3PLR – MAXWELL V THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS – CWL

POLICY, PRACTICE AND PUBLISHING, LAW REPORTS  3PLR

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 MAXWELL

V.

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
(ON BEHALF OF HIS MAJESTY)

 

[HOUSE OF LORDS.]

1934 JUNE 28.

3PLR/1934/2 (HL-E)

 

 

OTHER CITATIONS

[1935] A.C. 309

BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:

VISCOUNT SANKEY L.C.

LORD BLANESBURGH

LORD ATKIN

LORD THANKERTON, and

LORD WRIGHT

 

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for appellant: F. Wilberforce Bridge, for William-son AND Stephenson, Hull.

The Director of Public Prosecutions.

 

MAIN ISSUES

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE:- Manslaughter – Evidence – Admissibility – Cross-examination – Prisoner’s previous Character – Previous Charge – Acquittal – Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 (61 AND 62 Vict. c. 36), s. 1, proviso (f).

HEALTHCARE LAW: – Primary healthcare – Doctors –Illegal abortion – Professional malpractice – Relevant issues thereof

CHILDREN AND WOMEN LAW: Women and Healthcare – Primary healthcare for women – Procurement of miscarriage/abortion – Death arising from illegal operation

 

 

HISTORY AND SUMMARY OF FACTS

By proviso (f) to s. 1 of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898: “A person charged and called as a witness in pursuance of this Act shall not be asked, and if asked shall not be required to answer, any question tending to show that he has committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offence other than that wherewith he is then charged, or is of bad character, unless –

“(i)     the proof that he has committed or been convicted of such other offence is admissible evidence to show that he is guilty of the offence wherewith he is then charged; or

“(ii.)   he has personally or by his advocate asked questions of the witnesses for the prosecution with a view to establish his own good character, or has given evidence of his good character, or the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution; or

“(iii.) he has given evidence against any other person charged with the same offence”:-

 

Held, that the admissibility of evidence under the proviso is subject to the condition that it is relevant to the issue before the jury or to the credibility of the prisoner as a witness.

A prisoner, charged with manslaughter of a woman by performing upon her an illegal operation, gave evidence of his good character. Thereupon counsel for the prosecution asked him the following questions:-

“Q.     This is the second time that sudden death has come to a woman patient of yours, is it not? – A. Yes.

“Q.     The first time was in 1927? – A. In 1927, yes. ….

“Q.     And were you tried for manslaughter? – A. Something like that; I                 could not tell you exactly.

1. And you were acquitted by the July? – A. Yes.” ….

 

The prisoner was found guilty of manslaughter.

 

Held, that these questions were not admissible, inasmuch as the fact that the prisoner had been acquitted on a previous charge of manslaughter was not relevant to the issue before the jury and did not tend to impair the credibility of the prisoner as a witness.

 

Held, consequently, that the conviction must be quashed.

 

Order of the Court of Criminal Appeal reversed.

 

APPEAL from the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal dismissing the appeal of William Maxwell from a conviction before du Parcq J. at York Assizes on February 27, 1934.

 

The prisoner was charged with the manslaughter of a woman named May Holliday and with feloniously using upon her a certain instrument, to wit an enema, with intent to procure a miscarriage contrary to s. 58 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861. He was convicted at York Assizes of the offences as charged and was sentenced to twenty months’ imprisonment.

 

He appealed against the conviction and applied for leave to appeal against the sentence. The appeal and application were heard by the Court of Criminal Appeal on April 23, 1934. The appeal was dismissed, and the application refused.

 

The prisoner, having obtained from the Attorney-General a certificate that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal involved a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it was in his opinion desirable in the public interest that a further appeal should be brought, appealed to this House.

 

1934. May 31.

MAIN JUDGMENT

The facts are stated in the speech of the Lord Chancellor, which also indicates the arguments of counsel.

 

The following authorities were referred to: Rex v. Barron (1); Rex v. Sullivan(2); Archbold’s Criminal Pleading, 28th ed. (1931), p. 482; 29th ed. (1934), p. 471; Rex v. Fisher (3); Rex v. Ellis.(4)

 

June 1. At the conclusion of the argument the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal was reversed, and the cause was remitted back to that Court to do therein as should be just and consistent with the judgment of the House. The Lord Chancellor announced that the opinions of their Lordships would be delivered on a future date.

 

 

June 28. VISCOUNT SANKEY L.C.

My Lords, the appellant, William Maxwell, was convicted at Leeds Assizes of the manslaughter of a woman called May Holliday, and also of using on her an instrument with intent to procure miscarriage. In effect he was found guilty of causing the woman’s death by performing on her an illegal operation. He was sentenced to twenty months’ imprisonment with hard labour. He appealed from that conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeal, who dismissed the appeal. From their decision he has now appealed to your Lordships’ House under a certificate given by the Attorney-General under the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, on the ground that there is involved a point of exceptional public importance so that in his opinion it was desirable in the public interest that a further appeal should be brought. The question is whether it was permissible in the particular facts of the case, under the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, s. 1, proviso (f), for the prosecution to ask the prisoner whether on a previous occasion he had been charged with a similar offence, the charge having been tried and having resulted in an acquittal.

 

Sect. 1, proviso (f), of the Act is in these terms:-

“(f)    A person charged and called as a witness in pursuance of this Act shall not be asked, and if asked shall not be required to answer, any question tending to show that he has committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offence other than that wherewith he is then charged, or is of bad character, unless –

 

“(i.)    the proof that he has committed or been convicted of such other offence is admissible evidence to show that he is guilty of the offence wherewith he is then charged; or

 

“(ii.)   he has personally or by his advocate asked questions of the witnesses for the prosecution with a view to establish his own good character, or has given evidence of his good character, or the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution; or

 

“(iii.) he has given evidence against any other person charged with the same offence.”

 

The particular facts under which the question here arises are as follows. At the trial a detective inspector in the Hull City Police Force gave evidence that on November 17 previously he went to 11 Sandringham Street, the address of the prisoner, and met him in the passage of his house, and that the prisoner said to him: “Now, Mr. Huxley, I am unlucky again.” When Mr. Paley Scott proceeded to the cross-examination of this witness, he said to him: “There is one thing in your evidence that I think it is necessary to ask you something about. His words to you began, ‘Now, Mr. Huxley.'” The cross-examination then continued as

“Q.         I take it he knew you therefore? – A. Yes.

“Q.         ‘I am unlucky again.’ Is it a fact within your knowledge that a patient of his whom he was treating some seven years ago died during the treatment? –

1. Yes.

“Q. Not at his house, I think? – A. No.

“Q. But at a time when the patient was undergoing treatment by him? –

1. En route to his house from her home address.

“Q. So far as you know, would that be what he was referring to when he said, ‘I am unlucky again’? –

1. I should imagine so.

“Jardine: My Lord, I venture to submit that as my learned friend has asked about a patient who died some years ago and has left it at that, I am entitled to ask a further question on that topic.

“DU PARCQ J.: Is there any doubt about that, Mr. Paley Scott? The jury are entitled to know the whole story.

“Paley Scott: I can only say at the moment that I do not know what the question is going to be. I know what the facts are.

“Jardine: What are the facts which followed the death?

“DU PARCQ J.: I do not know about the facts which followed the death; I do not know anything about it.

“Jardine: The question that I propose to ask is: What happened to William Maxwell consequent upon the death of his patient?

“DU PARCQ J.: I do not think I could allow that question in that form.

“Jardine: If your Lordship pleases.

“Paley Scott: Now that that has been asked there may be a misunderstanding. The jury may think that he was convicted of some offence as a result of that. As long as it is quite understood that that did not happen, I have no objection. That question would suggest to the minds of the jury that he had been convicted.

“DU PARCQ J.: You found that a patient of his died during some treatment that she was receiving from him? –

1. Consequent upon treatment, my Lord.”

 

Subsequently the prisoner went into the box himself. He was asked by his learned counsel:

“Have you ever been convicted of any offence in your life?” and he replied: “No, I have lived a good, clean, moral life, sir.”

 

Thereupon, when the counsel for the Crown proceeded to cross-examine the witness, he asked him the following questions:-

“Q. This is the second time that sudden death has come to a woman patient of yours, is it not?

1. Yes.

“Q. The first time was in 1927?

1. In 1927, yes.

“Q. And you were tried for murder, were you not?

1. No.

“Q. Were you committed to trial for murder?

1. No.

“Q. And were you tried for manslaughter?

1. Something like that: I could not tell you exactly.

“Q. And you were acquitted by the jury?

1. Yes.

“Q. That woman was put by an adopted daughter of yours into a taxi and died before she got home?

1. No.

“Q. Where did she die?

1. At home.

“Q. How long after leaving your house?

1. I could not tell you, because I had nothing whatever to do with it. She got nothing from me and I had stopped the case a week before. They had only been twice or thrice at my place.

“Q. The matter was inquired into at the Assizes at Leeds and you were acquitted by a jury?

1. Yes, and I have given the information to the detectives and police of Hull, and people came and told me the whole story of that girl and what the mother had done. The next day after her death young doctors from the Infirmary gave evidence that the uterus was in a very advanced state of decomposition, a thing we have never seen before. I never used anything and never had. That was nothing to do with me whatever. She had never got into my room; she was here at the door.”

 

The learned judge in summing-up referred to the incident of the prisoner’s acquittal on the previous charge in the following words:

“Then there is one other matter which I must deal with. It came out in the course of the case that the prisoner had talked about another unfortunate business, or words to that effect; I am not giving the exact words. He had said something like, ‘I’m unlucky again,’ and naturally enough Mr. Paley Scott, representing him, wanted it to be clear to you that that did not mean that he had ever previously been convicted of any offence. Naturally enough also, Mr. Jardine, appearing for the prosecution, thought that you ought to know a little more about what happened, and it turns out that a patient of his died in circumstances which apparently gave rise to suspicion as a result of which he was put on his trial for murder and acquitted. Now my advice to you is, and I am sure you will act upon it; put that out of your minds altogether. You and I know very little about it; I know no more than you do, and that is not much. All we know about it is that he was suspected, and suspicion in these Courts I hope counts for nothing; it counts for nothing with me and I am sure it will count for nothing with you. He was tried and he was acquitted and that means that he can say that he was not proved guilty, and if he was not proved guilty he ought to be assumed innocent on that charge. Therefore, you are left at the end of all that evidence very much where you were before, and I am sure you will be wise enough to say to yourselves: ‘We will deal with this case and the evidence in this case and nothing else.'”

 

In the Court of Criminal Appeal the argument proceeded mainly upon the construction of the section above referred to and to its bearing on the facts which came out at the trial, and in dismissing the appeal the learned Lord Chief Justice said:-

“Now, here it is manifest that the appellant had personally and by his advocate asked questions with a view to establishing his good character and had given evidence of his good character and, therefore, the only question which we have to consider is whether that which was done here on the part of the prosecution was permitted under the words of the para. (f). It is obvious that that paragraph distinguishes three things: (1.) has committed, (2) has been convicted of, and (3.) has been charged with, any offence other than that wherewith he is charged. The questions which were here asked were questions on the point whether the appellant had been previously charged with some offence other than that wherewith he was then charged. The argument of Mr. Paley Scott is that the mere fact that a charge had been made against the appellant, seeing that that charge terminated in an acquittal, ought not to have been made the subject of cross-examination for the reason that it left a doubt whether the acquittal was justified. If that argument is correct, it would seem that in no circumstances can room be found for the words ‘or been charged with’ as distinguished from the words ‘committed’ or ‘been convicted of.’ It seems indeed a bold argument to allege that it was more prejudicial to the appellant to be asked whether he had been charged and acquitted than to be asked simpliciter whether he had been charged. No doubt, as Mr. Paley Scott has said, if counsel for the prosecution had merely asked whether the appellant had been charged with the other offence, it would have been the duty of counsel for the defence to make it clear in reexamination that that charge had terminated in an acquittal.”

 

On the appeal to your Lordships’ House, your Lordships came to the conclusion, after hearing the argument on both sides, that the appeal should be allowed, and made an order accordingly, but announced that at a later date the reasons for that course would be given. This I now proceed to do.

 

It must first of all be stated that it has been admitted throughout that the prisoner in saying that he had lived a good, clean, moral life, had put his character in issue, and had in the words of the proviso (f) (ii) “given evidence of his good character.” The first question here is, What consequences follow from that?

 

This involves the proper construction of s. 1 (f) of that Act. We start with the hypothesis that the prisoner had given evidence of his good character. It will be remembered that it was not until the year 1854 that the parties to a civil case were entitled to give evidence on their own behalf. But a prisoner could not give evidence on his own behalf at his trial until the coming into operation of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, except in a few cases, of which the most important are those specified in certain sections of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861, the Law of Evidence Act, 1877, and the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885. When Parliament by the Act of 1898 effected a change in the general law and made the prisoner in every case a competent witness, it was in an evident difficulty, and it pursued the familiar English system of a compromise. It was clear that if you allowed a prisoner to go into the witness-box, it was impossible to allow him to be treated as an ordinary witness. Had that been permitted, a prisoner who went into the box to give evidence on oath could have been asked about any previous conviction, with the result that an old offender would seldom, if ever, have been acquitted. This would have offended against one of the most deeply rooted and jealously guarded principles of our criminal law, which, as stated in Makin v. Attorney-General for New South Wales (1), is that “it is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce evidence tending to show that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts other than those covered by the indictment, for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that the accused is a person likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed the offence for which he is being tried.” Some middle way, therefore, had to be discovered, and the result was that a certain amount of protection was accorded to a prisoner who gave evidence on his own behalf. As it has been expressed, he was presented with a shield and, it was provided that he was not to be asked and that, if he was asked, he should not be required to answer, any question tending to show that he had committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offence other than that wherewith he was then charged, or was a bad character. Apart, however, from this protection, he was placed in the position of an ordinary witness in an ordinary civil case. The laws of evidence were not otherwise altered by the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, and the prisoner who was a witness in his own case could not be asked questions which were irrelevant or had nothing to do with the issue which the Court was endeavouring to decide. As has already been pointed out, the prisoner in the present case threw away his shield and, therefore, the learned counsel for the prosecution was entitled to ask him, and he could be required to answer, any question tending to show that he had committed or been convicted of or been charged with an offence, but subject to the consideration that the question asked him must be one which was relevant and admissible in the case of an ordinary witness. The Act does not in terms say that in any case a prisoner may be asked or required to answer questions falling within proviso (f), or impose any such affirmative or absolute burden upon him. I think this conclusion is confirmed by a study of the words of the statute. In s. 1, proviso (e), it has been enacted that a witness may be cross-examined in respect of the offence charged, and cannot refuse to answer questions directly relevant to the offence on the ground that they tend to incriminate him: thus if he denies the offence, he may be cross-examined to refute the denial. These are matters directly relevant to the charge on which he is being tried. Proviso (f), however, is dealing with matters outside, and not directly relevant to, the particular offence charged; such matters, to be admissible at all, must in general fall under two main classes: one is the class of evidence which goes to show not that the prisoner did the acts charged, but that, if he did these acts, he did them as part of a system or intentionally, so as to refute a defence that if he did them he did them innocently or inadvertently, as for instance in Makin v. Attorney-General for New South Wales (1), where the charge was one of murder; another illustration of such cases is Rex v. Bond. (2) This rule applies to cases where guilty knowledge or design or intention is of the essence of the offence.

 

The other main class is where it is sought to show that the prisoner is not a person to be believed on his oath, which is generally attempted by what is called cross-examination to credit. Closely allied with this latter type of question is the rule that, if the prisoner by himself or his witnesses seeks to give evidence of his own good character, for the purpose of showing that it is unlikely that he committed the offence charged, he raises by way of defence an issue as to his good character, so that he may fairly be cross-examined on that issue, just as any witness called by him to prove his good character may be cross-examined to show the contrary. All these matters are dealt with in proviso (f). The substantive part of that proviso is negative in form and as such is universal and is absolute unless the exceptions come into play. Then come the three exceptions: but it does not follow that when the absolute prohibition is superseded by a permission, that the permission is as absolute as the prohibition. When it is sought to justify a question it must not only be brought within the terms of the permission, but also must be capable of justification according to the general rules of evidence and in particular must satisfy the test of relevance. Exception (i.) deals with the former of the two main classes of evidence referred to above, that is, evidence falling within the rule that where issues of intention or design are involved in the charge or defence, the prisoner may be asked questions relevant to these matters, even though he has himself raised no question of his good character. Exceptions (ii.) and (iii.) come into play where the prisoner by himself or his witnesses has put his character in issue, or has attacked the character of others. Dealing with exceptions (i.) and (ii.), it is clear that the test of relevance is wider in (ii.) than in (i.); in the latter, proof that the prisoner has committed or been convicted of some other offence, can only be admitted if it goes to show that he was guilty of the offence charged. In the former (exception ii.), the questions permissible must be relevant to the issue of his own good character and if not so relevant cannot be admissible. But it seems clear that the mere fact of a charge cannot in general be evidence of bad character or be regarded otherwise than as a misfortune. It seemed to be contended on behalf of the respondent that a charge was per se such evidence that the man charged, even though acquitted, must thereafter remain under a cloud, however innocent. I find it impossible to accept any such view. The mere fact that a man has been charged with an offence is no proof that he committed the offence. Such a fact is, therefore, irrelevant; it neither goes to show that the prisoner did the acts for which he is actually being tried nor does it go to his credibility as a witness. Such questions must, therefore, be excluded on the principle which is fundamental in the law of evidence as conceived in this country, especially in criminal cases, because, if allowed, they are likely to lead the minds of the jury astray into false issues; not merely do they tend to introduce suspicion as if it were evidence, but they tend to distract the jury from the true issue – namely, whether the prisoner in fact committed the offence on which he is actually standing his trial. It is of the utmost importance for a fair trial that the evidence should be prima facie limited to matters relating to the transaction which forms the subject of the indictment and that any departure from these matters should be strictly confined.

 

It does not result from this conclusion that the word “charged” in proviso (f) is otiose: it is clearly not so as regards the prohibition; and when the exceptions come into play there may still be cases in which a prisoner may be asked about a charge as a step in cross-examination leading to a question whether he was convicted on the charge, or in order to elicit some evidence as to statements made or evidence given by the prisoner in the course of the trial on a charge which failed, which tend to throw doubt on the evidence which he is actually giving, though cases of this last class must be rare and the cross-examination permissible only with great safeguards.

 

Again, a man charged with an offence against the person may perhaps be asked whether he had uttered threats against the person attacked because he was angry with him for bringing a charge which turned out to be unfounded. Other probabilities may be imagined. Thus, if a prisoner has been acquitted on the plea of autrefois convict such an acquittal might be relevant to his credit, though it would seem that what was in truth relevant to his credit was the previous conviction and not the fact that he was erroneously again charged with the same offence; again, it may be, though it is perhaps a remote supposition, that an acquittal of a prisoner charged with rape on the plea of consent may possibly be relevant to a prisoner’s credit.

 

But these instances all involve the crucial test of relevance. And in general no question whether a prisoner has been convicted or charged or acquitted should be asked or, if asked, allowed by the judge, who has a discretion under proviso (f), unless it helps to elucidate the particular issue which the jury is investigating, or goes to credibility, that is, tends to show that he is not to be believed on his oath; indeed the question whether a man has been convicted, charged or acquitted ought not to be admitted, even if it goes to credibility, if there is any risk of the jury being misled into thinking that it goes not to credibility but to the probability of his having committed the offence of which he is charged. I think that it is impossible in the present case to say that the fact that the prisoner had been acquitted on a previous charge of murder or manslaughter, was relevant, or that it tended in the present case to destroy his credibility as a witness.

 

An instance showing how jealously our law regards the rights of prisoners giving evidence may be found in the recent Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1922. Sect. 2 of that Act provides that, in the case of a man of twenty-three years of age or under, the presence of reasonable cause to believe that the girl in respect of whom the offence is alleged was over the age of sixteen years shall be a valid defence on the first occasion on which he is charged with an offence under that section. If he is acquitted on that charge and is subsequently charged with another offence under the section and gives evidence on his behalf, he may then be asked whether he has been previously acquitted on a charge under the section. It must not be forgotten that the facts of the present case are very peculiar and exceptional, and it is unnecessary to review or restate the whole law of evidence in criminal matters. I now turn to the second point – namely, the contention advanced by counsel for the prosecution that apart from the Criminal Evidence Act, learned counsel for the prisoner by his cross-examination of the inspector had let in the evidence of a previous charge.

 

I do not think that it is possible to maintain such a contention. The chief argument of the learned counsel for the prosecution was that as his opponent had asked the question he was entitled to get out the whole story. The answer to this is the answer already given, that, as the story had resulted in an acquittal, the circumstances of the case were irrelevant to the issue which the jury was trying. In fact, the acquittal rendered the charge a nullity. The learned counsel for the prosecution was forced to admit that, if his contention was right, it was impossible for a man ever to clear his character by an acquittal because the fact that a prima facie charge had been made against him was always a slur upon his character. He even went so far as to say that when a man was charged before a magistrate, even if the prosecutor immediately admitted that he had made a mistake and that the person whom he charged was not the man, the fact that he had been charged with an offence must be a slur upon him. Such a contention is contrary to the whole idea of English jurisprudence.

 

It was further argued by the prosecution that, even if the evidence was wrongly admitted, the prisoner was not entitled to have the verdict and sentence set aside by reason of the proviso to s. 4 of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, which says that the Court may, notwithstanding that they are of opinion that the point raised in the appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, dismiss the appeal if they consider that no substantial miscarriage of justice had actually occurred. Probably upon no other section of the Act have so many cases been decided as upon this one. Their name is legion. The rule which has been established is that, if the conviction is to be quashed on the ground of misreception of evidence, the proviso cannot operate unless the evidence objected to is of such a nature and the circumstances of the case are such that the Court must be satisfied that the jury must have returned the same verdict even if the evidence had not been given. We think that the appellant has brought himself within this rule. Suppose, for example, that a man had been acquitted three times and the question put to him had been: “Is it a fact that you have been charged three times with this offence, and, secondly, is it a fact that on each occasion you have been acquitted?” The effect of such a statement on the minds of a jury might be overwhelming, and it is impossible to say in this case that the reception of this evidence was not the deciding factor which made the jury give their verdict. Here was a man of seventy-four years of age. It is impossible to deny that the evidence was strong against him. It is impossible to deny that he had to make very damaging admissions; but his case was that he had not in fact touched the deceased woman on this occasion, and that the seizure and collapse which immediately preceded her death took place when he in fact was in another room. It might well be that the fact that he had been charged some years before with a similar offence, although the charge led to an acquittal, might have been the last ounce which turned the scale against him.

 

If in any case the evidence against a prisoner (other than that which is inadmissible) is very strong and is abundant to justify a jury in convicting, it may well seem unfortunate that a guilty man should go free because some rule of evidence has been infringed by the prosecutor. But it must be remembered that the whole policy of English criminal law has been to see that as against the prisoner every rule in his favour is observed and that no rule is broken so as to prejudice the chance of the jury fairly trying the true issues. The sanction for the observance of the rules of evidence in criminal cases is that, if they are broken in any case, the conviction may be quashed. Hence the great care which has always been shown by the Court in applying the provisions of s. 4 of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, and refusing to quash a conviction. It is often better that one guilty man should escape than that the general rules evolved by the dictates of justice for the conduct of criminal prosecutions should be disregarded and discredited.

 

LORD BLANESBURGH. My Lords, I concur.

LORD ATKIN. My Lords, I concur.

LORD THANKERTON. My Lords, I am of the same opinion.

LORD WRIGHT. My Lords, I also agree.

 

Order of the Court of Criminal Appeal reversed: Cause remitted back to the Court of Criminal Appeal to do therein as shall be just and consistent with this judgment.

 

Lords’ Journals, June 1, 1934.

 

 

CITATION OF CASES REFERENCED

(1) (1913) 9 Cr. App. R. 236.

(2) (1913) 9 Cr. App. R. 201.

(3) [1910] 1 K. B. 149.

(4) [1910] 2 K. B. 746.

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(1) [1894] A. C. 57, 65.

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(1) [1894] A. C. 57.

(2) [1906] 2 K. B. 389.

 

 

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