3PLR – BKADIRI AJASA APAMPA V. THE STATE
POLICY, PRACTICE AND PUBLISHING, 3PLR, LAW REPORTS
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BKADIRI AJASA APAMPA
V.
THE STATE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA
18TH JUNE, 1982
SUIT NO. SC 97/1981
LN-e-LR/1982/9 (SC)
OTHER CITATIONS
(1982) All N.L.R 131
BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:
REPRESENTATION
R.A. Ogunwole (with him M.A. Apampa and Miss O. Akinjide) for the Appellant.
E.O. Awosusi, Depuly Director of Public Prosecution, Oyo State, for the Respondent.
MAIN ISSUES
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE:- Public Officer – Corruption and Abuse of Office – Acquiring or holding private interest in official contract – Trial Judge ruling that accused had no case to answer on ground that he was not a person employed in the Public Service – s.85 and s.88 of Criminal Code Cap. 28 Laws of Western Nigeria – How treated
GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:- Governance and constitution of membership of a university in Nigeria – Powers/functions of Senate and Council – Role of the Establishment Act of the University in ascertaining same – Appointment of non-academic staff of university by Council – Whether makes such appointee a public officer
EDUCATION AND LAW:- Governance of a university – Centrality of the Establishment Statute in determining the role of Senate and Council – Non-academic staff of University appointed by council – Whether deemed a public officer – Relevant considerations
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR LAW:- Non-academic staff of university – Where appointed by University Council established under the University’s constitutive Act – Whether a “person employed in the public service” for the purposes of the Criminal Code – Relevant considerations – Effect
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Interpretation of the Constitution and statutes made pursuant thereto – Correct approach – Need not to begin by looking to the meaning or interpretation of a statutory provision or Constitution of other countries with different wording
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – ACTION:- No case submission in criminal proceedings – Basis – Prosecution had not made a prima facie due to failure to prove a constitutive element of crime charged – Effect
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES:– The Constitution of Nigeria and Statutes made pursuant thereto – Duty of judge to observe principle that the provisions of our laws take precedence without the necessity of resorting to England for their interpretation
WORDS AND PHRASES: ‘Person employed in public Service” – Meaning – Relevant considerations
MAIN JUDGMENT
ANIAGOLU J.S.C. (Delivering the Judgment of the Court):
Kadiri Ajasa Apampa (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the appellant) has appealed to this Court, in this appeal, against the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal which, in turn, had set aside a ruling, made in his favour, by the High Court of Ibadan, of the Oyo State Judiciary, which had held on a submission of no case to answer at the close of the prosecution case, that the prosecution had not made out a prima facie case for the appellant to answer by reason of their failure to prove an essential ingredient of the offences charged In the information, namely, that the appellant was a person employed In the public service.
It would, perhaps, be of some assistance to trace the course, so far, of this case, from the record of proceedings. Charged before the High Court on ten Counts of the Information were the appellant and one Isaiah Olatiregun. Of the ten Counts, the appellant had six Counts to himself while Isaiah Olatiregun had four. In five of six Counts the appellant was charged, under section 85 of the Criminal Code Cap.28 Vol1 Laws of the former Western State of Nigeria, 1959, as a public officer, with being interested in contracts, and one Count, under section 88 of the Law, with abuse of office. Olatiregun was also charged on three Counts under the same section 85 of the Criminal Code, and one Count under section 88. Different amounts were alleged in the ten Counts of the Information.
Since the Counts were identical except for the various amounts and for various contracts, it will suffice to set out one Count only under section 85 and one under section 88 as follows:
Statement of Offence
1st Count – Public officers interested in contracts contrary to section 85 of the Criminal Code, Cap 28 Vol.1, Laws of the former Western State of Nigeria, 1959.
Particulars of Offence
Kadiri Ajasa Apampa (M), during the month of July 1975 at the University of Ibadan, Ibadan, in the Ibadan Judicial Division being employed in the Public Service knowingly acquired a private interest in a contract of purchases as evidenced by LP.O. No. 12730 of 10/7/75 and Invoice No. 000025 of 14/7/75 and payment voucher dated 17/7/75 for the sum of N1,150 and cheque No. IA/UB 083854 dated 26/7/75 on account of the Public Service, that is, the department of Anatomy, University of Ibadan, in which you were employed.”
“Statement of Offence 6th Count
Abuse of office contrary to section 88 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 28, Vol. 1, Laws of the former Western Nigeria, 1959.
Particulars of Offence
Kadiri Ajasa Apampa (M), between the months of January and August, 1975 at the University of Ibadan, Ibadan in the Ibadan Judicial Division, being employed in the Public Service, did in abuse of the authority of your office sell equipments to the Department of Anatomy, University of Ibadan for purpose of gain.”
At the conclusion of the case for the prosecution, counsel for the appellant, then Chief R.O.A. Akinjide (Mr. Olutunfese, Counsel for the second accused Olatiregun agreeing with him and associating himself with his submissions) made a submission of no case to answer arguing that the University of Ibadan was not a department of Government and, a fortiori, its Department of Anatomy under which the appellant was employed, was not a department of Government; that the University of Ibadan was a creature of statute, namely, the University of Ibadan Act, 1962 and was made, by its section 1 thereof, a body corporate, with all the attributes of a corporation and was responsible for the appointment of its staff, including the appointment of the appellant; that the said University was created for academic excellence with autonomy for appointment, promotion and dismissal of its staff none of whom came under the Public Service Commission; and finally, that the contracts for equipments, the subject matter of the Counts of the Information, were meant for the Department of Anatomy of the University and not for Government.
In the premises, counsel, relying for support, inter alia, on the authorities of Rufus Atli Momoh v. Afolabi Okewale & Another (1977) 6 S.C.81; Gafari Ajldag ba v. Adegoke Adelabu (1958) 3 F.S.C. 5 submitted that the appellant was entitled to a discharge on the merits on the principle laid down in Police v. Sydney Marke (1957) 2 F.S.C. 5.
The learned trial judge was of the view, on the ratio decidendi of the decision of Duffus, J. (as he then was) in the Ibadan High Court case, No.1/11 c/64 Aina v. Director of Public Prosecutions Western Nigeria a case which came upon appeal to the Supreme Court as S.C. 234/1964 that had the appellant held any of the offices mentioned in the University Act, 1962, he would have had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that in that capacity he was a person employed in the public service, but, that as he held none of those offices and instead was appointed by the University Council, he must find, and did find, on the authority of Rex v. William Opera 9 W.A.C.A. 70 a case by which he was bound that the appellant was not a person employed in the public service. He expressed himself as coming to that conclusion and discharging the appellant ‘with reluctance.” To quote the learned trial judge exactly, he said:
“On the authority of this case by which I am bound I have no option but to hold that the two accused persons are not public officers within the meaning of sections 85 and 88 of the Criminal Code because they are appointed by the University Council, an incorporated body consisting of several persons. Since the prosecution has failed within the meaning of the sections under which the accused are charged and since this is an essential element in each of the counts contained in the information before me, on the authority on (sic) Eke’s case supra and the English Practice Direction dated February 9, 1962 cited by one “of the defence counsel, I hold that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th counts against the 1st accused have not been proved. Similarly, I hold that the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th counts against the 2nd accused have not been established. I, therefore, discharge with reluctance the 1st accused on counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 and the 2nd accused on counts 7, 8, 9 and 10.
The discharge of the accused persons shall be on merit.”
The prosecution appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal which (as per Uche Omo, J.C.A.) as I have already stated, set aside the said judgment and remitted the case back to the High Court with a direction that the case be proceeded with, on the ground that the prosecution had made out a prima facie case for the defence to answer, and that the defence be called upon to proceed with its own case. It is from this judgment, again as I have already stated, that the appellant has appealed to this Court.
Before us, counsel for the appellant, Mr. Ogunwole, apart from a little elaboration, relied upon his Brief. For the respondent, Mr. Awosusi, of counsel, stated he relied entirely on the respondent’s Brief. The appellant filed three grounds of appeal as follows:
- The learned Justices of the Federal Court of Appeal erred in law when they held that R. Vs. Opera (1943) 9 W.A.C.A. 70 which was relied upon by the learned trial judge no longer represents the law in view of the decisions in (1) R. Vs. Ziks Press Ltd. (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 110 (ii) Service Press Ltd. Vs. Att. Gen. (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 176 (iii) D.P.P. Vs. Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd. (1964) KB. 146 when the issue of “person employed in the Public Service” as contained in the interpretation section of the Criminal Code, was neither raised nor referred to in any of the judgments.
- The learned Justices of the Federal Court of Appeal erred in law when they held:
“In conclusion therefore this appeal succeeds. The decision of the court below is hereby set aside. The order of this court is that this case be remitted to the court below with a direction that the prosecution has made out a prima facie case and that the respondents be called upon to be heard in their own defence”
“Particulars of Error
(i) The essential ingredient of the offence of which the appellant was charged has not been proved and no prima facie case has been made out against him as to be called upon to give his defence.
(ii) The appellant is not “a person employed in the public service” under SS.85 and 88 of the Criminal Code, cap. 28, Laws of Western Region of Nigeria, 1959.
- The learned Justices of the Federal Court of Appeal erred in law when they held that R. Vs. Opera (1943) 9 W.A.C.A. 70 which was relied upon by the learned trial judge no longer represents the law in view of the decisions in
(i) R. Vs. Ziks Press Ltd (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 110
(ii) Service Press Ltd. vs. Att. Gen. (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 176
(iii) D.P.P. Vs. Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd. (1964) KB. 146 when sections 85 and 88 of the Criminal Code under which the appellant was charged were neither raised nor referred to in any of the judgments.”
In a nutshell, the gravamen of the three grounds of appeal can be condensed as being an attack on the finding of the Federal Court of Appeal, on their view of the state of the law, that the appellant was a person employed in the public service and that the learned trial Judge was wrong in holding to the contrary.
The constructional meaning to be ascribed to the expression:
“Any person who, being employed in the public service” must of necessity be restricted to the meaning given to it by the statute carrying the expression, where the statute has given it a definition. It follows, as Lord Goddard has stated in Beeston and Stapleford Urban District Council & Anor. v. Smith (1949) 1 KB. 656, referred to by counsel, that different meanings could be given to the expression, under different statutes, depending on what meaning, if any, each statute has ascribed to it.
Thus under sections 98, 99, 100, 104, 116 of the Criminal Code, Cap.42, Laws of the Federation, 1958, for example, the meaning given to the expression ‘person employed in the public service’ is as defined in section 1 of the Criminal Code (See paragraphs 1507, 1511, 1513, 1519 and 1533 of Brett and Maclean). The equivalents of these sections in the Criminal Code of the former Western Nigeria, contained in Cap. 28, Vol. 1 are sections 82, 83, 84, 88 and 100 respectively, and again the meaning of the expression is as defined in s.1 of that Criminal Code of Western Nigeria.
The meaning cannot, it is true, be conditioned, in the face of specialized statutorily provided definition, to a loose approach on whether such a person’s duty is of service, or is beneficial, to the public.
A person may well be rendering immense service to the public in his occupation but that does not make him a ‘person employed in public service’ as understood in the legal connotation of that expression in our statutes. While the laundryman to whom you send your clothes for laundering, upon a fee, is rendering immense useful service to the public by maintaining the Laundry Service; or while the wayside photographer who is taking your passport photograph and giving you your copies within minutes for the purpose of your overseas travels, is doing enormous public good that does not bring them within the ambit of the legal meaning of a person employed in the public service. A person employed in the public service within the meaning of the Criminal Code is that person whose employment and/or duties fall within the definition given in the Criminal Code, in section 1 thereof. Cave, J. took that view, on a case in bankruptcy, the question being whether a charge given by the bankrupt on his salary as Chaplain of the Birmingham workhouse and workhouse Infirmary, was void on the ground of public policy, the issue being whether the Chaplain, who was a beneficed clergyman, was a public officer. He pointed out that:
‘To make the office a public office, the pay must come out of national and not out of Local funds, and the office must be public in the strict sense of that term. It is not enough that the due discharge of the duties of the office should be for the public benefit in a secondary and remote sense.” (in re Mirams (1891)1 Q.B. 594 at 5967]
The case was being decided on an interpretation of section 122 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883.
And now I turn specifically to the three grounds of appeal. Grounds 1 and 3 complain that neither the definitions in section 1 of the Criminal Code, nor sections 85 and 88 of the Criminal Code, were mentioned In the judgments referred to by the Court of Appeal, namely, (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 110, (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 176 and (1964) KB. 146, to justify what the Court of Appeal said in respect of R. v. Opara (1943) 9 W.A.C.A. 70. That may well be so, that those sections were not mentioned in those cases, but let us look at the cases.
It must be pointed out that the Court of Appeal referred to those cases for the purpose of showing that a company or a body corporate can be found guilty under the Criminal Code as “persons” and that since they were decided, after William Opara, the Courts had taken a new line of reasoning contrary to that in William Opera. Strictly, however, with much respect to the Court of Appeal, I do not see the relevance of those cases to a consideration of the issues raised in this appeal. R. v. Ziks Press Ltd. (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 110 laid down that the personal signature of the Attorney-general on an Information was sufficient compliance with section 52(2) of the Criminal Code with no necessity for a document consenting to the institution of the prosecution being filed in addition; and that where a limited liability company desires to appeal, or to ask for leave to appeal, against its conviction, the notices must be signed by its Manager on its behalf. In the Service Press Ltd. v. Attorney-general 14 W.A.C.A. 176, the Service Press Limited was charged with seditious publication, and the issue for decision was one of exclusion of evidence, namely, whether the trial judge was right in excluding evidence sought to be led by the company that the allegations in the publication were true. D.P.P. v. Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd. 1944 KB. 146 raised the question whether a company could be charged with making a false statement. The justices were of the opinion that the company could not in law be guilty of the offence since there was implicit in the offence an act of will or state of mind which could not be imputed to a body corporate. The justices were held to be wrong as a company could be convicted of the offence charged. Being strictly irrelevant the non-mention of sections 1, 85 and 88 in them, as contended by the appellant, also become irrelevant.
And now, R. v. William Opera 9 W.A.C.A. 70. That case was decided on 26th April 1943 by the West African Court of Appeal (Kingdon, Petrides and Graham Paul, C.JJ.) based on the meaning of the expression “person employed in the public service” having regard to its definition in section 1 of the Criminal Code as it then was, and section 3 of the Interpretation Ordinance 1939 (No.27 of 1939). The Court held that the meaning of “person” given in s. 3 of the Interpretation Ordinance 1939 only applied “unless there is anything in the subject or context repugnant to such meaning” (sec s.3) and came to the conclusion that the subject and context were repugnant to the interpretation of the word “person” as including a body of persons of which the Ekpeye Clan Council which employed William Opara was made up.
Whatever one might say of the correctness or otherwise of that judgment, one thing stands out clearly, namely, that the definition of “person employed in the public service” as contained in section 1 of the Criminal Code as it stood in 1943 when William Opera was decided, was specifically expanded in the definition provided for in section 1 of the Western Nigeria Criminal Code when that Code came into force in 1959 as part of the Revised Edition of the Laws of Western Nigeria. In respect of employees of local governments a further item (vii) of the definition was added (see p.498 of Vol.1 of the Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria 1959) to include
“(vii) a person in the employ of a Local Government Council in connection with any powers or duties exercised or performed by such local government council and in respect of the duties for which the employment actually exists.”
It is to be remembered that the High Court gave its ruling in this appeal on 30th January 1978, about 35 years after William Opara was decided in 1943.
In dealing with this appeal I agree with the view expressed by the Court of Appeal that in the search for the meaning of the expression “person employed in the public service” as contained in sections 85 and 88 of the Criminal Code one need not look elsewhere than the meaning ascribed to it in the definition section of the same Criminal Code. In particular, it is not necessary to go over to the United Kingdom in search of their definition and cases decided on it, unless their own provision of the Law is identical with ours. As was stated in this Court in Nafiu Rabiu and Kano State (1980) 811 SC.130 at 151 (per Sir Udoma, J.S.C.):
11 … it is not a correct approach to the proper interpretation of our present Constitution to begin by looking to the meaning or interpretation of a statutory provision or Constitution of other countries with different wording. But of course, foreign constitutions or statutes with identical provisions accepted as in pari materia with the relevant provisions of our Constitution will naturally carry some weight in their persuasive influence, bearing in mind always, that even in such cases, circumstances may be at variance.,,
This principle that the provisions of our laws take precedence without the necessity of resorting to England for their interpretation, had been pronounced upon by the Courts over the years. On 21st November, 1927, Webber, J. in Chief Ekei Ephraim Adam v. Etubom Adam Ephraim Duke 8 N.LR.88 applied the Chancery Procedure Act, 1852 which then applied to Nigeria and therefore was incorporated as the municipal law, and refused to apply a later English Rule Order XXV Rule 5 of the 1883 Rules of Court on the ground that the English Rules did not apply in the face of the municipal law.
The same principle was held applicable to the old Gold Coast (now Ghana). In 1937 in the Gold Coast and Ashanti Electric Power Development Corporation Ltd. v. The Attorney-general of the Gold Coast 3 W.A.C.A. 215 the West African Court of Appeal would not have recourse to the English Rules of Court on demurrer when the local Rules made provisions for it. The Court stated:
“Now we do not say that the Rules of the Supreme Court of England never apply or may never be applied in the courts in this country; but they should apply only when our law is silent.”
The said Criminal Code definition, as is relevant to these proceedings, reads:
‘person employed in the public service” means any person holding any of the following offices, or performing the duties thereof, whether as deputy or otherwise:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.”
(2) any office to which a person is appointed by or under any Statute or Ordinance or Law; or
(3) any civil office, the power of appointing to which or of removing from which is vested in any person or persons holding an office of any kind included in either of the two last preceding subheads of this section;
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.”
Under (2) above, the learned trial judge found that persons holding offices from the University such as the Registrar, Bursar, the Librarian and all those persons set out in section 2 of the University of Ibadan Act, 1962, are “persons employed in the public service,” by reason of the wordings of the subhead.
The learned trial judge did not, however, proceed to examine the employment of the appellant In relation to subheads (2) and (3) above in the context of the evidence adduced, but went on to hold that R. v. William Opera (supra) bound him to find in the appellant’s favour that he was not “a person employed in the public service.” It is, however, necessary to examine the meaning of subheads (2) and (3) together, against the evidence.
Exhibit 11 (the appellant’s letter of appointment) shows that the appellant was appointed by the Ibadan University Council as a Photocopy Technician in the University Library on 23rd October 1969 for an initial period of three years. Among the benefits enumerated therein, which constituted his conditions of services, was Item (e) under which he was entitled to
“Superannuation benefits under the Nigeria Universities Joint Superannuation Scheme.”
On 29th June 1973, by a letter of that date (Ex. 12), he was appointed Senior Technician in the Department of Anatomy of the University retrospectively to 13th June, 1973, on a salary of N2,760 with fringe benefits as enumerated in the letter.
From the evidence of Professor Ayodele Babaji Olukoya Desalu, the duties of the appellant included purchasing some materials required for the Department of Anatomy of the University such as teaching films for the teaching of anatomy, electronic enlarger timers, glacing (sic) machines, drums of ethanol et cetera. From the nature of his appointment and duties, the appellant was undoubtedly doing a vital job In the University.
Section 2 of the University of Ibadan Act, 1962, No.37 of 1962 spells out the constitution of the University. It provides:
“2. (1) The University shall consist of
(a) a chancellor;
(b) a pro-chancellor and a council;
(c) a vice-chancellor and a senate;
(d) a body to be called congregation;
(e) a body to be called convocation;
(f) the persons holding offices constituted by the First Schedule to this Act and not mentioned in the foregoing provisions of this section;
(g) all graduates and undergraduates; and
(h) all other persons who are members of the University in accordance with provision made by statute In that behalf.
(2) The First Schedule to this Act shall have effect with respect to the principal officers of the University there mentioned; and the Second Schedule to this Act shall have effect with respect to the bodies referred to in the foregoing sub section.”
The functions of the Council are set out in section 4 of the Act. From the provisions of section 4 it is dear that the Council is the governing body of the University. Section 5 reserves for the Senate of the University the functions of organizing and controlling the teaching at the University, as well as admission and discipline of students and promotion of research. Broadly speaking, from the nature of the functions of the two bodies the Council and the Senate it will be right to say that the Council is the governing arm of the University while the Senate controls the teaching side of the University. Of the many functions of the Council set out in section 4, subsections 1, 2 and 3 give an idea, in broad outline, of these functions as follows:
“4. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act relating to the visitor, the Council shall be the governing body of the University and shall have the general management of the affairs of the university and in particular the control of the property and expenditure of the university.
(2) Subject to subsection (6) of this section, the council shall have power to do anything which in its opinion is calculated to facilitate the carrying on of the activities of the university.
(3) The council may make statutes regulating the constitution and conduct of the university and regulating any authority or matter connected with the university; and a statute may alter or repeal any provision of this Act but shall not
(a) come into force until it has been confirmed by the Minister; or
(b) have effect in any part of Nigeria in so far as it is inconsistent with the law in force in that part of Nigeria.”
Being the governing body of the University which has the general management of the affairs of the University, and having the power to do anything which in its opinion is calculated to facilitate the carrying on of the activities of the University, it will, indeed, be right to say, generally, that the University performed its teaching and academic functions through the Senate and everything else, through the Council. The act of the Council therefore becomes the act of the University. The appointment of the appellant as Senior Technician in the Department of Anatomy of the University by the Council became an appointment made by the University under the University of Ibadan Act, 1962, No. 37 of 1962, under which the University was constituted and empowered.
By the definition of “person employed in the public service” as including
“any office to which a person is appointed by or under any Statute or Ordinance or Law”
the appellant, being a person appointed to the office of Senior Technician in the department of Anatomy, by the Council of the University of Ibadan, pursuant to the University of Ibadan, Act, 1962, No. 37 of 1962 a “Statute or Ordinance or Law’ is, dearly, a person employed in the public service as defined in the Criminal Code of the former Western State of Nigeria, 1959, under which he was charged.
Again, the body called the “Council” is holding an office the functions of which are set out in section 4 of the University of Ibadan Act, 1962. It was this body which appointed the appellant to the office of Senior Technician in the Department of Anatomy a civil office as mentioned in subhead 3 of the Criminal Code definition. And so, whichever way one looks at it, the appellant is clearly a person employed in the public service within sub heads 2 and 3 of the said Criminal Code definition.
It now remains for me to make a passing reference to Momoh v. Okewale and the Lagos City Council & Anr. (1977)6 S.C.81 a case of negligence involving a driver of the Lagos City Council and calling for a determination as to the liability of the driver and the vicarious liability of the Lagos Town Council, in the context of the provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap. 168, Laws of Nigeria within the meaning of “public officer,” as therein contained, in relation to the driver. The Criminal Code definition did not call for a determination in the said Okewale’s case a case which, I agree with the Court of Appeal, is irrelevant to these proceedings.
In the result, I find no merit in this appeal which should be dismissed, and is hereby dismissed. The decision of the Federal Court of Appeal is hereby affirmed and its order that the case be remitted to the High Court for a continuation of trial, before the same judge, O. Laude, J. on the basis that the prosecution had made out a prima facie case for the appellant to answer, be, and is hereby, confirmed.
SOWEMIMO, J.S.C.:
I agree with the judgment of my brother Aniagolu, J.S.C. I hold that the appeal be dismissed and that the Appellant continue his trial before LaJkle, J. of Oyo State.
IDIGBE, J.S.C.:
I agree that this appeal should be, and it is hereby, dismissed for the reasons stated in the judgment just read by my learned brother, Aniagolu, J.S.C. of which I had a preview.
ESO, J.S.C.:
I have had the privilege of a preview of the lead judgment which has just been read by my learned brother Aniagolu, J.S.C. I am in full agreement with his reasoning and conclusion and would not add anything to the judgment.
UWAIS, J.S.C.:
I have had a preview of the judgment read by my learned brother Aniagolu, J.S.C. I agree that the appeal lacks substance and I too will dismiss it. I also agree that the case be remitted to the High Court for the trial to continue before Lajide, J. since by our decision a prima facie case had been made against the appellant.
Appeal dismissed.
