3PLR – CHIEF KOFI AKRASI V. CHIEF OSEI KOJO

POLICY, PRACTICE AND PUBLISHING, LAW REPORTS  3PLR

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CHIEF KOFI AKRASI

V.

CHIEF OSEI KOJO

WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL, GOLD COAST

ACCRA, 21ST JUNE, 1951

CITATIONS

[1956] VIII WACA 243

BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:

VERITY, AG. P.

LEWEY, J.A.

MORGAN, J.

BETWEEN

CHIEF KOFI AKRASI

FOR HIMSELF AND AS REPRESENTING THE STOOL AND PEOPLE OF NYABOE

AND

CHIEF OSEI KOJO FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE PATRIENSA STOOL

REPRESENTATION

Siriboe for the Respondent.

Hayfron-Benjamin for the Appellant.

MAIN ISSUES

LAND LAW:- Claims – Whether relating to the ownership, possession or occupation of land – Duty of court thereto – Claim for tribute from agricultural land – Whether claim for rents simplicita – Claim for forfeiture of agricultural plantation – Whether relevant to determine if it relates to the possession or occupation of land

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE LAW:-Plantation farming –  Customary law practices relating to plantations and large farms – “Cocoa tribute“ – Claim for an order for forfeiture to the plaintiff of the defendant’s cocoa farm or in the alternative, in lieu of forfeiture the payment of a further sum of money – How treated

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:- Land matters – Jurisdiction – Whether within the jurisdiction of the Land Court or Divisional Court of the Gold Coast (Ghana) – Section 20A of the Courts Ordinance (Cap. 4) conferring, in certain circumstances, exclusive original jurisdiction on Land Court considered – Effect of counter-claim on jurisdiction of Court where claim originally within jurisdiction of Court and counter-claim outside its jurisdiction.

MAIN JUDGMENT

The following judgment was delivered:

VERITY, AG. P.

In this case the plaintiff claimed in the Ashanti Divisional Court against the defendant for a sum of £509 odd as “cocoa tribute “ due by the defendant to the plaintiff in respect of certain cocoa farms. He also claimed an order for forfeiture to the plaintiff of the defendant’s cocoa farm or in the alternative, by an amendment to the claim, in lieu of forfeiture the payment of a further sum of money.

When the matter came on for hearing in the Divisional Court it was submitted on behalf of the defendant that the Court had no jurisdiction inasmuch as the suit related to the possession or occupation of land. The learned judge reserved the point and then gave a ruling. The effect of the ruling was that there was nothing in the documents which created relationship between the parties in regard to these cocoa farms which suggested that title to the land on which the farms are situated is in dispute. And the learned judge went on that the documents proved that the forfeiture contemplated was not such a claim to occupation or possession as was contemplated by the Native Courts Ordinance and proceeded that it was obviously intended to apply to claims relating to such occupation or possession of land as would amount to a dispute which puts the title to the land in issue. He therefore held that the Divisional Court had jurisdiction and proceeded to hear it.

When the matter came before this Court by way of an appeal it was submitted on behalf of the defendant that the Divisional Court had no jurisdiction, that jurisdiction in this dispute resided either in a Native Court or in a Land Court.

In the first place it is to be considered what is the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in regard to land and how it is effected by section 20A of the Courts Ordinance (Cap. 4). By that section certain Lands Divisions of the Supreme Court were constituted and it was provided by subsection 4 of section 20A that the Land Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine any cause or matter relating to the ownership, possession or occupation of land in certain circumstances.

I would not for the moment deal with the circumstances in which the Land Court exercises jurisdiction. It is sufficient, I think, for the purpose of this appeal to refer to the fact that by this section of the Courts Ordinance the Land Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine any cause or matter relating to the ownership, possession or occupation of land. When, therefore, it is sought to bring a cause or matter in the Supreme Court and the question arises as to whether it is a Divisional or Land Court which is to exercise that jurisdiction it is only necessary to determine whether or not it is a cause or matter relating to the ownership, possession or occupation of land. If it does so relate, then the Land Court has exclusive original jurisdiction and a Divisional Court has therefore no jurisdiction. Coming to the present case, that is, I think, the only point which we have to determine: if the issue relates to the ownership, possession or occupation of land.

Although the learned judge in the Court below appears to have directed his attention rather to the question as to whether it was the Native Court or Supreme Court which possessed jurisdiction at the same time he did seek to interpret what is meant by the words, “ ownership, possession or occupation,” and he appears to have limited the meaning of the words “ possession or occupation “ to such circumstances only where the claim to possession or occupation involves a decision as to the ownership of the land. In so restricting the meaning and application of the words I think the learned judge erred. What is to be considered is whether the cause or matter relates to the ownership of land or to the possession of land or to the occupation of land, and if it relates to one or another of those three things, then the Land Court has exclusive original jurisdiction and the Divisional Court has no jurisdiction to hear or determine the matter.

As far as the first claim by the plaintiff in this suit is concerned I think it is beyond doubt and it has not been argued to the contrary that it is not a matter which relates to the ownership, possession or occupation of land. It is a claim for rents pure and simple.

In regard to the second claim, that of forfeiture, I find myself quite unable to determine that that does not relate to the possession or occupation of land. Whatever may be the nature of the transaction between the parties and whether it is one to which is to be applied native customary law or some other law, it appears to me that the claim by the plaintiff clearly relates to the possession or occupation of land.

The claim is that the defendants who, under this agreement were to have possession of these cocoa farms upon the payment of certain tribute should be dispossessed and the issue is whether failure to pay the tribute had entitled the landlord to re-enter on forfeiture. Clearly the defence in this case was that whether or not the defendant has failed to pay tribute, the landlord was not entitled to re-enter, as they were not under any forfeiture and remained entitled to possession. That this was the nature of the defence is, in my view, made more clear by the fact that the defendant entered a counter-claim which is clearly a claim for damages for trespass-a claim which is based only on the right to possession.

Counsel for the plaintiff before us referred to a proviso relating to the jurisdiction in such matters, and referring to counter-claims, and if I understood his argument aright it was to the effect that where a counterclaim is entered in a case which would otherwise be outside the jurisdiction of the Court the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is restored. I do not think that is the real meaning of that proviso think its meaning is that where the case is originally within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court the mere fact that a counter-claim is entered which deals with matters outside that jurisdiction has no effect on the original jurisdiction of the Court to hear and determine the issue in the case. But in any event, I would not base my view of the nature of this issue on the counterclaim as such but as an indication of the real issue between the parties in this matter. Was it the right of the defendant to continue in possession or the right of the landlord to forfeit the agreement and re-enter 1 That being so, my view is that the matter is clearly one “ relating to the possession or occupation of land .”

If the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is to be exercised in relation to. this dispute, then it is the Land Court which has the approved jurisdiction and not the Divisional Court. Therefore, I think that this ground of appeal succeeds and the appeal should be allowed.

I only wish to add one thing, and that is that I would not wish parties to consider that anything I have said indicates that in this particular case it is the Land Court that has the jurisdiction. It may be that the circumstances do not bring the matter within the limits imposed upon jurisdiction of the Land Court by subsection 4 of section 20A of the Courts Ordinance, and it may be, therefore, that if a Native Court exists in that area, it is a case within the jurisdiction of that Native Court. But in regard to the only question that I think this Court is called upon to decide I am of the opinion that the Divisional Court had no jurisdiction.

LEAVY, J.A. I concur.

MORGAN, J. I concur.

Appeal allowed.