomoso delivered in suit No. C.41/70: Salami Akanni (For himself and members of Garuba Ajao family v. Aborode Alade and family delivered on or about the 25th March, 1971 the defendants said customary tenancy on the said parcel of farmland had been forfeited.
An order of the court granting the plaintiffs possession of the said parcel of farmland.
An injunction restraining the defendants, their servants, agents privies and/or any other persons claiming through them from entering unto or doing anything whatsoever on the said parcel of farmland.

The value of the said parcel of farmland is N2,000.00

Pleadings were filed and served by parties, after which the learned Judge proceeded to hear evidence of five witnesses for the plaintiffs. The defendants relied on the evidence of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs instituted the action in a representative capacity for themselves and on behalf of their family bale Ibapon (Aidindi) against the defendants in respect of the parcel of farmland situate at Ibapon Village in Ogbomosh shown and verged green in survey plan No. KESH/Y/9036 dated 11th November, 1980. The plaintiffs traced the traditional history of the land to their ancestor, one Saibu a great and noble Muslim priest who migrated from Sokoto to Largate. Saibu was of service to the Onpetu Asamu, as a result of which he was invited to Oje by the said Onpetu to settle permanently there near him, whereby he made an absolute grant of a vast tract of farmland, a virgin land now known as Ibapon to the said Saibu. Saibu founded a village later called ibapon on a portion of the land.

The Onpetu gave his only daughter Lanike in marriage to Saibu and they begat Ismaila whom the Onpetu ordered and the Saibu agreed that only his descendants should inherit the said farmland. On Saibu’s death the farmland devolved by inheritance under native law and custom on Ismaila who exercised various acts of ownership over it without any disturbance, and after his death his descendant who included the 1 s t and 2nd plaintiffs inherited it.

The defendants’ family Aborode vide the request of Faghohun the 1st defendant’s father was granted the land in dispute for farming purposes by Lawani the then head of the plaintiffs’ family on payment of annual customary tributes ishakole’. On the death of fagbohun the land in dispute devolved on his brothers who continued to pay the agreed Ishkole until garuba the defendant refused to do so during the reign of garuba Ajao, even though they continued to use the land after their father’s death. Consequently the said Garuba Ajao instituted an action against the 1st defendant and his family in n1951 at the grade ‘B’ Division of the Ogbomosho Native Court vide Suit No. 2/51 Garuba Bale Ibapon v. Aborode and family and he succeeded. After the judgment the defendants revived the payment of ishakole until 1966 when they refused again, and yet another action was instituted by garuba Ajao on which he succeeded even on appeal to the High Court. There were further refusals of payment of the said Ishakole after the death of Garuba Ajao and some litigations. The plaintiffs have exercised rights of ownership by making absolute grant to various parties, and laid out building plots hut the defendants have stubbornly and illegally refused to vacate or quit the land in dispute, hence the present action.

The 2nd and 3rd defendants even though agreed vide their joint statement of defence that there were litigations in respect of land instituted against them by the plaintiff’s ancestor, the parties in the suits sued each other in their personal capacities, and the land in dispute were not the same as the one in dispute in the present case. If on the other hand the land in dispute is the same as the one being litigated upon in dispute in the present case the defendants traced the traditional history of the land in dispute to a grant to their ancestor lakoso many centuries a go by Onipetu Asamu under native law and custom on payment of Ishakole to the Onpetu chieftaincy family, and since the death of Lakoso the land has continued to devolve on his descendants amongst whom are the defendants, under native law and custom. The defendants have exercised various rights over the land, and have lived and farmed thereon. According to the defendants their family were immediately before the commencement of the Land use Act 1978 in occupation of the said land and therefore had exclusive rights to the land, and to grant the plaintiffs’ claims will hav4 the consequence of infringing against the provisions of the said law. The defendants counter claimed in their statement of defence as follows:-

“And by way of counter-claim the defendants repeat paragraphs 1-29 of the defence and if contrary to their contention it should be fo9und that the plaintiffs have a right to enforce the forfeiture they claimed to be relieved from the alleged forfeiture on such terms as the honourable Court shall think fit.”

The leaned judge who heard the case after evaluating the evidence before him and considering the addresses of counsel gave judgment in favour of the plaintiffs as follows:

“In the light of the foregoing, I would grant the order of possession sought. The plaintiffs are hereby granted possession of the farmland situated lying and being at Ibapon Village in Ogbomosho District, which parcel of farmland is more particularly, shown described and verged ‘green’ in the survey plan No. KSN/Y/9036 admitted as Exhibit ‘A’ in this case. I would also grant the injunction sought.”

Dissatisfied by the judgment of the lower court the defendants appealed on the following grounds of appeal:-

The judgment is against the weight of evidence.
The trial Judge erred in law by holding that the defendant/appellants were not lawfully in possession of the land.

Particulars of Error.

(i). The issues as to the possession of the defendant/respondents being lawful or otherwise has been decided in Suit No. HOS/100/76- Salami Akanni v. Aborode Alade AND others and as such the respondents and the trial court are thus estopped from reopening and the court from deciding that issue again.

(ii). The issues of lawfulness or otherwise of the possession by the appellant was not an issue raised by the parties at the trial.

(3). The trial court erred in law to have granted the orders sought by the plaintiffs as the defendants being occupiers or holders of the land used for agricultural purposes on the commencement of the land use Act have their interest protected by the said Act.

Particulars of Error

(i) The action having been instituted after the coming into effect of the land Use Act, the tenancy of the defendants could not be forfeited, or possession and injunction of the same granted to plaintiffs

(ii). The plaintiffs did not establish the their right to the declarations and order sought and granted by the trial court.

(4). The court erred in law to have granted the plaintiffs the order for possession and injunction as the plaintiffs/respondents have no locus to institute the action and to claim a right to possession on any land in the State in view of the land use Act. 1978.

Counsel exchanged briefs of argument which were adopted at the hearing o the appeal. A single issue was formulated for determination by the appellants their brief of argument and that is:-

“Whether the defendants/appellants’ occupation and use of the land in dispute was unlawful and were consequently not protected by the provisions of the Land Use Act, even though they were persons using or occupying the land for agricultural purpose.”

Learned counsel for the respondents in the respondents’ brief of argument raised six issues for determination, some of which did not flow from the appellants ground of appeal and thus had no relationship whatsoever. It is a well established principle of law that issues must be tied and or derived its source from already filed grounds of appeal, for there must be a relationship between a ground of appeal and a formulated issue. See Oko v. Ntukidem (1993) 2 NWLR(Pt. 274) 124. In the case Wali, J.S.C. explained the need to tie issues to grounds of appeal thus:-

“Before dealing with the arguments., let me once again state the procedural law where briefs have been filed and issues have been formulated. Issues are formulated to the grounds of appeal filed and once that is done, all arguments are presented on the issues and not on the grounds of appeal. It is misleading for the learned counsel for the appellants to say ‘Ground 1 and 2 taken together’ while in fact he was arguing issues 1 and 2 together which were based on the said grounds. See Momodu v. Momoh (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 169) 608; Ojibah v. Ojibah (1991) 5NWLR (Pt. 191) 296; and Aja v. Okoro (1991)7 NWLR (Pt. 203) 260.”

Before I delve into which of the issues formulated by the respondent are not appropriate I will first of all consider the competence of the brief itself as a whole. I have observed that the respondent’s argument are based on the grounds of appeal instead of issues. This court and the Supreme Court have time and time against consistently reminded counsel that arguments canvassed in a brief of argument must be based on issues formulated and not grounds of appeal, but many have seemingly turned deaf ears to such counsel The need for good brief writing cannot be over embassies and so is the requirement to comply with the formal. A brief which does not conform or comply with laid principle is incompetent and deserves to be struck out. see Adegboyega v. Awe (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 280) p. 224; and Orji v. Zaria Industries (1992) 3 SCNJ 29. (1992) 1 NWLR (pt. 216) 124.

Secondly a respondent’s brief is supposed to be a response to the appellants brief, which to my mind is to be confined within the periphery of points raised by the appellant, not to ramble endlessly on what is not a point in issue as the respondents brief in this case seems to have done. See order 6R. 4(ii) of the Court of Appeal Rules, amended which stipulates as follows:

“The respondent’ s brief shall answer all material points of substance contained in the appellants brief and contain all points raised therein which the respondent wishes to concede as well as reason why the appeal ought to be dismissed ……..”

For the reasons of all the above shortcoming it is my view that the respondents brief of argument is incompetent and should be struck out. In the alternative I will proceed to deal with the respondents brief for all its worth.

Coming back to the redundant issues formulated in the respondents brief of argument I am of the view that issues Nos. (2) and (iv) are not related to the grounds of appeal and the y are hereby struck out. See Ugo v. Obiekwe (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 99) 566; Western Steel Works Ltd AND Anor v. Iron Steel Works Union of Nigeria (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 49) 284 ; and Atanda v. Ajani (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) 511.

It is clear from the judgment of the trial Judge that he relied on the judgments of the case instituted by the plaintiffs predecessors in title against the defendants predecessors in suits Nos. C. 66.66. C. 48/69, and C.41.70 admitted in evidence as Exhibit ‘B’ – ‘F’ and accepted them as qualifying to operate as estoppel per rem judicatam. In his judgment he said:-

“I am fully satisfied that the judgments Exhibits ‘B’ -‘F’ eminently qualify to operate as estoppel per rem judicatam against the present defendants because the parties to the present suit are privies to the parties in the previous suits in which those judgment were given.

In the said suits the defendants were consistently Aborode family as borne out by the judgement, and the present plaintiffs are privies to the plaintiffs in those suits as is borne out by the averments in their pleading which were supported by evidence of the plaintiffs witnesses which the learned Judge believed, for in his judgment he held thus:-

“The crucial question I have to decide now is whether the defendant occupation or make use of his land in dispute, in this case is in accordance with Customary Law. There is evidence before met that there have been judgments against the defendants and their predecessors in-title culminating in the said suit C.11/70 given on the 25th of March, 1971 (certified true copy of which was admitted Exh. ‘F’) in which the forfeiture of the defendants tenancy on the land in dispute was ordered. This was about seven years before the Land Use Act came into force. I have given most anxious consideration to the facts of this case, ore particularly the fact that the last court which dealt with the customary law on the matter came to the decision that the defendants have forfeited their interest in the land in dispute and there was no appeal against the judgment. It is trite law that an owner of land is entitled under native law to recover possession from a tenant who wrongfully claims ownership. (See Olota v. Davidson (1904) 1 NLR 57). I cannot but hold that the defendants occupation of the land, in the circumstances, is not in accordance with Customary Law.’

Another grouse the appellant has against the judgment of the lower court in the instant case is that the effect of the dismissal of the plaintiffs for trespass in Suit No. HOS/1000/76 Salami Akanni v. Aborode Alade and other s was not considered, for according to leaned counsel for the appellant they raised the issue of res judicate in their paragraphs 8,9,10,11 and 12 of the statement of defence that plaintiffs were precluded from relitigating on the issues. Learned counsel for the r respondents has submitted in his brief of arguments that the issue of estoppel did not arise in this case as the issue in Suit No. HOS/100/76/ Exh. ‘C’ was not the same as the issue in the instant case, for the earlier one was trespass whilst this one was for possession. Indeed a look at Exh.’C’ shows that the action by the plaintiff/respondent was based on trespass, whereas the one before the lower court was based on possession as is claimed in paragraph 47 of the statement of claim. Being different claim and cause of action suit No. 100/76 cannot operate as estoppel in this case. Leaned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the cases of Chief Karimu Ajagunjeun AND Others v. Sobo Osho and others 91977) 5 S.C. page 89.

It is an established principle of law that for a cause to operate as estoppel res judicatam and for a defence of res judicatam to succeed it must be shown by the defendant that the cause of action in the earlier and later ease are the same. See Ndiribe v. Ogbogu (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 123) 599

An action for trespass is different from that of possession, as such when one fails the other can be instituted, which was exactly what the plaintiff in this case did. In view of the settled law, as replied above the learned trial Judge did not err when he failed to hold that the previous judgment Exh. ‘C’ operated as estoppel per rem judicatam against the defendants.

I would have paused here to examine the trial Judge’s consideration of paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the statement of defence, but I find that the need to do so does not arose since there was no evidence in support of the averments. I supposed that was why the learned Judge did not consider the operation of estoppel pr rem judicatam in respect of Exh. ‘C’ against the plaintiff. One need not ever emphasise the requirement of the law that pleadings must be supported or proved by evidence, as the former is not tantamount to the other, but it is imperative that I mention it in passing at this juncture. See Hutchfull v. Biney (1971) 1 All NLR 268; Akinfosile v. Ijose (1960) 5 FSC 192; and petrojeessica Enterprises Ltd. v. Leventis Technical Ltd. (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 244) 459.

An argument canvassed by leaned counsel for the appellant was the application of Section (1) and 36(10 and (2) of the Land Use Act in favour of the appellant for the postulated that the possession of the appellants was protected since they continued to be customary tenants at the commencement of the said Act. This postulation definitely is not tenable for the appellants have forfeited that customary tenancy by failure to met the condition of the tenancy i.e. refusing to pay the customary tributes, which led to the appellants forfeiting the land to the respondents vide court orders in the Exhibits B.D. E. etc. In the circumstance the appellant cannot be said to have been in lawful possession. Now coming back to section 36 of the Land Use Act. The interpretation of the words holder or occupiers was given by Wali J.S.C. in Onwuka v. Ediala (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 96) 182 as follows:-

“In my views the words holder or occupier means the person entitled to a customary right of occupancy that is the customary land owner other than a customary tenant. The definition of the expression.’ Customary Right of Occupancy an occupier and holder’ in section 50 of the Act lend support as a customary tenant however so long cannot mature to corner the rights envisaged in the Act”.

I find the above view very illuminating and educative and I am fortified by it. In view of the reasoning and the supra reproduce portion of the Supreme Court judgment I fail to see how the appellant can successfully claim protection under the said Section 36(2) of the Land Use Act supra. The learned trial Judge in dealing with the provisions in the Land Use Act Decree, which counsel for the defendant merely raised in his address went on a very long voyage of discovery analysing in detail the provisions of the Land Use Act and in the course interpreting some of the provision. In my view the exercise was most unnecessary and at most an academic exercise in futility. Counsel in the lower court did not even make a case of the provisions he relied upon , he only addressed the court on it, which to my mind did not deserve the time and industry wasted on it by the learned Judge.

However, the learned Judge found correctly at the end of the day in his judgment when in referring to the provision of the said Section 36(2) of the Land Use Act he stated:-

“Under the foregoing provisions a person shall be entitled to continue to be in possession of a parcel of land for use for agricultural purpose as if customary right of occupancy had granted to him if – on the commencement of the Act i.e. the 29th of March, 1978, he was an occupier or holder of such land under customary right or otherwise; and the land was as at the date of commencement of the Act being used for agricultural purposes. There would appear to be less difficulty with the terms “holder” “customary right of occupancy” since these have been defined in the Act itself.”

In the final analysis all the ground of appeal supra fails. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed for lack of merit and substance. The judgement of Ademakinwa j. is affirmed. The sum of N500.00 is awarded as cost to the respondents.

Nigerian cases referred to:

Adegboyega v. Awe (1993)3 NWLR (Pt. 280) 224

Agbetoba v. Lagos state Executive Council (1991) 4NWLR (Pt. 188) 664

Akinfosile v. Ijose 91960) SCNLR 447

Atanda v. Ajani 91989) NWLR (Pt. 11 1) 511

Fadare v. Odeyale (Unreported) Suit No. CA.I/ISO/88

Gafar v. U.A.C. Ltd. (1961) SCNLR

Hutchful v. Biney (1971) 1 All NLR 268

Imana v. Robinson91979)3-4 S.C.1.

Leventis Technical ltd. v. Petrojessica Enterprises Ltd (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 244) 459

Modupe v. State (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt 87) 130

Ndiribe v. Ogbogu (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 123) 599

Nwosu v. Udeaja (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 125) 22

Oko v. Ntukideni (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt. 274) 124

Okonkwo v. Okolo (19880 2 NWLR (pt. 79) 636

Okpala v. Ibeme 91989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 102) 208

Okupe v. Ifemembi 91974) 3 S.C. 97

Onwuka v. Ediala (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 69) 182

Orji v. Zaria Industries (1992) 1 NWLR (Pt. 216) 124

Toriola v. Williams (1982) 7 S.C. 27

Ugo. v. Obiekwe (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 99) 566

Western Steel Works Ltd v. Iron AND Steel Workers Union 91987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 49) 284

ALOMA MARIAM MUKHTAR Delivering Leading Judgement

The following is the content of a writ of summons taken by the plaintiffs in the lower court who are respondents in this court against the defendants who are now the appellants:-

Declaration that the defendants are up till the 25th day of March, 1991, the plaintiffs’ Customary tenants on the plaintiffs farmland situate being and lying at Ibapon village in Ogbomose District in Oyo Sat of Nigeria which parcel of farmland shall be more clearly shown, described and demarcated in a survey plan to be filed later in this suit.
Declaration that by the judgment of the Oshun North West Grade ‘B’ Customary Court. Ogbomoso delivered in suit No. C.41/70: Salami Akanni (For himself and members of Garuba Ajao family v. Aborode Alade and family delivered on or about the 25th March, 1971 the defendants said customary tenancy on the said parcel of farmland had been forfeited.
An order of the court granting the plaintiffs possession of the said parcel of farmland.
An injunction restraining the defendants, their servants, agents privies and/or any other persons claiming through them from entering unto or doing anything whatsoever on the said parcel of farmland.