3PLR – TEMPLE NWANKWOALA V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

Published by Law Nigeria Admin at June 6, 2018

POLICY, PRACTICE AND PUBLISHING, LAW REPORTS 3PLR

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TEMPLE NWANKWOALA

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NIGERIA

ON MONDAY, THE 23RD DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2015

CA/B/106C/2012

3PLR/2015/135 (CA)

OTHER CITATIONS

(2015) LPELR-24392(CA)

BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS

PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE, JCA

HAMMA AKAWU BARKA, JCA

UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, JCA

BETWEEN

TEMPLE NWANKWOALA (DSP) – Appellant(s)

AND

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA – Respondent(s)

REPRESENTATION

Ken E. Mozia (SAN) with Santos Awotori – For Appellant

AND

Paul Bassi Esq., Assistant Chief Legal Officer I.C.P.C with A. E. Ayode with V. O. Iwoba (Mrs). – For Respondent

ORIGINATING STATE:

Edo State High Court, holden in Benin City, [Hon. Justice E. F. Ikponmen presiding]

MAIN ISSUES

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE – OFFENCE OF CORRUPTION: Ingredients of the offence -Section 135 of the Evidence Act 2011 – requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt – That the accused or offender is a public Officer within the meaning of S.2 of the 2000 Act – That he asked for the benefit of any kind for himself or for any other person in respect of something to be done afterwards, or something already done – That he asked for the benefit in the course of the discharge of his official duties – how treated
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE – STATEMENT OF AN ACCUSED PERSON: clear and unambiguous statements of accused person – whether needs corroboration
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE – CONVICTION OF AN ACCUSED PERSON: retrospective law – Whether an accused person can be convicted same – Section 33(8) of the 1979 Constitution, (which is in pari materia with Section 36(8) of the 1999 Constitution) – “No person shall be held to be guilty of a criminal offence on account of any act or omission that did not, at the time it took place, constitute such an offence; and no penalty shall be imposed for any criminal offence heavier than the penalty in force at the time the offence was committed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – COURT – POWER OF COURT: Charge in a criminal case – Whether court has power to amend or add to any charge in a criminal case before judgment – duty of court to ensure that the amended charge is read out and explained to the accused person
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – EVIDENCE – CONTRADICTION IN EVIDENCE: When an evidence is said to be contradictory – Whether every discrepancy, contradiction and or inconsistency will affect the substance of a criminal case – to succeed in upturning a decision – need for the said contradiction to be relevant, casting doubt in the mind of the judge and so obvious that it would cause a miscarriage of justice
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – EVIDENCE – EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE: evaluation of evidence – whether it stops with assessing the credibility of witnesses – whether it extends to a consideration of the totality of the evidence on any issue of fact in the circumstance of each case in order to determine whether the totality of the evidence supports a finding of fact which the party adducing the evidence seeks that the trial court should make
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – APPEAL – INTERFERENCE BY THE APPELLATE COURT: miscarriage of justice warranting interference of an appellate court – need for appellate court to satisfy itself that the miscarriage being complained of is substantial either as to the facts, misapplication of the law or both – mere technicality which caused the appellant no embarrassment or prejudice – how treated by court
WORDS AND PHRASES – “DEMAND”: Definition of

MAIN ISSUES

HAMMA AKAWU BARKA, J.C.A. (Delivering The Leading Judgment):

This appeal is against the judgment of the Edo State High Court sitting in Benin City, delivered on the 25th of January, 2012 presided over by Hon. Justice E. F. Ikponmen, wherein the appellant was convicted and sentenced to seven years imprisonment with hard labour. The brief facts of the case are as follows:-

The appellant, a Deputy Superintendent of Police, was arraigned before the High Court No. 4 Benin on a two count charge, on the 24th November, 2006 later amended with the leave of court to a three count charge bordering on the violation of the provisions of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000.

The three count charge thus brought against the appellant were:

“COUNT 1

CORRUPT DEMAND BY PERSON CONTRARY TO SECTION 10(A)(II) OF THE CORRUPT PRACTICES AND OTHER RELATED OFFENCES ACT 2000
PARTICUTARS OF ERROR

That You, Temple Nwankwoala, Deputy Superintendent of Police of the Nigeria Police Force, at Benin City, Edo State, on or about the 18th day of October, 2006, being a Police and the officer in charge of the Homicide Section attached to the office of the Assistant Inspector General of Police, Zone 5, Benin city, did ask or demand for the sum of N1,000,000 (One Million Naira) from elder Alexander Okiye, being a person against whom criminal complaints were made and on account of the said criminal complaints being investigated as an inducement to write, secure, procure and counter a favourable report of Elder Alexander Okiye in respect of the criminal complaints and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 10(a)(11) of the ICPC Act, 2000.

COUNT II

CORRUPT RECEIPT BY PERSON CONTRARY TO SECTION 10(A)(II) OF THE CORRUPT PRACTICES AND OTHER RELATED OFFENCES ACT, 2000
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE

That you, Temple Nwankwoala, Deputy Superintendent of Police and an officer in charge of the Homicide Section attached to the office of the Assistant Inspector General of Police, Zone 5, Benin City, Edo State, on or about the 6th day of November, 2006, did receive the sum of N500,000 (five Hundred Thousand Naira) as gratification from Elder Alexander Okiye against whom criminal complaints were made and being investigated in order to write, secure, procure and confer a favourable report in favour of the suspect, Elder Alexander Okiye in respect of the criminal complaints made against him, and thereby committed and offence punishable under Section 10(a)(II) of the ICPC Act, 2000.

COUNT III

FAILURE TO REPORT OFFER OF GRATIFICATION CONTRARY TO SECTION 23(1) OF THE ICPC ACT 2000
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE

That you, Temple Nwankwoala, Deputy Superintendent of Police of the Nigeria police Force, being the officer in charge of the Homicide Section in the office of the Assistant Inspector General of Police, zone 5, Benin City, on or about 26th day of October, 2006, in the course of investigation of complaints of crimes against one Elder Alexander Okiye was offered gratification by the said Elder Alexander Okiye but refuses and failed to report the offer of gratification to any officer of the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) in Benin City or any police officer and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 23(1) of the ICPC Act, 2000.”

To the three count charge read to him, appellant pleaded not guilty; and the case proceeded to trial. In the course of the trial the prosecution called four witnesses. The appellant in his defence called five witnesses. A total of 15 documents titled Exhibits A – P were tendered by the prosecution.

At the close of the defence Evidence, parties submitted their final written addresses, which were subsequently adopted. At the close of trial, appellant was convicted on count 1 and 3 and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment with hard labour in respect to count one but cautioned and discharged on count three. He was however discharged on count two of the charge. Pages 179 – 210 of the records.

Aggrieved by the decision of the Lower Court, appellant filed a notice of appeal against his conviction on the 8th March 2012 containing five grounds of appeal. See pages 211 – 214 of the records. The grounds of appeal shorn of their particulars are hereby reproduced.

“GROUND 1

The learned trial judge erred in law when His Lordship held inter alia:

“I believe the evidence of the prosecution witnesses PW2 and PW3 that the accused was putting pressure on PW2 to pay N1 million. I find that whether it was for his benefit or that of DW2 is irrelevant as in either situation the accused would be culpable by virtue of Section 10(a) of the aforesaid Act which provides thus “Any person who ask for, receives or obtains property or benefits of any kind for himself or any other person”.

GROUND 2

The learned trial judge erred in law when he held that the appellant made a confessional statement admitting that he was offered gratification by the pW2 as charged.

GROUND 3

The learned trial judge erred in law when he held that count 3 which was introduced after the appellant had testified was not unconstitutional by depriving him of his right to fair hearing.

GROUND 4

The learned trial judge erred in law when he held that the law which the Accused person was alleged to have violated or infringed have not been repealed by Section 55 of the Corrupt Practices And Other Related Offences Act, 2003.

GROUND 5

The learned trial judge erred in law by convicting the appellant for committing offences set out in an incompetent charge.”

The record of appeal having been compiled and transmitted on the 10th of May 2012, parties filed and exchanged their briefs of argument, The appellant’s brief was filed on the 24/5/2013 upon the leave of court granted on the 15/5/2013. Upon receiving the respondent’s brief, appellant filed a reply brief dated the 10/11/2014. The respondent’s brief was filed on the 28/10/2014 with the leave of court.

At the hearing of the appeal on the 2nd of December, 2014, Mr. Ken Mozia (SAN) leading Santos Awotori, learned counsel for the appellant adopted his submissions in the appellant’s brief of argument, and the reply brief, and urged the court to allow the appeal. Similarly, Mr. Paul Bassi Assistant chief Legal officer leading A. E Ayode and V. O. Iwoba, all of the ICPC, adopted the respondent’s brief and prayed the court to dismiss the appeal in its entirety.

In the appellant’s brief of argument settled by Justin O. Igiebor of learned counsel for the appellant, three issues were raised for the determination of this appeal, They are as follows:-

“1. Whether the prosecution was able to establish all the essential ingredients of the charge proffered against the Accused person/Appellant which are subject of this appeal beyond reasonable doubts to warrant his conviction (Grounds 1 & 2).

Whether count 3 in respect of which the Appellant did not make any statement and which was introduced after the Appellant had concluded his evidence in-chief and his witnesses had testified, and did not breach his right to fair hearing (Ground 3).
Whether the law which the Accused person/Appellant was alleged to have violated has not been expressly repealed by Section 55 of the Corrupt practices And Other Related Offences Act, 2003 (Grounds 4 & 5).”

For the Respondent, the following two issues were submitted as arising for determination.

“(i) Whether the respondent proved the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt to justify the findings of guilt against him on counts 1 & 3 by the trial court. (Grounds 1, 2 & 3 of the Notice of Appeal).

(ii) Whether the Corrupt practices And Other Related Offences Act, 2000, under which the appellant was tried and convicted is a valid law. (Ground 4 of the Notice of Appeal)

The learned counsel for the appellant argue issues 1 and 2 of the three issues formulated by him together. The issues are:

“(a) Whether the prosecution was able to establish all the essential ingredients of the charge proferred against the Accused person/Appellant which are subject of this appeal beyond reasonable doubt to warrant his conviction (Ground I & 2).

(b) Whether count 3 in respect of which the Appellant did not make any statement and which was introduced after the Appellant had concluded his evidence in-chief and his witnesses had testified, did not breach his right to fair hearing. (Ground 3). Learned counsel submits that the prosecution was not able to establish all the ingredients of the charges proffered against the appellant, nor was the charge proved against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It is on account of these reasons that counsel states that appellant’s conviction on the said offences was fatally flawed.

I have before now reproduced the amended three count charge framed against the appellant, to which he pleaded not guilty. To establish count 1, counsel argues the following particulars must be established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

“a. On or about the 18th day of October, 2000 the accused person asked or demanded for the sum of N1,000,000 (One Million Naira) from PW2, Elder Alexander Okiye;

There were criminal complaints against he said P.M. 2 at the material time which was being investigated by the Accused;
The money allegedly demanded was intended to induce the Accused person to write, secure procure and confer a favourable report in favour of P.W.2 in respect of the alleged criminal complaints.”

For the above proposition, counsel places reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Audu Aruna & Anor. vs. The State (1990) 6 NWLR (pt.155) 125 at 136. He submits further that the prosecution woefully failed to establish that the appellant demanded the sum of one million naira from PW2 on or about the 18/10/06. Recounting the evidence adduced by PW2 before the trial court, counsel contends that there is conflict as to whether the appellant demanded for N1,000,000 bribe on the 18/10/2006 or 12/10/2006.

It is his further submission that the date of the alleged demand is an essential ingredient of count 1, and the failure to adduce any believable evidence as to the date and circumstances of the alleged demand cannot be cured by the phrase “on or about 18/15/2006”. He submits still that different and contradictory dates and circumstances having been given in evidence by the prosecution witness, the court cannot pick and choose which version is correct. Counsel therefore submits that the date and circumstance under which the demand was allegedly made not having been proved beyond doubt, and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses being clearly in conflict, such truth of the matter, and such doubts must be resolved in favour of the accused person. He cited the case of Aruna & Anor. vs. The State (supra) at p. 134 and Onuchukwu & 3 ors. vs. The State (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt.547) 576 at 590.

Learned counsel submitted also that the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant was investigating any criminal complaint against PW2′ Alluding to pieces of evidence from the testimonies of PW1, who did not see a copy of the petition, and the appellant’s evidence in his defence, asserting that no case of vandalization of pipelines or product diversion was referred to him for investigation, and Exhibit K, counsel wants the court to hold that the prosecution did not establish the fact that the appellant was investigating any report of criminality involving PW2 based on which the alleged demand was made.

Learned counsel referred to the charge sheet where nobody is referred to as the complainant in respect of the alleged criminal complaint founding the count of the charge, the nature of the favourable report which is stated as an inducement, and generally that the prosecution failed in its duty in establishing all the essential ingredients and particulars of the charge proferred against the appellant.

He argues that all the telephone calls originated from PW2, save for the initial demand said to have been made on an indeterminable date. It is his further submission that all the foregoing pieces of evidence are contrary to the notion of demand. The sum of N500,000 is at variance with the sum indicated in the particulars of the count and the purpose of the payment was not established counsel argues. He opined that from the pieces of evidence rendered, PW2 is not a witness of truth. On the funds offered, counsel submits that PW1 shamelessly lied in his testimony when he testified that he sought and got the money from the operations fund with the ICPC, but later admitted that it was PW3 that arranged for the money used in the operation. He contends that the evidence of PW1 should on that count be treated as unreliable based on the authority of Akogwu & Anor. vs. The State (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt.681) at 253.

It is the further submission of learned counsel, that contrary to the assertion of the prosecution, the appellant testified that the funds were meant for DW3 following an agreement between PW2 and DW3 as compromise amount owed to DW3 to be settled by PW2 in instalments. He submits that before convicting an accused person, the court must critically examine the ingredients of the offence and ascertain that the acts of the accused person conforms with the particulars of the offence charged. He cites Ojo & Anor. vs. FRN (2009) 11 NWLR (pt.1099) 457 at 530 and Idowu vs. The State (1998) 11 NWLR (Pt.574) 354 at 366 in support of this legal position.

He contends that a complaint founded on a claim of indebtedness arising from a contractual relationship does not qualify for prosecution.

Based on the doubts created on the issue as to whether the appellant demanded for the payment of bribe of one million naira as charged, and the purpose for which the sum of N500,000 was taken to the A.I.G. office by PW2, counsel urges the court to hold that the charge was not prove beyond reasonable doubt, and to resolve the issue against the respondent.

On count 3 of the charge, learned counsel submits that there was no evidence giving rise to the count. He states that the count did not indicate what was offered as gratification by PW2, which appellant failed to report. He argues that the count was not the subject of any report made to the police, nor was it derived from any investigation. He submits that PW2 did not give any self incriminating evidence to the effect that he offered gratification to the appellant, and contends that the count is bereft of any evidence to sustain the count of the charge.

Furthermore, counsel submits the introduction of the new count breached Section 36 (a) & (b) of the Constitution, as the appellant was denied his fundamental right to fair hearing, and cited the case of Shande vs. The State (2005) 12 NWLR (pt.939) 301 at 320 – 321. He wants this issue resolved in favour of the appellant.

As regard the third issue, the question posed by learned counsel is, whether the law which the accused person/appellant was alleged to have violated has not been expressly repealed by Section 55 of the corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2003.

Counsel argues that both counts upon which the appellant was convicted, i.e Section 10(a)(ii) and Section 23(i) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 were expressly repealed by Section 55 of the Corrupt practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2003.

He contends that the said act became operational by virtue of the revised edition of the laws of the Federation Act, 2007, which enabled effect to be given to the revised edition of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria published in 2004, and signed on the 25/5/2007. He contends that Section 55 thereof expressly repealed the revised edition of the laws of the Federation of Nigeria Act, 1990.

He argues that the charge before the Lower Court for which the appellant was prosecuted and convicted having ceased to amount to an offence under the extant legislation of the 2003 Act, by the authority of FRN vs. Ifegwu (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt.842) 113 at 14 WACA 370, it is unconstitutional to retrospectively criminalize a conduct in order to facilitate prosecution, and once a person is arraigned under a non-existent law, the trial to that effect is null and void.

He submits finally that the three count charge having been presumed under a non existent law, it is incurably bad and should be so dismissed by this court. He urged this court to allow the appeal in its entirety.

For the respondent on his issue one, it is his submission that the prosecution proved the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt to justify the findings of guilt by the trial court on counts 1 and 3 of the charge. Counsel submits also that to succeed against the appellant on count 1, the following ingredients of the offence under section 10(a) (ii) of the corrupt practices and other Related Offences Act, 2000, must be proved.

(a) The offender must be a public officer.

(b) That he asked for benefit of any kind for himself or for any other person in respect of something to be afterwards done.

On the first ingredient, counsel submits that there is ample evidence showing that the appellant is a public officer. In proof of the second ingredient, counsel referred to the evidence of PW1, PW2, and PW3, and submits that the accused person categorically asked for gratification for himself. The gratification he argued was a request for one million naira to enable the accused write a favourable report for PW2 in relation to the case he was investigating.

He faults the defence put forward by the accused person to the effect that he collected the N500,000 as part settlement for PW2’s indebtedness to DW2, as pertinent questions arise which can only be answered against the accused persons assertion. He contends that the evidence proferred by the prosecution was uncontroverted and not contradicted, and the trial judge was free to accept and to act on same. He cites the case of Ajibade vs, The State (2013) 8 NCC 221 at 245. On the last ingredient, counsel alluded to the testimonies of PW2 and PW3 and submits that the respondent proved beyond doubt the ingredient of the offence in the first count.

On the 3rd count, learned counsel submits that two ingredients must be proved to ground the conviction of the accused person.

These counsel argue are:

(a) The offender must be a public servant.

(b) The public officer to whom the offer of gratification is made to must report same together with the name of the person who made the offer, if known to the nearest officer of the ICPC or a police officer.

It is the submission of learned counsel that the evidence of all witnesses are agreed in that the accused person is a public officer within the definition of Section 2 of the Act. It is his further submission that although it is for the respondent to show that an offer of gratification was made to the accused person, and he refused to report the said offer, the accused person under cross examination confessed to this ingredient. He contends that appellant having admitted the offence no further proof is needed. He cited Section 29(1) of the Evidence Act 2011, and the case of FMH vs. CSA Ltd (2009) 9 NWLR (pt. 1145] 193 at 214.

He argues that the offence in Section 23(1) of the Act deals with the refusal of the appellant to report the offer of bribe. Learned counsel said that from the pieces of evidence adduced and the seeming confession of the accused person, this ingredient of the offence is established. He urged upon the court to resolve this issue in favour of the respondent and to dismiss the appeal.

On issue two formulated by the respondents, learned counsel posits that the corrupt practices and other related offences Act 2000 under which the appellant was charged is a valid law still in force. Responding to the argument that the appellant was charged under a law repealed by the corrupt practices and other Related Offences Act, 2003, counsel argues that the said act was not assented to by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as required by Section 58 of the Constitution.

He submits further that the unreported case of Bala Kaoje & 5 Ors. Vs. The National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & 13 Ors. in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/93/2003, declared the 2003 act as null and void, and revalidated the ICPC Act, 2000, He also referred to the case of Bitrus Bakkat vs. FRN (No.2) 2014 2 CPCLR 455 at 472 per Omoleye JCA wherein it was held that the 2000 Act is solidly in existence. He further referred to the cases of Chidiebere Ude vs. FRN (2013) 8 NCC 348; Ajisegiri vs. FRN (2013) 8 NCC 408; Terhemba Shija vs. FRN (2013) 8 NCC 430; Sunday Ehindero vs. FRN (2014) 17 CPCLR 78 and FRN vs. Senator Adolphus Wabara & 2 Ors. (2010) LPELR 4940, all tried under the 2000 ICPC Act to buttress his contention that the appellant was tried under a valid and subsisting act.

Responding on some basic issues raised by the appellants, counsel argues that there was no fatal discrepancy in the evidence of the prosecution witness regarding the date of demand, and the date is not crucial in proof of the offence created by Section 10(a) of the ICPC act. He states that all witnesses testified that appellant was investigating a complaint made against PW2 by DW2, and the phone calls made by PW2 at the instance of PW1 was after the demand was made.

He states further on count three of the charge, that same was read to the accused person in conformity with Section 163 of the CPA Act LFN 2004, and given the opportunity to recall witnesses under Section 164 and 165 of the same Act. He cannot complain of breach of fair hearing. He therefore prays that the appeal be dismissed for lacking in merit.

In the reply brief, filed by learned counsel to the appellant and in response to respondent’s brief, learned counsel argued that the reason for the alleged demand is an essential ingredient of the charge. He referred to the evidence of pW2 and pW3 on the point, and argues that there being glaring conflict, inconsistency and contradiction in the testimony of PW2 and PW3 on the point, the Lower Court ought to have disbelieved the evidence of both witnesses and thereby reach a decision to the effect that this essential ingredient has not been proved. He goes on to state that Exhibit K has nothing to do with vandalization of pipelines etc; and in view of the appellant’s denial that no such case was referred to him, the findings of the Lower Court was perverse.

It is the further argument of counsel that there being no reply to the submission made on the issue of the inconsistency of PW2 and PW1’s evidence as to the source of the N500,000, the respondent is deemed to have conceded the point. He cites in support the case of Olley vs. Tungi & 2 Ors. (2013) 10 NWLR (Pt.132) 275 at 321. Counsel also raised the point that conviction cannot be founded on mere suspicion and speculation, and joined issues on the position that the appellant admitted/confessed to being offered gratification.

On issue two raised by the respondent, learned counsel argued that the respondent did not address on the applicability of the revised edition (Laws of the Federation) Act, 2007 upon which the appellant issue 3 is predicated. Counsel argues that the argument by the appellant are deemed admitted. On the case of Bitrus Bakkat vs. FRN (supra) cited by the respondent, counsel states that the case is inapplicable in view of the effect of the revised Edition (Laws of the Federation) Act 2007, rendering the 2003 Act ineffective, was not considered. He argues further on this that all the cases cited in view of the 2007 Act are inapplicable.

On want of fair hearing, it is the contention of learned counsel that Section 35 (3) of the Constitution, which is to the effect that the appellant ought to have been informed of the facts and grounds for his arrest and detention within 24 hours in writing, was breached in relation to count 3.

Finally, learned counsel prays that the appeal be allowed and the conviction and sentence of the appellant reversed. These are the submissions of the learned counsel for and against the appeal.

Having carefully examined the issues formulated by the two learned counsel and the submissions made, I am of the view that the issues raised by the learned counsel to the respondent will adequately settled this appeal. I will therefore approach this appeal on the basis of the issues raised by the respondent, starting with issue two.

Whether the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 under which the appellant was tried and convicted is a valid law (ground 4 of the notice of appeal)

This issue brings to the fore once again arguments rendered at the court below at pages 138 to 139 of the records. At the Lower Court, the learned trial judge stated:

“I am satisfied that a similar Act passed in 2003 was incorporated in the Revised Edition of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 but I am not satisfied that the said Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act was signed by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or given assent to by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria before it was compiled in the Revised Edition (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria) Act 2007 to which he gave assent. It is my humble view that each law must pass through the proper procedure for it to become a law and it does not become a law by compilation. The learned counsel for the accused has not proved that the President assented to the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act.

Even if it is taken that by giving assent to the Revised Edition (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria) Bill, 2007, on the 25/5/2007, the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2003 is deemed to have been assented to which is not my position, this law takes effect in my respectful view from 25/5/2007. It therefore means that the accused person in this case whose trial commenced under the 2000 Act cannot thereby be affected by this new Act. However, I am bound by the decision in Wabara & others V. Federal Republic of Nigeria cited by Mr. Erewa. I therefore hold that the Act under which this accused person stands trial is not repealed and remains valid.

Evidently the trial court just like this court in Bitrus Bakkat vs. FRN No 2 (supra) cited by the respondents, relied on the case of Adolphus Wabara vs. FRN (2010) LPELR 4940, and held that the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences, Act 2000 is solidly in existence, as it is yet to be repealed. Learned counsel for the appellants now submits that these decisions were made when the effect of the revised Edition (Laws of Federation) Act 2007 which rendered the 2003 Act effective was not considered therein. He contends also that the case of FRN vs. Adolphus Wabara & Ors (supra) did not decide the question of whether the applicable law was the 2000 Act or the 2003 Act, Counsel contends further that a statute or legislation becomes law on the day it is assented to, irrespective of the commencement date, which can be verified from the document in question. He makes reference to Section 2 (1) and 2 (2) (a) of the interpretation Act, and the cases of Osadebay vs. A.G Bendel State (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt.169) 525 at 579 and Obmiami Brick & Stone (Nig) Ltd. vs. ACB Ltd. (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt.229) 260 at 309.

Let me start by kow towing to the decision of the Supreme Court in Federal Republic of Nigeria vs. Ifegwu (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt.842) 113 at 177.

“Section 33(8) of the 1979 Constitution, (which is in pari materia with Section 36(8) of the 1999 Constitution) which was unsuspended and was then applicable also forbade retroactivity of criminality as follows:-

No person shall be held to be guilty of a criminal offence on account of any act or omission that did not, at the time it took place, constitute such an offence; and no penalty shall be imposed for any criminal offence heavier than the penalty in force at the time the offence was committed.”

The cases of Asko vs. Fagbemi (1961) 1 All NLR 400 and Ogbomor vs. The State (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.2) 223 at 233 were cited and relied upon.

It follows therefore, that where the argument of the learned counsel to the appellant is answered in the affirmative, the entire proceedings and the resultant conviction and sentence of the appellant would be a nullity, a vain exercise and void to the extreme.

Now reverting to the argument on the issue by the learned senior counsel, I have critically examined the Gazette, titled Revised Edition (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria Act 2007), at pages A 1037 – 1039. It is a bill which gives effect to the Revised Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 made under the authority of the Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice. Section 3 of the bill is instructive. It reads:-

S.3. the review Edition (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria) Act 1990 is repealed.

It is not in contention that the Corrupt practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 remained valid law unless amended or avoided by a law validly made by the National Assembly. The crucial question therefore is, whether from the provisions of the revised Edition (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria) Act, 2007 it can be read that the 2000 Act was repealed therein, and consequently that the appellant’s trial was based upon a repealed law?

A dispassionate look at the section above cited shows that the Act repealed therein is the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 1990. Even were it to be held that the 2007 Act gave life to the 2003 Act, same was assented to on the 25th of May 2007,O months after the commencement of the present case before the trial court. Furthermore, the 2003 Act having been declared null and void having no effect, and the 2000 Act remaining the extant law, unless amended or avoided by any subsequent valid law, it can safely be assumed that the 2000 Act still remains in force. This is even more so where Section 2 of the 2007 Act is taken into consideration, which reads:-

“S.2. Any inadvertent omission, alteration or amendment of any existing statute shall not affect the validity and applicability of the statute.”

Consequently, I have not been persuaded that the purpose of the 2007 Act was meant to repeal the 2000 Act. The learned counsel for the respondent and the court below was therefore right to hold that the 2000 Act still subsists even after the promulgation of the 2007 Act.

I am not unaware of the argument by the appellant that the Federal High Court in the case of Hon. Bala Kaoje & 5 Ors. vs. The National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & 13 Ors. (Unreported) in suit No.FHC/ABJ/CS/93/20o3; lacked the competence to grant an order of perpetual injunction in an interlocutory application. That may be so, however that case has not been shown to have been set aside or overruled on appeal, the decision remains until it is invalidated. See Udeh vs. Okoli (2009) 7 NWLR (Pt.1141) 571 at 588.

It is my candid view therefore that the 2000 Act solidly stands, and the appellant was duly and rightly tried under the 2000 Act, which was the law in force.
This issue is resolved against the appellant.

I now proceed to the other issue i.e issue one. Whether the respondent proved the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt to justify the findings of guilt against him on counts one and three by the trial court.
With respect to count one, Section 10(a) (II) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 provides:-

“Any person who

(a) asks for, receives or obtains property or benefits of any kind for himself or any other person; or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain any property or benefit of any kind for himself or any other person on account of

(ii) anything to be afterwards done or omitted or any favour disfavour to be afterwards shown to any person by a public officer in the discharge of his official duties or in relation to any such matter as aforesaid, is guilty of an offence of official corruption and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for seven (7) years.”

To establish count 1 of the offence against the accused person, the following ingredients of the offence must be proved, and by Section 135 of the Evidence Act 2011, the proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. See John Agbo vs. The State (2007) 2 NCC 158 at 189; Miller vs. Minister of Pensions (1947) 1 All E.R 372.

(a) That the accused or offender is a public Officer within the meaning of S.2 of the 2000 Act,

(b) That he asked for the benefit of any kind for himself or for any other person in respect of something to be done afterwards, or something already done.

It is not in contention the fact that the appellant as at the time of the commission of the alleged offence was a public servant within the contemplation of Section 2 of the 2000 Act. There is ample evidence from the prosecution and the accused person, that as at the time in contemplation, he was a Deputy Superintendent of Police, attached to the office of the Assistant Inspector General of Police Zone 5, Edo State, Benin City.

The bone of contention here in my honest belief is whether the accused person, now appellant demanded for bribe in his official capacity in order to induce him to proffer a favourable report in favour of the complainant PW2 in respect of the criminal complaint against him.

To settle this basic ingredient of the offence, learned counsel for the appellant argues that the following three elements must be proved beyond doubt.

(a) On or about the 18th day of October, 2006, the accused person asked or demanded for the sum of N1,000,000 (one million Naira) from (PW2) Elder Alexander Okiye.

(b) There were criminal complaints against the said PW2 at the material time which was being investigated by the accused person and

(c) The money allegedly demanded was intended to induce the accused person to write, secure, procure and confer a favourable report in favour of PW2 in respect of the alleged criminal complaints.

At the court below, the learned trial judge elaborately evaluated the prosecution’s evidence and that of the accused person with regards to whether the accused person demanded for the sum of N1,000,000 as alleged. He concluded his evaluation, believing the prosecution and held that this vital ingredient of the offence grounding the first count of the charge was proved beyond doubt. This is at pages 201- 205 of the records.

Having critically analysed the evidence on record vis-a-vis the findings of the learned trial judge, I have no hesitation coming to the logical conclusion that the findings of the learned trial judge are amply supported by evidence.

On the demand for gratification from PW2 by the appellant, the evidence of PW2 and PW3, relied on states as follows:-

“I know the accused person. I knew him on the 11/10/2006. On the day at about 8a.m he came to my office with a team of policemen. He was a Deputy Superintendent of Police. He came to arrest me upon a petition by one Monday Ebhohimien an ex-employee of mine. Accused took me to his office at AIG Zone 5 and I made a statement. The accused told me that I am a petroleum Product diverter, a pipeline vandal and that I owe the petitioner Monday Ebhohimien N2.7m. After 9 hrs, I was granted bail. The accused person then called me aside and asked me to see him privately. I had been given a date to report back on 18/10/06,, but he asked me to see him the next day. The following day I went to the accused person, who called me aside and said that he will need 1 million naira from me, otherwise the way he will investigate the case would require him arresting my staff, my senior NNPC staff and impounding my trucks, tankers and vehicles …………”

That he prefers me giving him one million naira so that he will not destabilise my business and that he will give me a favourable report.”

The witness on being cross-examined stated further:-

“…I went to the office of the ICPC in Abuja following my petition on 3/11/2006. I went alone. My lawyer went on another date. I see Exhibit C. I did not make it. I do not know when it was made. I was not present when it was made. The money N500,000.00 produced was not by me but by ICPC. It was after the following day I was arrested that the accused arranged with me that I should come the next day. i.e 12/10/2006. I cannot now remember whether it was on that day he made a demand for bribe on me because I went on some occasions and did not meet him in the office …. the only time the issue of N300,000.00 came up was when I pleaded with the accused to come down to N300,000.00 but it was by telephone.”

On the same issue, PW3 stated in evidence:-

“…PW2 told me that after the general meeting, the accused person called him and told him privately that the alternative to paying that $2.7 Million to Monday is that PW2 would pay N1 million for a favourable report to be written by him and that he would write a favourable report stating that the matter is civil and there is no criminality in the case. I asked PW2 if he will allow me confront the accused with the claim and he agreed and I asked him to come the next day so we can go together. The next day, we both went to the accused office where I met the accused person sitting under a tree behind his office. They brought chairs for us to sit with the accused there as he said any where he was his office. I told him what PW2 told me and he confirmed it. That he demanded for N1 Million to help PW2. He said he is the O/C pipeline and he was investigating vandalization and diversion of fuel against PW2. That the one million Naira is little compared with what he would make if he decides to arrest everyone involved in the matter. He told me that if he is allowed to investigate the matter, PW2 would lose more than N1 million naira.”

The word demand as defined by the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary connotes “a very firm demand, the act of demanding usually made by one party to another.” The charge against the accused in count one is to the effect that (accused) did ask for, demanded for the sum of N1,000,000 (One million Naira) from Elder Alexander Okiye being a person against whom criminal complaints were made, as an inducement to write, secure, procure and confer a favourable report in favour of the said Elder Alexander Okiye in respect of the criminal complaint against him.

Contrary to the learned counsel for the appellant’s submission, that the prosecution failed to establish that the appellant was investigating any report of criminality involving PW2 based on which the alleged demand was made, the appellant in Exhibit K, his statement stated:

“Sometime last month in October 200G, the Assistant Inspector General of Police, AIG Zone 5, Gazali Rasaq called me into his office as O/C Homicide. When I went into his office, he was with some gentlemen. They were complainants in a case of intimidation, harassment and threat to life, the AIG asked me to investigate this case and to make sure that justice was done.”

The appellant still in his statement Exhibit K, which he did not deny stated further,

“Monday Ebhohimien made statement to the police stating that he was defrauded the sum of N2.7 million naira in a business related case by one Alex Okiye. That Alex Okiye (m) and himself used the name of the military at the S and T barracks Benin City to load some petroleum products Petrol, diesel and kerosene which they illegally sold to other end users without the knowledge of the NNPC management. They loaded about 8 trucks per week. He also stated that they involved themselves in pipeline vandalisation of petrol at Sapele Delta State whereby Alex Okiye used bunkering business. That upon these jobs done by both of them, that Alex Okiye (m) held back his money worth N2.7m. Further to that Alex Okiye has been threatening his life and intimidating and harassing him without paying him. Based on the above allegations. Alex Okiye (m) was invited.” (Underlining mine)

From the above quoted statement of the appellant, it is very clear that PW2 Alex Okiye was being investigated for threat to life, involvement in petroleum vandalisation, bunkering etc. It is trite law that clear and unambiguous statements need no corroboration. The appellant having asserted that it was based on the allegation in the statement of DW2 that he invited PW2 in his investigation, it serves no useful purpose further establishing such facts at the trial. See Usman vs. The State (2010) 6 NWLR (pt. 1191) 454 at 457; A.G Abia State vs. A.G Federation (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt.763) 264. I am therefore unable to agree with the learned senior counsel that the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant was investigating any criminal complaint against PW2 because a copy of the petition was not shown to PW1.

Learned senior counsel also submitted at length with regards to the date the alleged demand was made. It was argued that different and contradictory dates and circumstances were given in evidence by the prosecution witnesses as the date of the alleged demand. The learned trial judge in his judgment held the view that there was no material contradiction in the prosecution’s case.

PW2, the complainant in his evidence in chief stated the date of the demand as the 12/10/2006. On being cross examined, the witness stated that he could not remember the exact date. When he was shown Exhibit A, his statement made to the ICPC, the witness admitted that the alleged demand was made on the 18/10/2006.

PW3 on the point stated that PW2 informed him of the demand in the evening of 18/10/2006, and he personally confirmed the demand the next day being the 19/10/2006. It is evidently clear therefore that while PW2 in his evidence in chief stated the date of the alleged demand by appellant being 12/10/2006, he later under cross examination and in his statement made before the ICPC stated the date as 18/10/2006. In the case of Ayo Gabriel vs. The State (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt.122) at page 457, the apex court on contradiction stated, “that to contradict is to speak or affirm the contrary. A piece of evidence is said to be contradictory to another when it asserts or affirms the opposite of what the other asserts, and not necessarily where there are some minor discrepancies. It goes further to state that for an inconsistency or contradiction in evidence to result in the judgment being reversed, it must be material and substantial, casting doubt in the mind of the judge.” Agbo vs. The State (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt.977) 545; Ashiniyu vs. The State (1982) 10 S.C 13; Eke vs. The State (2011) 3 NWLR (pt.1235) 589 at 393.

The question to be answered is whether the inconsistency on the date the alleged demand was said to have been made by the complainant PW2 is material to the finding as to whether a demand was actually made.

The position of the law is that evaluation of evidence does not stop with assessing the credibility of witnesses. It extends to a consideration of the totality of the evidence on any issue of fact in the circumstance of each case in order to determine whether the totality of the evidence supports a finding of fact which the party adducing the evidence seeks that the trial court should make. See Basil vs. Fajeke (2001) FWLR (Pt.51) 1914 at 1928. Where the totality of the evidence on the fact of the date is considered, the finding by the trial court on the totality of the evidence therefore to the effect that there was a demand by the appellant cannot be faulted.

The appellant in his defence denied asking for N1,000,000 as inducement, but rather asserts that the one million naira was payment to be made to DW2 in settlement of the sum owed to him by the PW2. Indeed the learned trial judge in rejecting this proposition asked questions. In Exhibit K, the complaint of DW2 against PW2, is based on threat to life, harassment and intimidation. In the course of his investigation, the appellant stated that DW2 alleged petroleum vandalisation bunkering etc against PW2.

These are grave accusations known under our criminal justice system. It is not open to the appellant therefore to cover the investigation of all these allegations, in favour of collecting an alleged debt of one million naira for the complainant. The trial judge did not believe him, I do not believe him either. This is more so when the entire transaction has been concealed from all other officers involved in the case, and not reported to his superior who assigned the case to him in the first place. The trial judge said:

“The accused person was acting on his own as his team members were unaware of this payment PW2 was to make on the day of accused arrest. I cannot find any doubt to puncture the case of the prosecution in this case the deposition of PW2 in Exhibit G confirms the prosecution’s case. More so when by the accused person’s showing in his statement and conduct in going outside the Police Zone 5 premises personally to receive the money the allegation is shown to be true. ”

I see no reason to fault the finding of the trial judge in that regard. This issue is resolved against the appellant.

On the third count of the charge appellants grouse is two fold, firstly that the count was belatedly introduced by the prosecution when there was no evidence of a complaint giving rise to the count of charge, and the charge did not indicate what was offered as gratification which the appellant failed to report.

Secondly, that the prosecution did not comply with the provisions of Section 36(6) (a) and (b) of the Constitution with regards to the manner of the introduction of the new count.

The charge under count three against the appellant is predicated on Section 23 of the 2000 Act, refusal to report the offer of bribe made to him. The trial judge considered the arguments on this issue, and found the accused person guilty thereof. I am totally enthused by the holding of the trial judge. The complainant with regards to this count is the state.

The count of the charge originates from the course of proceeding principally from the appellant’s evidence. In his statement of 6/11/2006, the appellant stated:

“He has offered me money severally in the office in the presence of some officers and his lawyer, but I told him that I do not take bribe.”

Yet in Exhibit B, the appellant also stated:

“PW2 attempted to bribe me in the presence of his lawyer B. A. Iluobe Esq., his inlaw a taxi-driver and one Sgt Irabor through a hand shake with me. He attempted to bribe me twice. The second time was in my office when he bent over my desk to introduce money into my desk, but I took him outside.”

All these pieces of evidence contained in his voluntary statement were not retracted by him. Worst still, there is the evidence of PW3, B. A Iluobe:

“At about six o’clock, John Okokhue and some others negotiated the bail running from the accused person to the other officers begging them to assist in begging the accused person to reduce the amount for PW2’s bail from N150,000. At about 7pm I was with John Okokhue when he was gathering money, he personally brought out N10,000 from his pocket, that the accused had agreed to take N50,000. They contributed N50,000. The accused person sent for a bail bond which he filled and PW2 was asked to sign in my presence and asked to go home.”

All these instances were not reported as demanded by Section 23 of the 2000 Act.

As regards to the appellant’s complaint on non compliance with the provisions of Section 36(6) (a) and (b) of the 1999 Constitution, learned trial judge rightly referred to the case of Princent vs. The State (2003) 1 MJSC 87 at 102, and held that the appellant had ample opportunity to defend himself and was not prejudiced nor misled. It is trite law that whenever there is an amendment to a charge after the commencement of a trial, it is the right of the accused to be permitted to recall witnesses who had already testified before the amendment for further cross examination and also to call further witnesses that the court may consider to be material in the light of the amendment. See also Osuola vs. The State (1991) 8 NWLR (pt.212) 770 at 777.

The position of this case is that on the 19/11/2010, and in the course of trial, the prosecution applied to amend the charge against the appellant, by the addition of count three of the charge. The application was opposed. In his ruling read on the same date, the court allowed the application and case adjourned.

On the 22/11/2010, the amended charge was read and explained to the accused person now appellant, to which he pleaded not guilty.

Learned counsel then applied to be allowed to recall any of the witnesses previously taken, which was granted and the case was adjourned for the purpose.

The accused person who was giving evidence, proceeded with his testimony, and Mr. Awomolo (SAN) for the prosecution was allowed to cross examine the appellant with regards to the third count of the charge. Thereafter the trial proceeded and final written addresses submitted by the two learned senior counsel.

Now Section 36 6(a) and (b) of the Constitution reproduced, reads:-

“6. every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to:

(a) be informed promptly in the language that he understands and in detail the nature of the charge

(b) be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence.

I have carefully studied the arraignment of the appellant in respect of the third count of the charge, and I am satisfied that the provisions of Section 36 (6)(a) and (b) of the Constitution being complained of were adequately complied with.
This issue is likewise determined against the appellant.

The position of the law is clear, in deciding whether there had been a miscarriage of justice to warrant the interference of an appellate court, the appellate court must be satisfied that the miscarriage being complained of is substantial either as to the facts, misapplication of the law or both. Where it is of mere technicality which caused the appellant no embarrassment or prejudice the Court of Appeal will be slow to interfer see. Ononuju vs. The State (2014) 8 NWLR (pt.1409) 345 at 379; Adebayo vs. A.G. Ogun State (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt.1085) 201; Okegbu vs. The State (1979) 11 S.C. 1.

Having therefore determined the two issues canvassed by the appellant against him, the conclusive effect is that this appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed by me. The lucid and sound decision of Justice E. F. Ikponmen of the Edo State High Court delivered on the 25th of January, 2013 is hereby affirmed. I also affirm the conviction and sentence of the Lower Court.

PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE, J.C.A.:

I have been opportuned to read in draft the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother H. A. BARKA JCA. I have gone through the said judgment with a fine tooth comb and there is no gainsaying the fact that a number of cases have been tried under the ICPC Act 2000. I also refer to the case of BITRUS BAKKAT V. FRN (2014) 2 CPCLR 455 @ 472 where thus court held that the Independent Corrupt Practices Act of 2000 is still extant.

I throw my weight behind the sound reasoning of my Learned brother that the above case goes to buttress the contention that the appellant was tried under a subsisting law.

Another salient point proffered by learned appellant’s counsel in this appeal is whether in view of the inconsistencies in dates, the finding of the trial judge that the appellant actually made the demand was correct.

No doubt, it has been extensively argued that the dates given by the appellant of the alleged demand were different and contradictory, I also agree with both the learned trial judge and my learned brother that even though there were slight discrepancies in the dates of the actual demand by the appellant, those contradictions do not affect the core of this appeal and indeed not material enough to tilt the pendulum of justice in favour of the appellant. I too am of the view that those inconsistencies in dates are of no moment as long as it has been proved by credible evidence that the actual demand had been made by the appellant.

It is however trite law that it is not every discrepancy, contradiction and or inconsistency that will affect the substance of a criminal case. To succeed in upturning a decision, the said contradiction must be relevant and so obvious that it would cause a miscarriage of justice. See EDEINWE V THE STATE (2011) 7 NWLR 402; OMISADE v. QUEEN (1964) 1 All LR 233.

On the issue of fair hearing after a new count had been introduced, it is common legal parlance that a court is empowered to amend or add to any charge in a criminal case before judgment but the court must ensure that the amended charge is read out and explained to the accused person. See UGUBU v THE STATE (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt.771) 90.

In this case, the appellant was granted the opportunity to defend himself and call witnesses. The appellant actually took advantage of the said opportunity and called witnesses.

From the totality of all of the above, and the fuller and admirably lucid reasons and conclusions of my learned brother in the lead judgment, I too hold that this appeal has no scintilla of merit, it fails and I dismiss it in its entirety. I affirm the decision of Justice E. F. Ikponwen of the Edo state High Court delivered on the 25th day of January, 2013.

The conviction and sentence of the court below is also hereby affirmed.

UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.:

I was privileged to read in draft, the judgment just delivered by His Lordship, Hamma Akawu Barka, Justice of the Court of Appeal. His Lordship has deftly dealt with the issues thrust up for determination in this appeal. Having equally read the Records of Appeal and the briefs of argument filed by the parties, I agree with his reasoning and conclusion that the appeal is devoid of merit and is deserving of a dismissal.

I only wish to say a few words with respect to the issue of the extant and regnant corrupt Practices and other Related offences Act, if for nothing else, to highlight the confusion engendered in this regard by the Laws of the Federation, 2004.

The Appellant submits with some force that the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act, 2000 was expressly repealed by section 55 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related offences Act, 2003. The Appellant continued and opined in para 6:01 on page 15 of the Appellant’s Brief inter alia as follows:

“The said Act (the 2003 Act) became operational and effective by virtue of the Revised Edition (Laws of The Federation of Nigeria) Act 2007. This Act which enabled effect to be given to the Revised Edition Of The Laws Of The Federation Of Nigeria compiled and published in 2004 was signed by Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, The President of The Federal Republic of Nigeria on the 25th day of May, 2007. Section 3 of the said Act expressly repealed The Revised Edition (Laws Of The Federation Of Nigeria) Act, 1990.

The Corrupt Practices And Other Related Offences Act, 2003 is embodied in Vol 4 Chapter C 31 of The Revised Edition (Laws Of The Federation of Nigeria) Act, 2004. This statute is effective by virtue of the provisions of the Revised Edition (Laws Of The Federation Of Nigeria Act, 2007 as aforestated.”

The Appellants contention is this regard is luminous; and it is that the extant and regnant Act is the corrupt practices and other Related offences Act. 2003 embodied in Volume 4 chapter c 31 of the Revised Edition Laws of the Federation, 2004. Volume 4 Chapter C 31, Laws of the Federation 2004 however puts this contention to the sword. The Act therein codified is the corrupt Practices and other Related offences Act No. 5 of 2000. To make matters worse and deepen the confusion, pages lxxxvii and lxxxviii in Volume 1 of the Laws of the Federation, 2004 dealing with the Acts considered by the Law Revision committee and showing the action taken on each Act considered annotates that the corrupt practices and other Related offences Act No. 5 of 2000 was repealed by Act No. 6 of 2003 and further stated that the corrupt Practices and other Related offences Act No. 6 of 2003 was retained as Cap. C31 of the Laws of the Federation 2004.

I have already stated that Cap. C31 Laws of the Federation, 2004 contains the Corrupt Practices and other Related offences Act, 2000 and not the corrupt Practices and other Related offences Act, 2003. This is manifest by the fact that contrary to the contention of the Appellant, the offences for which he was tried and convicted are contained in Cap. C31. Furthermore, section 55 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related offences Act, 2003 which was stated to have repealed the corrupt practices and other Related offences Act, 2000 is not in the Act codified as Cap. C31.

The resolution to the quagmire is not as simple as the Appellant would have the court believe that it can be accomplished by the production of the Revised Edition (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria) Act No. 30 of 2007 which repealed the Revised Edition (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria) Act, 1990 and approved the use of the Laws of the Federation, 2004. Quite apart from the disceptation as to whether the 2003 Act was assented to by the president or whether the National Assembly overrode the veto of the president, firstly, the corrupt Practices and other Related offences Act, 2000 is not one of the laws codified in the Laws of the Federation, 1990, so the repeal of the Laws of the Federation, 1990 should not affect the corrupt practices and other Related offences Act, 2000 which was not codified in the Laws of the Federation, 1990. Secondly, the corrupt practices and other Related Offences Act codified in the Laws of the Federation, 2004 is the corrupt Practices and Other Related offences Act, 2000 and not the 2003 Act. Going along with the submission of the Appellant that the extant and regnant law is in Cap. C31 Laws of the Federation, 2004, then the said law is the Corrupt Practices and Other Related offences Act, 2000. It is the law under which the Appellant was charged, tried and convicted. Consequently I am unable to agree with the submission that the Appellant was not tried under an existing law.

I hasten to daresay that a great measure of higgledy-piggledy has accompanied legislations passed in this democratic dispensation. There is this confusion as to the extant corrupt practices and other Related offences Act, there are different versions of the Evidence Act, 2011; the several amendments to the grundnorm, the 1999 Constitution, vary from one copy in circulation to another. This is just to mention but a few. The rudimentary and hornbook law is that ignorance of the law is not a defence, there is therefore an abiding need for the legislature to get its act together with regard to ensuring that there is certainty, not only in the bills passed into law, but also in their contents. I say no more.

Conclusively, it is for the above reasons and the more detailed reasons contained in the lead judgment of my learned brother that I also join in dismissing this appeal. The judgment of the High court of Edo State in Charge No.B/ICPC/2/2006 delivered on 25th January 2012 is hereby affirmed.

3PLR – TEMPLE NWANKWOALA V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

POLICY, PRACTICE AND PUBLISHING, LAW REPORTS 3PLR

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