3PLR – YARA V. THE QUEEN
POLICY, PRACTICE AND PUBLISHING, LAW REPORTS 3PLR
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YARA
V.
THE QUEEN
FEDERAL SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA
20TH MARCH, 1958.
F.S.C. 24/1958
3PLR/1958/74 (FSC)
OTHER CITATIONS
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BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:
M.C. NAGEON DE LESTANG, AG. F.C.J. (Presided)
SIR HENLEY COUSSEY, AG. F.J.
ROBERT YORKE HEDGES, AG. F.J. (Read the Judgment of the Court)
BETWEEN
- GOJEN YARA
- UBAN TAKWALA
AND
THE QUEEN
REPRESENTATION
I.I. OLUWA – for 2nd Appellant.
C.H.E. MILLER – for Respondent.
MAIN ISSUES
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE:- Murder – Appellant joining in beating deceased but not taking part in killing – Assisting in disposing of dead body – Whether liable for murder
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: – Murder – Common intention – Absence of – Effect.
CHILDREN AND WOMEN LAW: – Wife-killing – Murder – Appellant/husband strangulated wife to death for stealing his yam – Whether third party who aided beating/burying of dead body but not strangulation is also guilty for murder
MAIN JUDGMENT
HEDGES, AG. F.J (Delivering the Judgment of the Court):
The two appellants applied for leave to appeal against their conviction for murder in the Jos Division of the High Court of the Northern Region. In the case of the first appellant leave to appeal was refused. In the case of the second appellant leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed and the conviction set aside. We give our reasons now.
The case for the Crown was that the first appellant beat his wife, who had been stealing his yams, and then held her throat “for about thirty minutes” until she was dead. The first appellant admitted that this is what he did. The second appellant arrived on the scene during the beating and assisted the first appellant to beat his wife. He took no further part until after the woman was dead when he assisted the first appellant to dispose of the body.
We think that the learned trial Judge erred in treating the statement of the second appellant as a confession. It was certainly not a confession of murder. There is certainly nothing in the evidence to suggest a common intention to kill or even to cause grievous bodily harm. The evidence as to the cause of death was not entirely satisfactory, but it seems clear that whilst the woman was still alive she was strangled by the first appellant and the second appellant took no part in the act of strangulation.
We are, therefore, of opinion that the conviction of the second appellant for murder could not be allowed to stand. The learned Judge held, quite rightly in our view, that on the facts the first appellant was clearly guilty of murder as charged.
DE LESTANG, AG. F.C.J.: I concur.
COUSSEY, AG. F.J.: I concur.
1st Applicant’s Application refused.
2nd Applicant’s Application and Appeal allowed.
